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ABSTRACT
The Politics of Pedagogical Reform
(June, 1978)
Michael M. Morris, B.S., University of Southern Mississippi
Ed.D,, University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David Schuman
This dissertation analyzes a wide range of issues relevant to al-
tering conventional teaching-learning practices in American higher edu-
cation. It sets out to determine the historical source for many of the
'new' ideas and discusses the re-articulation of these concepts during
the 1960's and 1970' s. Various proposals for reform advocated during
this period are analyzed from a critical perspective. In particular,
the underlying assumptions about how change occurs are thoroughly
critiqued.
The central thesis of this work is that most of the major strate-
gies for reforming higher education are liberal in their origin and con-
sequently doomed to inevitable failure. These strategies tend to hold
that one can tamper with structural or process aspects of an institution
in ways that lead to transformation of the whole. This liberal perspect-
ive, besides being extremely naive, denies the importance of three cri-
tical resistance factors: (1) mainstream American ideology, (2) the
nature of the university as an organization, and (3) the biases inherent
in most institutional decision-making systems. Each of these factors is
discussed along lines which demonstrate how they subvert reform ideas.
The concluding portion of this study stresses that pedagogical and
Vi ns ti tut i ondl chdngs will continu6 to bo olusivG unlGss rGform idoas arG
tiGd to a largGr social changG agonda. Particular attention is given to
the key elements in the old change agenda—access, power, and values—
and how those ideas must remain constant concerns. Nevertheless, it is
suggested that a more 'transitionary strategy' will have to emerge which
links internal higher education reform with the nature of life in this
society before and after credentialing. The issue of "Work in America"
is then examined as a potential vehicle for transitionary strategists.
Data for this dissertation was gathered from participation observa-
tion at several non-traditional programs, over one-hundred twenty-five
hours of taped interviews, and a thorough review of significant litera-
ture in the fields of higher education, change and innovation, organiza-
tional behavior, and political science.
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A dissertation is not always a personal statement. Only in the
sense that the general topic is somewhat related to an idea one might
originally have in mind. What it is, however, is a negotiated topic--
negotiated with a committee and with yourself over time. As you begin
to do it, the dissertation changes form. The topic you struggle to de-
fine as a problem assumes a life of its own. Often it is a life that
you either did not intend or anticipate. And, in many cases, this life
brings new meaning to your own. Such is the case with this work.
This writer does not use the word "work" lightly. For this has
not always been a labor of love. VJhat it has been is one white middle
class male's ongoing struggle with himself and a branch of reality
known as American higher education. The struggle represents a testing
of not only analytic skills and insights but also a personal confronta-
tion with the limits of my own mind and imagination.
When you read the pages that follow this will not be apparent.
For
in the writing, editing and re-editing of this work much of
that turmoil
and self-doubting has been brushed over. In this sense,
it is the con-
text behind which the discussion occurs that is missing.
This context
exists as a backdrop which symbolizes a journey in my own
development as
a person and professional. And, in order to
more fully understand that
context and why this particular document vias
prepared, some of that
needs to be shared. For it is the story
behind the pages which g^ves
IX
Xmeaning to this work and my own progress.
This dissertation is concerned with change, politics and pedagogy.
It represents rny personal odyssey with those issues. The travels began
at Southern Methodist University in Dallas during the early 1970's.
The times were filled with Vietnam, protest, and personal action. A
major part of this action was directed at trying to improve the quality
of life on that campus. Endless discussions were participated in where
the mode was to analyze various ills of campus life and propose alter-
native solutions to those conditions.
My role in all this was as a low level administrator in the student
affairs division. My style then was to take the central criticisms of a
particular issue (say dormitory life or teacher evaluations) and set out
on a search for relevant models which might be applied to the local
situation. In surveying the possibilities, much time was spent review-
ing articles and books on academic reform and innovation at other cam-
puses. Inevitably, some idea would appear which seemed transferable to
SMU and this writer would run back to his support group with this latest
nugget in hopes that others would agree with the possibilities.
Always, there was a core group of fifteen or so who not only saw
the merits of this suggestion (or had one of their own) but
were willing
to move forward with it. This usually meant that some
administrative
officer or governance unit was targeted for engagement.
However, when
meetings were held with department heads, deans, vice
presidents and
even presidents nothing seemed to materialize. Over a
period of three
years, this informal group of advocates advanced
some ten or twelve
ideas. . .all to no avail.
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From this sense of paralysis my own deeper interests in the poli-
tics of change emerged. An obsession grew with this topic to the point
that most of my readings, my professional trips, and my personal inter-
actions with peers were related to it. Out of all this came a realiza-
tion that some departure would have to take place, a movement away from
Dallas and to an environment where innovation seemed not only to exist
but to flourish as well. This, of course, required another search; one
geared to finding a graduate program where change could be viewed first
hand and where one had the ability to design a degree program which cor-
responded to my interest in organizational and social change.
A major criterion for moving was that the institution be actively
experimenting with a number of innovative issues--access, admissions,
governance, curricula, and so on. And that the graduate program be
modeling behaviors which were consistent with these experiments. Few
places fit those requirements as well as the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst. At least, few seemed to.
The school of Education was at the height of its national publicity
at this point. Saturday Review had just completed a comparative study
between the Harvard program and UMass's, with the Amherst one obviously
being seen as more change-oriented. Dean Dwight Allen was being
por-
trayed as an educational guru dedicated to turning the system
upside
down.
Amidst all this, Allen made a trip to Dallas for an
address before
a major national conference on educational reform. Naturally,
several
of us were in attendance and became spellbound
by his optimism. Remem-
ber that we were in an environment where change
was not only disvalued
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but where there was no hope given that it could occur. Here was a
rather jolly figure, popping can upon can of Tab, and spouting one out-
rageous idea after another, all in dead seriousness. A most appealing
personality.
. .at least to those of us who were without a comparable
role model locally.
That speech plus a personal audience with Allen served to entice
me to UMass. Upon admission in March of 1973, plans were made to move
in late summer. Also, it was my good fortune to find work that was
perfectly suited to my interests. Beginning in late August and con-
tinuing for the next three years, my place of employment was the Office
of Special Programs, that subunit of the University directly responsible
for an assortment of twenty innovative projects. My work as a special
assistant to the Associate Provost provided me with a first hand, ex-
tensive exposure to the intricacies of program planning, development and
implementation. This would be the experiential component of my learn-
ing.
What about the academic program? Very early on my choice for a
dissertation focus was made. That focus served to organize my course
choices, niy selection of independent study options, and my contacts with
faculty members and fellow students. Basically, all my actions in this
regard sought answers to these questions: what are the alternatives to
the prevailing teaching mode, what sort of issues do these ideas ad-
dress, what values underlie these ideas, and where did these ideas come
from? In terms of change, my questions were: what constitutes change,
innovation or reform, how does one recognize it, what are the restrain-
ing factors, and, more importantly, how does it come about?
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Answers to these questions were sought in several ways. First,
some attention was given to the historical development of higher educa-
tion and, in particular, the changes which have occurred over time.
This was done through both reading and conventional course offerings.
Second, considerable time was spent on improving my understanding of
organizational behavior and how that relates to the politics of change
and the innovation process. Third, independent study programs were
undertaken which involved a thorough review of potential reform options
and their programmatic implementation.
Perhaps, the most insightful experiences were related to my work
situation with the Special Programs division. Under the encouragement
of rny two supervisors (read mentors), Robert Woodbury and John Hunt, a
major research inquiry was developed which sought to determine the his-
torical and political development of special programs at UMass and the
general reactions of faculty, administrators and students to these ef-
forts. Over eighteen months, some forty-seven persons were interviewed
in depth to a total of one -hundred-twenty-five (125) taped hours. This
research served not only as a basis for policy discussions within spe-
cial programs but as foundation for this dissertation. Much of what is
discussed here emerged from those interactions.
Beyond that, the eighteen months as a staff member of the Center
for Individualized Education at Empire State College have further con-
tributed to this dissertation. Though the bulk of the content was writ-
ten before employment at the Center, exposure to a national network of
innovative institutions, and a wide range of professionals who work in
such settings, has greatly influenced my tempering of several
sections
of this document. Suffice it to say that the lessons which have been
learned leads me to believe that things are neither as bad as I imagined
nor as hopeless as my discourse sometimes assumes. Much of the optimism
represented in my last chapter, for both educational and social change,
is derived from my encounters with countless colleagues who continue to
believe change is, indeed, possible.
What then is the gist of this dissertation? To begin with, it is
an analysis of the pedagogic left and their suggestions for change in
American higher education. Obviously, rny interpretation is greatly
biased by the fact that I am both an observer of this perspective, as
well as a ' true-bel iever. ' Consequently, this work assumes both an ad-
<
vocacy and a critical perspective. On the one hand are my basic be-
liefs; on the other rests my general skepticism about what is proposed
in both content and process terms. Meaning that what follows here is
filled with my own contradictions as a member of the pedagogic left and
as a critic of its limitations. This constitutes a major portion of the
personal growth issue mentioned earlier; struggling with this has great-
ly added to my own understanding of the issues and myself.
One can assume then that this dissertation takes the assertions of
the pedagogic left at face value. My intention has been to look at what
was suggested seriously. Their ideas and proposals for reform
and
change are interpreted as real proposals; proposals designed to
change
the educational system somehow and perhaps lead to a larger
cu.tura:
'.v-ar.s^-ormation over time. Tne task of this dissertation is
to determine
if “hrt occurred and, if it did not, to analyze why
change was sc dif-
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In terms of this, seven chapters review the issues in a fairly se-
quential manner. Chapter I discusses the historical roots of the peda-
gogic left. Particular attention is given to the elements of reform
which came from the historical period of American society known as Pro-
gressivism. Chapter II delineates the major change agenda of the peda-
gogic leftists in rather straightforward terms. Several major concerns
are discussed in some detail.
Chapter III is the pivotal chapter in this study. In that section,
this writer argues that the proposals for change were designed to fail.
My position is, basically, that the assumptions about how change occurs
are limited and serve to doom change advocates to inevitable frustra-
tion. In essence, one cannot change universities by worshipping two
opposing idols: reform and the status quo. By accepting proposals
which seek to fix up higher education, reform efforts are advanced which
do little to the total system, either education as a whole or the cul-
ture.
In Chapter IV, my intention is to begin discussing three central
factors to understanding why change is so difficult in higher education.
These include mainstream American ideology, the nature of the university
as an organization, and the bias of decision-making. Chapter IV sum-
marizes the ideological restraints on change. Chapter V elaborates on
the three metaphors which dominate organizational reality and how each
mixes with the other to impact on reform proposals. Chapter VI reviews
conventional assumptions about university decision-making and then poses
that all decision-making takes place within a context which biases the
potential outcomes in favor of the status quo.
xvl
The final chapter, Chapter VII, is an attempt to capture the es-
sence of the preceding chapters and place it in some larger cultural
context. Far too often we have imagined change to be something that is
done to institutions without tying the specific structural or process
agenda to a larger social vision. As long as the terms reform and inno-
vation are viewed in simple ways, either as new methods, processes or
goals for educational organizations, then the elusiveness of change will
continue. We can no longer be content with tampering with organizations
while denying the context in which they exist.
• The final chapter argues that real change must confront the reali-
ties of economic and political America. To continue playing with inter-
nal structures and processes solely is to deny the contradictions of the
larger system, in which education occupies the role of an integral sub-
system. The question is not an either/or one. Change proposals must
address both institutional concerns and a larger social vision. That
vision must seek to construct a new ideology, new forms of social or-
ganization, new participatory decision-making arrangements, and a new
economic structure built on democratic principles.
Obviously, this vision cannot be built overnight. It will require
generations of committed citizens working in a variety of settings (edu-
cation and otherwise) to create a new culture. Consequently, one must
view these complex changes as being developed over time in transitionary
ways
.
Some of the changes required by this adventure are personal in
nature. We each will need to change how we think about ourselves
as in-
dividuals, each other, human nature, organizational structures,
decision
making, and what constitutes a just economic and political system. Such
rethinking demands that we look at reality in radically different v/ays.
As long as we accept what exists now as being inevitable then we are
trapped with this reality. In the words of William Irwin Thompson "Con-
sciousness is like an FM radio band: as long as one is locked into one
station, all he receives is the information of one reality."^ And it
is with our own sense of consciousness that we must begin.
As a concluding note, there are several significant others who have
greatly contributed to my intellectual and personal development through-
out this period of my life. A special expression of gratitude goes out
to: Jamie Roth, who convinced me that you can only change higher educa-
tion when the society itself is transformed; Drea and Pat Zigarmi, whose
friendship and support sustained many a cold New England night and
fueled my thoughts in immeasurable ways; Jack Lindquist and Dan Flanagan,
who demonstrated that politics and change are inseparable and continue
to share their lives and ideas with me; John Hueffner and Steve Lander,
who sent me on my way from Dallas with enough memories and lessons to
last a lifetime; Mike Cusack, Jack Leader, Marty Miller, and Merril
Pellows, who taught me on countless occasions that students can indeed
be teachers; and John Hunt and Tom Clark who displayed uncommon confid-
ence in my ideas and abilities.
Others helped push me along through their personal support and en-
couragement. This is especially true of my colleagues at CIE, CAEL, and
UECU--in particular, Harriet Cabell, Sill Craft, Ben Davis, Lance Dublin,
Hjilliam Irwin Thompson, Passages about Earth (New York: Harper
and Row, 1973) , p. 51
.
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Susan Fine, Ed Harris, Barbara Knudson, Earl Lov/ell, Cheryl Mateychick,
David Morris, Tim Pitkin, Diana Bamford-Rees
,
and Susan Rydell. And,
of course, no thanks would be sufficient for Bob Press who forced me to
finally face the final chapter (and thus complete the cycle). In addi-
tion, niy personal appreciation goes out to my dissertation committee
members--David Schuman, Kenneth Dolbeare, and Robert Woodbury--who read
draft upon draft and contributed their ideas and suggestions in a most
gentle manner. And finally, there is Sherrye, my wife and friend, whose
patience and love sheltered me in moments of doubt and self criticism.
Without her this would have all been impossible and thus to her and our
daughter Meghan this labor is dedicated.
CHAPTER I
SEEDS FOR THE SIXTIES: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY
Progress! vism was a gigantic effort to deal with the discovery
that the United States v/as a land of small farms and country
stories no longer; an effort to deal with the discovery of
the slum, the political machine, the immigrant, the monopoly,
and the decline of ethical standards which was registered in
poisoned toys, dishonest advertising, tainted meat, and toxic
drugs.
Frederick Rudolph
We have all heard, at some point or another, the rather trite
phrase which suggests that 'history has a way of repeating itself.' No
doubt we have also heard that 'today's generation functions without any
real sense of history.' Two things could never be more true. . .espe-
cially if we are discussing the dynamics and content of change in
American higher education. With relatively few exceptions, things do
seem to be repeating themselves and those who advocate various new pana-
ceas almost always do so devoid of a historical perspective.
For example, given all the hoopla of the past decade, one would
think we just witnessed an era of unparalleled debate on the educational
process. Or, on the other hand, one might imagine that we have dis-
covered a whole set of unique responses to the problems of the day--
governance, admission, instruction, or whatever. Not true in either
case.
You see, for more than two centuries now, laymen and educators
alike have regularly debated several fundamental pedagogical issues.
1
2what, how and whom to teach. And, as strange as this may seem, we have
yet to reach consensus on these concerns as a culture or as individuals
working in academic settings.
To examine this phenomenon in some limited way, we have chosen to
begin our discussion on the politics of academic reform in the past.
Because it is from these roots, to use the current vernacular, that the
present conditions evolved. In particular, we plan to analyze the edu-
cational discussions which began some fifty to sixty years ago and be-
came known as Progressivism. This perspective serves as the major
breaking point with traditional interpretations of the university,
knowledge and learning.
How and in what ways these progressive ideas were responded to also
provides a noteworthy example of the processes of change. For Progres-
sivism furnishes not only many of the rationales for current pedagogical
reform thrusts but it also demonstrates how new ideas are resisted and
compromised over time.
Early Teaching-Learning Practi ces
In our colonial and pre-Civil War period, colleges were extremely
rigid in their courses of instruction.^ Also, they were often dominated
by secular or religious groups. The student population was largely
^Much of this subsection is drawn from the following sources: (1)
Richard Hofstader, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961); (2] Walter P'. Metzger, Academic Free-
dom in the Age of the University (New York: Columbia University Press,
196177W F. Freeman Butts, The College Charts Its Course (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1939); and (4) Frederick Rudolph, Th^ Ameri can Col lege an^
University (New York: Knopf, 1962).
3drawn from aristocratic backgrounds. Students were required to enroll
in a standard curriculum based on the seven liberal arts: grammar,
rhetoric, logic, astronorny, geometry, arithmetic and music. Added to
this foundation over several decades were other intellectual offerings,
but this core, along with the institution's particular brand of reli-
gious doctrines and moral philosophies, served to illustrate what a
well-educated person should know. ^
However, the period prior to the Civil Uar, especially between
1800-1860, witnessed a tremendous growth and expansion of collegiate in-
stitutions as denominations competed with and against one another for
moral and intellectual territories. As an example, before the Civil War
some 516 colleges were established in sixteen states of the republic.
p
Afterwards, only 104 survived or barely nineteen percent. Usually
there was very little to distinguish one institution from another in
terms of curriculum. Whether privately or state funded, the curriculum
content was mostly modeled on the classical -mathematical studies of the
Renaissance period. A few colleges added medical and legal schools,
while others introduced additional requirements in geography, history,
chemistry, and botany. In most cases, faculty members were expected to
instruct their pupils in each subject area, or at the very least several
areas
.
Soon critics of American higher education began to point to the
rigidity and dullness inherent in this system of required courses. By
^Hofstader, Academic Freedom in the Age of the College, p. 211.
41825, several persons (including Thomas Jefferson) had proposed alter-
native approaches to collegiate education. But George Ticknor. a Harvard
College faculty member, is generally recognized as the foremost spokes-
man for a movement which called for more student freedom and choice
among a wider variety of courses.
Greatly influenced by his graduate experiences and training at the
German universities, Ticknor proposed that Harvard consider dividing its
instructional staff along lines of study, such as Greek, Latin, mathe-
matics, and so on. Ticknor's approach, which came to be known as the
"elective system," called for greater choice on the part of the student
from subjects taught by faculty who specialized in particular intel-
lectual areas. Ticknor also stressed that the college should improve
instruction through organizing subjects into specific disciplines, and
thus encouraged faculty to instruct in only one area of knowledge.
It is interesting to note that Ticknor's proposals were debated
nationally for nearly a hundred years. Moreover, Ticknor's ideas were
never widely accepted at Harvard until well after the Civil War. Never-
theless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the narrowly prescribed
curriculum of a few subjects yielded in most institutions to an ever-
expanding curriculum which permitted students some choices. What became
known as the German ideal won converts among faculty who began to see
the merits of specializing in a single subject area.
As one might assume, this new model was not accepted without an
immense amount of foot-dragging, debates, and outcries against the ob-
vious subversion of the classical learning model. The classical studies
interpreted Ticknor's elective system as a direct challenge to the per-
5petuati-on of mankind's shared culture. Yet. the elective system gained
wider acceptance due to its perceived efficiency and proceeded to spread
to an increasing number of institutions. New curriculum and depart-
mental structures were recognized. And, the American colleges began to
evolve from a solely aristocratic and elitist model into a more merito-
3
cratic one. In time, research acquired more importance, and academic
status distinctions, in the form of professorial rank, were also intro-
duced. Journals and other specialized publications were initiated to
serve as forums for faculty discussions and debates within a wide range
of disciplines and subfields.
By 1900, the college curriculum was generally beginning to be or-
ganized along elective lines. Students now had two distinct options
which were commonly referred to as distribution requirements or field of
concentration. In the first approach, students were to enroll in cer-
tain required courses in their first two years, but permitted to choose
among the remaining discipline offerings in the final two years. Both
Indiana and Stanford Universities had begun to experiment with allowing
students an area in which to concentrate their studies. As this gained
increasing favor on campuses throughout the country, it became known as
the major concept.
The Progressive Tradition
The twentieth century also produced a new dawn of social awakening
^Christopher Jenks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (New
York: Anchor Books, 1969).
6which was labeled as the Progressive era. During this period, reform-
ers in all walks of life questioned the existing social, economic, poli-
tical and educational order. Educational institutions were not excluded
from this scrutiny or from the activities of progressive zealots propos-
ing solutions to the ailments of schools and colleges. As Progress! vism
challenged America and its citizens to deal with the problems and pro-
mises of this nation, it also shook the foundations of the standard con
tent and instructional methods of education.
In his widely acclaimed study of educational change during this
period, Lawrence Cremin categorized what Progress! vism meant to educa-
tion in these terms:
1) broadening the program and function of the school to include
direct concern for health, vocation, and the quality of family
and community life;
2) applying in the classroom the pedagogical principles derived
from new scientific research in psychology and the social sci-
ences ;
3) tailoring instruction more and more to the different kinds of
classes of children who were being brought within the purview
of the school
;
4) a radical faith that culture could be democratized without be-
ing vulgarized, the faith that everyone could share not only in
the benefits of the new sciences but in the pursuits of the
arts as well
^Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Ran-
7Cremin goes on to acknowledge that the educational wing of the Pro-
gressive movement exhibited itself through remarkable diversity of
pedagogical protest and innovation."® Others have noted that the ab-
sence of a well
-conceived or shared definition of the meaning of Pro-
gressive education facilitated the use of the term with a pluralistic
range of reform ideas.® So, as is often the case with the modern "inno-
vations" of our own time, the word came to mean different things to
different persons.
Within higher education, new and more intentional institutions did
begin to surface as a result of this ferment. Many institutions attri-
buted their development to the writings and/or direct influence of such
Progressives as William Kilpatrick,^ John Dewey, Harold Rugg, George
Counts and Boyd Bode. In general, these institutions were seen as self-
conscious colleges. They each shared a broad purpose to enhance the
promotion of knowledge but from a more explicit set of principles or
guidelines than most colleges operated with. Furthermore, these "ex-
perimental" institutions often attempted to integrate learning with some
dom House, 1961), pp. vii and ix.
^Ibid, p. 22.
^Patricia Graham, Progressive Education : From Arcady to Academe
(New York: Teachers College Press, 1967), p. 12.
^In a recent interview with Tim and Helen Pitkin, the persons most
responsible for holding Goddard College together for nearly forty years
(Tim as president and Helen in one capacity or another) described how
Kilpatrick mapped out the Goddard plan on a napkin at the Columbia Uni-
versity Faculty Club in 1936. Such places as Bennington, Reed, Black
Mountain, Goddard, and to some extent Antioch, all took on elements of
the Progressive movement.
8fairly specific philosophy of life.
Of course, we must remember that there was rarely unanimity within
these institutions concerning what the college should or should not be
doing with regards to learning and life. Frequently, internal groups
clashed over educational aims and directions to such an extent that it
eventually led to the total demise of an institution. Martin Duberman
described just such a case in the rise and fall of Black Mountain Col-
lege.®
Still, the intentional institutions were the most visible excep-
tions to the more common trends of the period. Established colleges and
universities tended to adopt and adapt the Progressive proposals into
the mainstream of their educational offerings without redefining the
mission or intent of the whole institution. In this manner, traditional
colleges were most often likely to just graft on some of the new ideas
without altering their total academic program.
The question remains: what constitutes a Progressive college or a
Progressive program?
At a conference on Progressive colleges held in the early 1930's,
E. H. Wilkins, then President of Oberlin College, stated, that it was:
(1) a matter of attitude rather than particular devices; (2) a readiness
to adapt the college to the "true and changing needs" of college stud-
ents; (3) flexibility in the use of all instruments of college activity
in the learning process; (4) the study of each student as an individual;
®Martin Duberman, Black Mountain : An Exploration iji Community (New
York: Dutton, 1972).
9(5) a heightened degree of faculty-student interaction and cooperation;
(6) recognition and development of those educational values inherent in
what are commonly called extracurricular activities; and (7) the pro-
gressive attitude, if it to be effective, cannot be delegated and dis-
missed to special offices, but must permeate the actions of the entire
faculty.^
You will note that Wilkins fails to fully discuss the philosophical
conflicts surrounding very opposite interpretations of the "true" pur-
pose of higher education which were present at that time. It is with
these conflicting views that one can best ascertain the tensions under-
lying very different approaches to the nature of knowledge and the
learning process. Differences which continue to surface again and again
in American higher education.
Debates on the Nature of Knowl edge and Learni ng
When two opposing sides are present in such a discussion it
is not long before the controversy becomes involved with fund-
amental points of view concerning what a liberal education
should be, what studies are of most value for a college educa-
tion, what the relation between college and society should be,
what place authority and freedom should have, what the nature
of knowledge and truth is, and, ultimately, what constitutes
the essential stuff of human nature and reality.'^
Though it may be somewhat difficult to draw absolute boundaries be-
q
E. H. Wilkins, "What Constitutes a Progressive College?" Bulletin
of the Association of American Collages, Volume 19 (March 1933), pp.
108-109.
^^Sutts
,
The Col l ege Charts Its Course .
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tween all the philosophical camps which argued these questions, it is
still useful to explore the two predominant forces active during this
period.
On one extreme of the debate were persons referred to as Platonics,
Cultural Traditionalists, Dualists, and/or Conservatives. For our pur-
poses we will simply use the term traditionalists.
In higher education, this group was largely identified with such
figures as Robert Hutchings, Mortimer Adler, Stringfellow Barr, and
Scott Buchanan. These people were interested in counteracting and
repudiating the central concepts of the "scientific method" as it was
then being pursued and argued by persons in the natural and social sci-
ences. The Traditionalists believed in classical idealism as postulated
by the teachings and writings of Plato and Aristotle: Each person was
viewed as a moral and rational being endowed with an identical nature
as all other persons. Thus each possessed the inherent qualities of
reason, morality, a sense of art and beauty, as well as religion and
therefore the best way to stimulate and strengthen these qualities is by
a thorough study of the ancient masters of the great books of the world.
The traditionalists discussed learning issues in terms of develop-
ing a person's mind rather than her/his total organism. Each individual
possessed a faculty of human nature entitled reason or intellect. And,
the central mission of higher education and learning is to nurture and
^Vor a representative sampling
following: (1) Robert M. Hutch
Haven: Yale University Pres ,
Counter-Revol uti on ists i n_ Ame ri can
State University Press, 1970).
of these spokespersons, see the
h'i ns
,
"
t[^_ Hi gher Le a i ng i_n 7^ir,ev'i ca (H'c-w
s, 1936); andT2T M'ichael Jiarris , Five
leri Higher Education (Corvaihs: Ov'egon
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expand a person's intellectual powers of discrimination and judgment.
From the traditionalist's perspective, this could best be done through
exposing the student to the great literature and classical studies of
the past. In this manner, each person would share and experience the
cultural traditions of mankind, and the torch of collective knowledge
and truth would be passed on from generation to generation.
For the most part, the traditionalists believed the university was
becoming diluted with 'new sciences' and their plans for undergraduate
education resembled a return to the past. They advocated an improvement
in the quality of university teaching in order to cultivate the intel-
lectual lives of the students. For the traditionalists, the college was
a retreat where the problems of the real world were locked out. In this
setting, a select group of students and teachers pursue "truth" in the
classical tradition.
A Conflicting Opinion
The persons who opposed this cultural interpretation of humanity
and learning were generally called Experimentalists, Pragmatists, and/or
1
2
Progressives. The last term will suit our purposes. Their ideas were
closely linked to the writings of John Dewey and to research in the
^^There are much too many Progressive writers published to list in
any meaningful way. However, for those who want to pursue this per-
spective further, we suggest the following: (1) John Dewey, Democracy
and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916) and Exper i ence and Education
l[Tiev/ York: Macmillan, 1938); (2) Boyd H. Bode, Progress! ve Education at_
the Crossroads (New York: Newson, 1938); (3) George S. Counts, Dare the
^ooi Bu iTdTa New Social Order? (New York: Arno Press, 1932; and (4)
William H. ililpatrick. Education for a Changing Civilization (New York:
Arno Press, 1926).
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natural and social sciences, especially the early work of such learning
psychologists as G. Stanley Hall and E. L. Thorndike. The Progressives
believed that an individual develops her/his own unique and distinctive
personality as a result of her/his interaction and participation with
other persons and society as a whole. Human nature was interpreted by
the progressives as not something fixed or permanent for all times but
as a "mode of reaction which is affected by and which affects the sur-
rounding culture." Progressives saw differences in culture as produc-
ing varying effects on the manner in which an individual or group re-
acts. Consequently, one could not emphatically say that human nature
was the same for everyone everywhere.
John Dewey, the principal author identified with this position,
presented a new conception of knowledge and truth which became known as
Instrumentalism . This approach views knowledge not in terms of the
ideas handed down from previous civilizations through great books, but
as the process of action that an individual carries out in her/his daily
existence. Ideas or theories from the past are perceived as useful only
as relative concepts or instruments of action. In this manner, ideas
are simply tools or intellectual instruments utilized by the mind to
deal with practical situations, and knowledge is seen as constantly
changing as a person experiences different events and situations.
The major contributions of the Progressive education movement rests
with the host of pedagogical ideas initiated during this period. As we
discussed earlier, much of what was labeled as progressive might better
^
^Butts
,
Th^ College Charts Its Course , p . 276
.
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have been referred to as eclectic. For awhile almost any change, other
than the prescribed classical curriculum, was identified as a progres-
sive development. Nevertheless Dewey reportedly described the elements
of Progressive education as "an emphasis on individuality and increased
freedom, an inclination to build upon the nature and experience of the
student, an atmosphere of informality, a preference for activity as dis-
tinct from passivity, and an unusual attention to human factors.
This statement captures the essence of progressive reform.
During this period, programs were discussed and designed which per-
mitted the student, some for the first time, to pursue her/his own in-
terests. Students were viewed as possessing their own individual apti-
tudes and capacities. And, it was acknowledged that the prescribed cur-
riculum format could not or did not fully take this into consideration.
Thus a major part of the Progressive agenda was the notion of individ-
ualization.^^ Several institutions sought to restructure the student-
faculty relationship in ways which explicitly recognized student differ-
ences, in terms of both interests and abilities. Again, institutions
like Bard, Goddard, and Sarah Lawrence struggled to find ways to per-
sonalize the student's learning experience. Out of this activity grew
the expansion and reaffirmation of the value of independent study op-
tions. First, it was permitted with juniors and seniors and later by
first and second year students. Others attempted to utilize a contract
^^Graham, Progressive Education
, p. 50.
^^Louis T. Benezet, General Education in the Progressive College
(New York: Arno Press, 1971 )
.
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approach as a way of individually negotiating learning objectives.
Whatever the strategy, the student's uniqueness was validated in these
settings.
Because the student was viewed as an individual with her/his own
unique experiences with and in this world, experience and learning were
correlated or linked to one another. Some colleges like Goddard and
Bennington, in recognition that learning can take place anywhere,
pressed students to make full use of their extra-curricular activities
through involvement with plays, chorus, student government, clubs, and
so forth. Others like Antioch and the University of Cincinnati encour-
aged the student to experience or test out vocational interests through
work study options. Many other institutions, who were unable to provide
this flexibility throughout the regular academic year, altered their
calendar to permit January or Winter field periods for vocational pur-
suits and other learning projects.
Finally, the progressives' plans for altering the collegiate ex-
perience were founded on a belief that the institution and its members
must engage the world. Students and faculty members have a responsibil-
ity to focus on the problems of the world as it exists, because it is
this world which most directly influences their lives. Meaningful learn-
ing occurs when an individual and/or group gains experience and exposure
to problem-solving that is as real as possible, and one cannot achieve
this by relying solely on the great thoughts of the past.
In response to this, programs were created that dealt with problems
and events in contemporary life. Thus, curricula were initiated which
sought to break down the narrowness of the departments. Special courses
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and seminars sought to integrate the perspectives of several disciplines
to a social problem or thematic issue. In some cases, students were en-
couraged to pursue a particular project which required the application
of several disciplines to a given topic. In addition, sessions were
constructed on such topics as marriage and family life, personal health,
public institutions, and a wide range of civic affairs.
In general, the Progressive era facilitated a reawakening within
higher education. (Table 1 summarizes the major distinctions between
the Traditionalist and Progressive Perspectives.) Institutions explored
different ways and means to construct a meaningful undergraduate experi-
ence. Students within some colleges were able to acquire an increasing
amount of autonorny over their educational and social lives. The con-
cepts associated with recognizing the student as a unique individual
were established. The validity of experience and action as learning
tools were postulated and selectively tried. And, perhaps, more than
any other contribution, the era planted the seeds of a different ap-
proach to teaching and learning.
The Devoluti on of §_ Movement
Others have reported that the student interest approach to higher
^^One can find many links, in both a conceptual and programmatic
sense, between the Progressive movement and what would become known as
the reform era of the 1960's. Perhaps the most interesting link is that
several of the key writers for change in this later period came out of
Progressive college experiences. For example, Harold Taylor served as
president of Sarah Lawrence; Paul Goodman was, for a short tiipe, a
faculty member at Black Mountain; and Judson Jerome drew heavily on his
experiences as a faculty member at Antioch.
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Table 1
The Traditionalist and Progressive Perspectives
Traditionalist Perspective
Culture : stresses the cultural
heritage of mankind through the
study of great books and the lib-
eral arts
Ivory Tower : views the college as
a monastic or academic retreat
which is separated from the world
and neutral towards its social,
political, and economic problems
Intel lectualism : holds that each
person should have her/his intel-
lectual faculties cultivated
through an indepth exposure to
the great books of mankind, books
which are invariably Western or
European in origin
Fixed Truths : believes that
truth in its ultimate form is ab-
solute and fixed, and, therefore,
education must also be fixed and
authoritarian in order for stud-
ents to acquire the correct con-
ception of knowledge
Discipline : thinks college
should enforce strict disciplin-
ary control over the student's
life when she/he becomes associ-
ated with the institution
Aristocratic Institutions : feels
Fhat college should be for the
few
,
the intellectual and finan-
cial elite, and advocates select-
ive admission standards to permit
only the most "worthy" students
to enter
Progressive Viewpoint
Vocati on : advocates the examination
of more practical or vocational is-
sues, as well as a redefinition of
the liberal arts so that they might
be joined with vocational issues
^^latch Tower : argues that the stud-
ent must engage the world and grapple
with its problems
Intelligence : supports student in-
tellectual growth and development
through designing education programs
which assist the student in solving
problems they face in their personal
and social life
Changing Truths : believes in experi-
•mental naturalism which looks upon
truth and knowledge as flexible and
changing conceptions; thus they main-
tain that education must also be
flexible and changing
Freedom : argues that the students
should have more freedom and be per-
mitted to pursue their own social and
intellectual interests
Democrati c Institutions : insists
that in a democratic society colleges
should be open to more and more stud-
ents regardless of social, economic,
racial, or previous academic back-
ground, so that any student might
benefit and profit from tne college
experience
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tacks the”eiective system and pre-
scribed curriculum as being too fixed
and rigid, and argues in behalf of
limited or no prescribed courses with
the bulk of academic experiences ori-
ginating from the student's own in-
terests
.
*7
education never gained wide acceptance^® Even the more experimenting
colleges of the Progressive period hedged on a solely individualized
program. Places like Goddard, Antioch, Reed, and a few others continued
to march to their own drum, exploring new frontiers along the way. But,
for the most part, the pedagogical reforms of the era were dismissed as
unreasonable or too expensive and time consuming, frequently without
ever having been tried.
Some might say that there were no clear winners and losers in this
struggle for ideological and programmatic dominance of our learning in-
stitutions. They would, of course, be wrong. In a Hegelian sense, the
Progressives became the Traditionalists. The resiliency of the older
and established educational values absorbed the new ideas. Compromise
rather than reform occurred. In T. S. Eliot's terms, the movement for
a new vision of education died not with a bang but with a whimper.
The crusaders for a new order through the ut'*! ization of applied
and experiential learning were co-opted into the more staid and tradi-
tional system. The "new" sciences, both natural and social, became part
^
^Adapted and reinterpreted from Butts' The College Charts Its
Course.
1ft
Benezet, General Education in the Progressive College , p. 170.
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of the academic establishment, more like brethren than advocates. An
unsigned alliance and truce was acknowledged: You exist, we exist. Let
us co-exist.
The elective system reigned supreme by the late 1950's. Now, stud-
ents were expected, required if you will, to enroll in courses from sci-
ences as v/ell as the liberal arts. Freedom and individual interests
were sacrificed before departmental growth, institutional efficiency,
and more importantly, social control. The student, viewed as an indi-
vidual with unlimited potential, would be replaced by an identification
number.
CHAPTER II
OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES
The breeding ground of institutional change is the sense ofinstitutional failure.
Walter Metzger
The chroniclers of America have referred to much of the period
ranging through the 1960's and early 1970's as the "era of student un-
rest. During that time, youthful dissidents protested against a number
of social and political injustices they perceived to exist in this na-
tion. The thrusts of these discords were primarily directed towards an
expansion of civil rights, an elimination of American military commit-
ments in Southeast Asia, and the institution which housed most of them--
namely, the university.
In this section, we are concerned with the central issues surround-
ing the student attacks on higher education during much of this period.
Moreover, the intention here is to present a review of the major aca-
demic reform concerns expressed in those criticisms.
The Uni vers i ty Dethroned
Collegiate education in the early Sixties was believed to be every
person's potential ticket up the social mobility ladder. As post-Sput-
nik America raced to catch the Russians intellectually, higher education
boomed as an industry with federal, state and foundation support reach-
ing all time highs. Almost overnight new institutions sprang up, and on
19
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established campuses new programs, buildings and facilities were quickly
developed. At some institutions enrollments doubled, then tripled, and
even quadrupled as the 18-22 year old college age population swelled.
/
Yet, institutional growth was also accompanied by a series of po-
tentially disruptive organizational conditions: overcrowded campuses;
the building of largely impersonal and too often sterile facilities; an
ever-expanding administrative bureaucracy with its subsequent red tape;
computerized enrollment packages that further contributed to a general
sense of alienation; academic requirements which often forced students
to enroll in a host of large lecture oriented or televised introductory
courses where they were often no more than a number among other numbers;
and a more intense awareness of the competition and fear of failure that
prevailed among the young who battled for grades, class rankings, gradu-
ate school admissions, and other symbols of academic success.
As John Keats reported in his excellent but too little read The
Sheepskin Psychosis
, students in the 1960's often entered college be-
cause that was where they were supposed to be. For college had been
sold to America's young and their parents like some sort of ultimate
elixi r.
Still, many young persons chose to enroll in an institution on the
basis of such superficial things as status considerations, the college's
physical location, or its reputation for "good times," rather than any
real commitment to what one might learn there. Also, too many under-
graduates expected the college of their choice to be very different from
high school, but they soon discovered that it was very often more of the
same, only amplified.
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After the Berkeley events, however, students throughout the nation
began to vent their frustrations against the contradictions and inade-
quacies inherent in the educational system. Though they would express
their concern over specific issues which might vary from one institution
to another, the general dissatisfactions centered on increasing student
freedom. The major issues included such things as: 1) the elimination
of restrictive social rules and regulations; 2) an increased role in
setting those rules and regulations, as well as university governance as
a whole; 3) the improvement of living conditions within the university,
ranging from dormitory conditions and restrictions to the quality of
food service; 4) the nature of the entire teaching-learning process pre-
dominant in most universities during this time, embracing everything
from the curriculum to grading practices.
It is important to stress the interconnectedness and reciprocity of
the issues. Without the initiatives generated by the so-called "stud-
ent power" efforts within the university, few of the dissatisfactions
expressed over the learning process are likely to have received even an
airing. It was the institutional climate created by the protests, and
in many cases the attention it received from the media, which served to
produce not only a sense of urgency, but also to legitimatize the con-
cerns as well. The issues themselves mixed in such a fashion that the
real targets for change were often extremely difficult to decipher. So
many issues were being presented that the situation appeared to be a pot-
pourri of crises. Thus, no single cause was ever likely to stand alone,
at least for very long. Rather, issues dovetailed into and extended
from one another. One protest escalated to another in what often seemed
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like an endless process. As an illustration of how an issue might
bridge both the institution as a whole as well as standard teaching-
learning practices, let us look for a moment at a major goal of the
student protest movement.
Power and Parti cipati on
Central to almost all of the student demands was the assumption
that the university should exist as a democratic community. This meant
that the decision-making processes within an institution ought to in-
volve those persons most likely to be affected by the outcome of a spe-
cific decision. In particular, students believed to be currently disen-
franchised from the governance of a university or college should be
given more rights and responsibilities.
The arguments for why an institution ought to do this were based on
both educational and democratic theory. The noted philosopher Charles
Frankel summarized those in the following manner:
If people have some power over the way in which they live and
work, they have more interest in their experience, and they
learn more from it. If they have some power, they tend to be-
come more responsible. They are more likely to make the con-
nections between ideas and action, rhetoric and reality, that
are at once the tests and pleasures of the moral life.*
The real question is, of course, hovi far does one go to democratize
an institution? In most situations, students were initially interested
in gaining representation on certain administrative-faculty councils or
^Charles Frankel, Education and the Barricades (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1968), p.28.
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control over setting the rules and regulations which govern their social
lives. However, it was soon apparent that by stretching the participa-
tion arguments a bit further students might also influence other areas.
In the clearest sense of the word, participation became a direct chal-
lenge to the authority of the faculty and administration over issues
traditionally considered under their purview. Student participation
came to mean representation at all levels of the decision-making process,
ranging from the board of trustees to departmental personnel committees
charged with faculty tenure decisions.
Relevance and the Conflict of Values
In tracing other issues leveled against the university, one can see
the same diffusion patterns in operation. A charge is articulated, us-
ually against the institution as a whole, and then filtered down to en-
gulf the departments and individual faculty members. For example, the
question of "relevance" demonstrates this same phenomenon. Critics
pointed to the foolishness of an educational system which teaches iambic
pentameter but refuses to grapple with how to bring peace to society.
They asked: Where is the moral application of what the university says
it stands for? Why are the most important questions of human existence
not seen as worth asking?
In an attempt to force America's institutions of higher education
to bend to a more personal conception of education, students asked over
and over again. . .what is the relevance of this to me in the here and
now? That question was applied to almost every conceivable university
regulation and course requirement, as well as a host of other things.
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What had been only a few years before accepted as part of the tradition-
al college experience was held up to more contemporary standards.
Thus, It was the very ideal of the university which was now in dis-
repute. While protests against American society wailed about this na-
tion's inconsistencies, the university and that society were seen by
many critics as "so intimately intertwined that their ills do not differ
significantly. "2 One by one the myths which held academic institutions
together were pulled like loose strands of a fiber. When a faculty ar-
gued the historical evidence which supported the neutrality of univer-
sities from involvement with social issues, some students indignantly
pointed to the fallacies inherent in such logic. How could universities
declare themselves as neutral and conduct war related research, act as
slum landlords, or hold stock portfolios in exploiting industries? How
could the university say it strives to inculcate democratic ideals and
continue to discriminate against racial minorities through elitist ad-
mission policies? How could the administrators discuss the university
in terms of building individual character and continue to practice i
n
loco parentis philosophies through oppressive rules and regulations?
How could the faculty speak of a "community of scholars" and ex-
clude the students from participation? How could the university discuss
the merits of an educational process that is dominated by faculty re-
search rather than undergraduate teaching? How could individual faculty
members continue to say that research is value-free? How could adminis-
^Michael Rossman, The Wedding wi thin the War (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1971), p. 153.
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trators and faculty members talk about education as If it were a fixed
body of knowledge, separate from the world of contemporary problems, and
basically unchanging? And so it went.
If there were a core source for the disputes to be identified, it
must be derived from the obvious conflict of values which existed in
this strained situation. For many of the young and their supporters had
visions of what the university and society ought to be which were consid
erably different from those of faculty members and administrators who
advocated a more traditional and restrained conception of both. The
youthful values emerged loosely around such things as: participatory
democracy, a return to community, the elimination of inequality, living
in the present, personal growth and freedom, social consciousness, and
the rejection of materialism. While the more tradition bound saw the
young abdicating America's cherished culture; accepting an anti -intel-
lectual and anti -reason approach to life; depending too much on their
own emotions to impulsively reach decisions; asking for America's col-
leges and universities to allow them a free ride to "do-thei r-own-
thing," and attempting to engage social problems that were none of the
university's business. But as one disgruntled faculty member described,
"the age asked for freedom, relevance, and informality, and the issue
was never much in doubt.
Soon four major concerns v/ould be expressed on campus after campus:
a) the quality of teaching and student-faculty relationships; b) rigid
o
Ronald C. Wendling, "The Undergraduate Curriculum: What Did We
Do To It?" AAUP Bulletin, Volume 59, No. 4 (December, 1973), pp. 407-
41C.
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academic requirements; c) grading and examination procedures; and d) the
limitations inherent in existing curriculum arrangements. These would
be the most often mentioned problems by students and critics of Ameri-
ca's higher education system. Now, let us briefly look at each of these
issues
.
Teaching
In attempting to explain why his campus sought to alter the stand-
ard teaching relationship, one administrator described teaching in these
terms
:
Too frequently the teacher stands in a place similar to the
mule driver who has had the animals equipped with blinders as
he holds tight to the reins and cracks his whip about the ani-
mals' ears. Similarly, in the classroom freedom and latitude
in self-expression are usually discouraged and education is
presented as a fiat. To be sure many such situations are en-
hanced in their rigor by pop quizzes and the like but they
seldom produce greater self-insight, inspire personal initia-
tive, or develop acceptance of responsibility.^
Teaching was based primarily on the lecture system in the early
'60s. A faculty member might enter the classroom at the beginning of a
session, take attendance, and proceed to lecture to the students on the
assignment of the day. All too often, this took the form of a reitera-
tion of the previous reading assignment. And, in some cases, the pro-
fessor might actually spend the hour reading from that text. In most
^From remarks by John Bevan at a conference on experimental higher
education in W. H. Stickler (ed.). Experimental Colleges: Their Role in
American Higher Education (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 19647,
p. 94.
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places, this was called teaching.
There are, of course, implicit assumptions behind such an approach
to learning. As Harold Taylor explains:
^ learning and thinking is conscious and
mind IS as Locke described it—a clean slate on whichsense impressions and ideas are written. In assumes an old-fashioned, pre-Freudian dualism in which the mind is separatedfrom the body, the emotions from the intellect, the consciousfrom the unconscious. In spite of everything we know about
conmuni cations, about symbols, signs, words, images, memory,intuition, and the way ideas and values are communicated from
one person to another.
. .it assumes that the best way to com-
municate ideas and facts is to sit people down in chairs in
large groups and talk at them.^
The misconceptions in such a system seemed all too apparent to the
students and their supporters. It served to put the learner in a sub-
servient role to the all -knowing teacher. It forced the student to ac-
quiesce to another person's view of knowledge. It taught the student to
be passive. It encouraged students not to think, or if they did to keep
those thoughts to themselves. For the concern of such a system is ef-
ficiency—implanting the greatest number of facts into the greatest num-
ber of students.
In order for that system to change, the students and their support-
ers contended that the authority and expertise of the faculty must be
neutralized somehow. Classes would have to become smaller and more inti-
mate. The role of the faculty member would have to be drastically al-
tered from a dispenser of knowledge to one which v/as much more humanis-
^Harold Taylor, How to Change Colleges (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p. 68~
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tic and facilitative. Faculty rewards would also have to swing from the
professional oriented emphasis on research to an equal recognition of
the merits of teaching.
Requi rements
By the '60s the prevalent model in higher education involved split-
ting up the world of knowledge into smaller subject matter departments,
each with its own faculty and course offerings. In order for a student
to graduate from an institution, he/she was required to sample certain
courses from each of these areas. This would normally encompass a stud-
ent's first two years in an institution.
Even though a student might declare a major or area of concentra-
tion in his/her initial year, say business or political science, the
academic marketplaces were such that the student was often compelled to
enroll in courses which were not only of little or no interest to them,
but also not in any conceivable way related to their major. In addi-
tion, within the department, a student often could not enroll in a par-
ticular course without having fulfilled that area's own requirements.
This might entail a specific sequence of courses which a student must
complete. In some cases, it also meant completing a prerequisite course
or groveling before a professor to secure a waiver.
On the whole, upon entering an institution a student faced both
uni vers ity-wide requirements, college or school requirements, as well as
departmental requirements. This sort of "lock -step" thinking created a
situation where there v/ere more rules blocking the learning process than
those actually encouraging it. The assumptions behind most of the aca-
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demic requirements were seen by many critics as simply an extension of
In Toc£ garentis thinking. Which, in academic terms, is translated to
mean that the students might not have the good sense to enroll in cer-
tain disciplines in a more open and voluntary system.
Faculty members countered by explaining that the well educated per-
son should be exposed to the major thoughts and concepts of the various
disciplines. This, after all, was the premise behind the term "liberal
education.
"
Then how, replied the students, do you explain the fact that few
undergraduates retain even the faintest memory of what those concepts
and ideas are upon the completion of the required curriculum? They went
on to say that requirements fail to recognize basic individual differ-
ences. Requirements cannot account for the uniqueness of the student's
previous experiences, current capacities, and present interests.
The more radical students argued that the entire requirements syn-
drome was nothing less than a tacit agreement between departments to
perpetuate their existence at the expense of the students. Require-
ments, they declared, were simply collusionary arrangements between de-
partments designed to insure that each student would be equally exposed
to all the disciplines, a sort of price fixing between departments.
There was no educational philosophy at stake in the requirements scheme,
just self-interests. The end result of such a system, these radicals
argued, was to force the student to make a commitment to one of the dis-
ciplines .
The intention of the students' analysis was to open up what they
saw as a closed educational system. This, they believed, could only be
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done by eliminating most, if not all, of the requirements. In addition,
more options would have to be provided for the student.
Grading Practi ces
Few issues were debated under as heated circumstances as the ques-
tion of grading. From the very beginning at Berkeley, the examination
and evaluation practices of faculty were seen as suspect. But, it was
not just the faculty who were to be chastised in this squabble. Stud-
ents criticized each other for participating in the sham of "grade wor-
shipping." One such critic noted:
You repeat to yourselves over and over as an undergraduate
that "It doesn't make any difference.
. .it's the grade that
counts," . . .a threadbare and worn phrase (if you are lucky
enough to make it to the third or fourth year); used as com-
monly as your word "regurgitation" in place of "exam." You
know the measure of truth in those bits of slang: it i^ nau-
seous. . .you almost ^ "puke up your work" to professors.^
The importance of grades was stressed by educators, family and fel-
low students alike. For it was grades that had become the principal
"coin of the realm" in the academic life of undergraduates. Grades were
the unit of exchange--the so-called symbol of success or failure in the
world of knowledge. Grades were important for other reasons as well:
1) their impact (at that time) on military draft status; 2) future em-
ployment opportunities and graduate school admissions; 3) a student's
self-image; 4) the organizations and peer interactions open to a stud-
^Brad Cleaveland, "A Letter to Undergraduates" in Jacobs and Lan-
dau (eds.). The New Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 218.
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ent; and 5) relations with one's parents and sponsors.^
But it was the negative aspects of the grading system which drew
the most attention. Or, as one critic stated:
Because it controls decisions about the worth of student ac-
complishment, the assignment of grades controls everything
else, and is responsible, more than anything else, for inject-
ing the twin poisons of hypocrisy and fear of failure into the
student consciousness.
°
The students' reactions to grades were founded on a conviction that
the entire educational system was entirely too competitive. Many stud-
ents believed that competition was not a healthy thing for an educa-
tional system to be fostering. In their opinion, cooperation not com-
petition should be encouraged. They linked a number of America's soci-
etal woes to the individualism and aggressiveness which were reinforced
by competitive educational practices. For them, grades came to repre-
sent a symbol of all that was wrong with American education and, in par-
ticular, the excessive anxiety it generates among the young.
Students went on to argue that the grade itself was now more im-
portant to their fellow classmates than any learning which might take
place in a specific course. In the quest for high grades, they admit-
ted, students engage in rote memorization, endless last minute cramming,
and even cheating on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the testing
and evaluative mechanisms utilized by most faculty members were seen as
^Jennie Farley, "The Scriber: Modern Styles," Improving College
and University Teaching , XXII, No. 1 (Winter, 1974), pp. 29-30.
^Taylor, How to Change Colleges , p. 100.
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not measuring what a student actually knew or thought about a subject so
much as what the faculty wanted to hear. In the simplest terms, tests
were creating a "right answer" syndrome which many students abhored.
Also faculty were charged in some cases with exercising their "power to
grade" to punish students who challenged them in the classroom.
Faculty members responded to these allegations by admitting that
each instructor must face the issues of whether grading practices were
indeed valid, reliable, objective and totally free from arbitrary and
.
. 9
capricious decisions. They often acknowledged that each student was
different but each also required some standardized form of feedback on
how he/she was proceeding within a particular course or academic experi-
ence. One professor explained:
A grade should be considered an effort to put back together,
to synthesize, the separate judgments about a student's work.
It gives the student some sense of the quality of his perform-
ance on the whole. ^0
In many situations, faculty members gave in to what they interpret-
ed as an anti -evaluation movement. However, they steadfastly maintained
that grades were necessary not only for the registrars to be able to re-
cord a student's performance for graduate school admissions and employ-
ment opportunities but also because grades were the primary motivator
for students in the present system. Many faculty believed that without
^Wayne Mollenberg, "To Grade or Not to Grade— Is That the Ques-
tion?" College and University , Volume 49, No. 1 (Fall 1973), p. 5.
lORobert A. Feldmesser, "The Positive Function of Grades," Educ^-
tional Record, LIII, No. 1, (Winter, 1972), p. 67.
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grades students would aimlessly pursue their education.
There were, of course, some faculty members who agreed with the
student analysis of grading practices. These persons often resorted to
subverting the existing system through issuing "blanket grades" to ev-
eryone. For the novice, this practice involves a variation of either
giving everyone the same grade or allowing the students to decide what
grade they will receive according to their own needs. As a result, more
traditional faculty members argued that the grade would soom become so
inflated as to be meaningless as a measurement of student achievement.
These faculty members interpreted the anti -grade movement as a deliber-
ate attempt to lower academic standards.
In viewing the grading-related issues, the movement for abolition
or reduction of emphasis on grades was rooted in a belief that rewards
must be more intrinsically based. This argument holds that each indi-
vidual should have more control over her/his reward system. Never mind
the difficulties of moving from a system that is dominated by extrinsic-
ally controlled rewards, students demanded a more egalitarian system
where internal judgments by the student finally determine an individ-
ual's growth and intellectual progress. If this was an impossibility,
then the existing system should be restructured to accommodate the more
humanistic overtones of this argument. For failure , as a concept, was
to be eliminated from the educational system. No one failed; they just
did not fulfill the requirements.
The Confining Curri culum
The criticisms levied against university and college curricula
are
34
in many ways a continuation of the allegations and arguments previously
discussed in relation to other teaching-learning issues. In discussing
the inadequacies of the dominant curricular patterns, Judson Jerome com
men ted:
. . .why have we not resented-and changed-educatlon conduct-
ed almost without reference to current politics, religion,
sex, personal ethics, family relationships--wi thout reference,in short, to the areas of experience which matter as one pre-*
pares for citizenship, parenthood, or any other role outside
the school? How many of us truly feel that our college educa-
tion was relevant to real human concerns? How many of us, es-
pecially in graduate study, have let a model of scholarship be
foisted upon us which took us farther from rather than nearer
to, our interest in our subject? How many of us have let edu-
cation exorcise our enthusiasm and quell our will to action?!"*
As Jerome stresses, and we have stated elsewhere, the prevailing
curriculum in most institutions of higher learning was perceived as
largely out-of-touch with the intellectual and social needs of under-
graduates. In many students' opinion, the curriculum failed to give
ample attention to the societal issues that dominated their lives--war,
racism, the environment, and so on--and which as citizens they would be
called upon to make decisions and judgments about. Moreover, the cur-
ricula, and the faculty and departments that sponsored the courses,
seemed bent on suppressing any linkage between issues of a contemporary
nature and what was comnonly referred to as formal knowledge. Linder the
guise of traditional education, the curriculum shrank from addressing
issues which focused on the students' personal problems and concerns.
!! Judson Jerome, Culture out of Anarchy (New York: Herder and Her-
der, 1971), p, 14,
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Coupled with this lack of personal relevance, the students also re-
sponded to the rigidity of institutional and departmental requirements.
In their opinion, requirements chopped up their educational experience
through unrelated courses. The student was expected to enroll in four
or five courses from the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the
humanities, per semester or time period. It was argued that this tended
to spread out student commitments to such a point that many were unable
to concentrate sufficiently on any single subject.
One chief academic officer described the incongruencies of such a
required curriculum in these terms:
The theory--was probably good: knowledge is vast and must be
approached from divergent points of view if one is to become
educated . "Educated" must in that case mean "having acquired,
digested, related, even integrated some knowledge." My pro-
fessors rarely spoke individually of any relationship between
what each was asking me to learn and what I was picking up
from other folk. The theoretical purpose of divisional re-
quirements had no practical significance. There was no prac-
tice of integration. Now if I understood empirical tests at
all, practice must precede theory. Without integrative prac-
tice, integrative theory could not exist. Fragmentati ve prac-
tice--requiring students to jump over isolated hurdles not
even laid on the same track--made my curriculum. Naturally,
I have never heard anybody advance a fragmentati ve theory of
education. 12
In a short time, a number of undergraduates and their supporters
began to articulate a view that education, and in particular the curri-
culum, ought to consider the student along political, aesthetic, intel-
lectual, social and personal dimensions. In other words, education
l^John Satterfield, "From Self-Examination to Self-Respect: Pui
poses Served by Faculty Evaluation," The Institute for Undergrad ujj^
Curricular Reform Newsletter, Issue Ei (jht ( Apri 1 1975, p. 5.
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should strive to deal with the student in holistic terms. If the curri-
culum, with the possible exception of the natural sciences and profes-
sions, was as Paul Goodman stated, without consequences and "morally and
even personally useless, then, the faculty and their curricula would
have to be altered so that students could be dealt with as total persons.
In the future, all taboos against dealing with the student as a de-
veloping person were to be lifted. Because the student develops intel-
lectually and also emotionally during the collegiate years, both fall
under the purview of the institution and its faculty. Affective growth
was to be equally as important as intellectual development. Further-
more, no longer could learning be assumed to be a phenomenon which is
solely confined to the classroom. For total education also encompasses
the world external to the campus and especially out-of-class learning
experiences. The nucleus of this thesis was founded on a belief that
learning can and should take place anywhere at any time and need not be
limited to formal educational settings.
Many change advocates went on to propose that a more appropriate
method to transform the curriculum and make it more action-oriented was
to actively engage the world and its problems. Under this system, so-
cial problems and social change were to be a central focus of the curri-
culum and learning. In reaction to the narrowness they perceived in
discipline-based curriculum, students and their supporters contended
that solving problems would require the composite knowledge of many dis-
1 3paul Goodman , Compulsory Mis -education and the Communi ty_ of S^-
lars (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 316.
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ciplines, rather than the prejudiced views and biases of single depart-
ments. As an example, the problems of the disadvantaged might be ap-
proached from such disciplinary perspectives as political science, eco-
nomics, psychology, genetics, business, and many others. Therefore, the
answer to holistic education, relevance, fragmentation, and requirements
was for many reformers an interdisciplinary one.
In Summary
The basic rationale for change during this era rested on a reitera-
tion of a humanistic dictum. Critics especially argued that each indi-
vidual must be viewed as a unique human being possessing enormous poten-
tial. Under prevailing conditions, the majority of America's institu-
tions of higher learning v/ere seen as thwarting human potential.
Through their formalistic teaching practices, excessive requirements,
overemphasis on grades and competition, and an antiquated curriculum,
colleges and universities limited and controlled crucial aspects of
student life.
For the student to be able to become more excited about education
and learning, it was further argued that these institutions would have
to be transformed. The salient features surrounding the strategies sug-
gested to insure transformation of higher education will be analyzed and
discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
STRATEGIES FOR DELIBERATE FAILURE
The key word then was innovation
,
which carried a hidden im-
plication that if we modernize ourselves a little, use a few
gimmicks, jazz up our teaching methods, incorporate a little
of the new hardv/are, we might get the old machine back on the
highway.
Judson Jerome
In the course of the years 1964-1975, a good many universities and
colleges throughout the country underwent an era of unparalleled modi-
fications. Stringent requirements were lifted. New academic programs
were initiated. Admissions standards were redesigned to facilitate the
enrollment of students previously not served by higher education. In
general, various educational experiences were generated or created which
seemed to make these institutions more flexible.
Educational historians in later generations may attribute this so-
called "reformation period" to a number of interrelated issues. Some
may simply say that discussions about new educational approaches can be
directly correlated with the student unrest which overlapped much of
this period. Or they might point to the tremendous amount of state
and
federal funding which was then available to higher education.
Others
will no doubt single out the large foundation gifts which were
frequent-
ly distributed for non-tradi tional and experimenting
ventures. Those
who sympathize with the power of the printed word will
simply identify
the proliferation of commission reports, journal articles, and
other
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change-oriented publications as part of the causal conditions behind the
array of alternatives.
Whatever the answers, few periods in the history of American higher
education produced a similar debate on the merits and pitfalls of learn-
ing. And, in the course of these debates, the knowledge establishments
were aroused and challenged to a series of reconstruction possibilities
on a scale previously non-existent. But, despite the widespread growth
of potential alternatives, one must ask whether anything much at all
really happened in the midst of all these change incantations. Did
American higher education really restructure itself? Was that even the
goal of these dialogues? And, in regards to the various ideas tested
and tried, why has the luxury of time seemed to dilute their impact?
Were these pedagogical and organizational proposals, as the early dis-
sidents had so often said, merely appealing techniques for coopting
larger struggles and thus a dissipating drain on societal change ener-
gies?
In this piece, these are some of the issues we hope to delve into.
It seems especially important during these times of economic retrench-
ment and reported non-growth to glance over our shoulders at the major
legacy of the educational decade just completed. If people are to com-
prehend the complexities of these academic institutions, they need to
know whether these agencies of cultural preparation were capable of re-
vitalizing themselves. Consequently, the principal task here is to de-
lineate the major educational options presented over the past ten years.
Moreover, it is also to make some rather rudimentary assessments
of the
limits inherent in these change strategies and then to discuss,
in more
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extensive terms, the results of these interventions.
Utopi an Visions
Almost every utopia is an implicit criticism of the civiliza-
tion that served as its background; likewise it is an attempt
to uncover the potentialities that the existing institutions
either ignored or buried beneath an ancient crust of customs
and habit.
'
Before cataloging the various proposals which surfaced, we need to
be more fully cognizant of an implicit goal running beneath the potpour-
ri of pedagogical ideas and organizational choices. Though it was not
often articulated as such, and some might argue that the diverse ideas
cannot be condensed in this manner, the dreams for a better educational
system remain part of a muddled utopian vision. The word muddled seems
quite appropriate because so few of those who advanced educational pana-
ceas realized the significance of their dreams. A minority did see that
to suggest education ought to be different somehov^ also implied a dif-
ferent vision for the society as a whole.
As Mumford noted in The Story of Utopias , a utopian image, whether
it refers to a nation state or one's academic department, is still a
separate reality. We can say that it is separate because this dream re-
sides with a given person or group and serves as a guiding light for the
way they believe the physical world could or should be. In many cases,
such visions are a reaction against the negative conditions of a parti
-
^Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: Viking Press,
1962), p. 2.
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cular external environment, the physical world which rests outside the
individual
.
Still people who envision a different wor1d--one, for example,
where people relate to each other in more humane ways, where organiza-
tions serve the people who work and live within them rather than the
other way around, and where ideals are pursued and debated in an open
and yet supportive manner--have at least two choices: 1) they can at-
tempt to escape the prevailing reality; 2) they can seek to reconstruct
the external world in ways which seem to make it more congruent with
their dreams. Although there are more than ample examples of both these
approaches operant in higher education over the last decade, it is the
remodelers which we plan to discuss in this chapter. For a central
thesis in this work is that the people who sought a new educational sys-
tem in America proposed (often unknowingly) "a new set of habits, a
fresh scale of values, a different net of relationships and institu-
tions."^
The implicit message of such a dream is humanism. Erich Fromm once
defined humanism as a "belief in the unity of the human race and man's
potential to perfect himself."^ If one were to v/rite a modern humanist
creed, it would probably go something like this: "I believe that every
human being has a self which gives that person the capacity for freedom,
reason, creativity, love, and sympathy. I believe that, because each
2lbid, p. 22.
^Erich Fromm (ed.). Socialist Humanism (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1965T7~p. vii.
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person has such a self, we ought to respect him and create situations in
which he can develop his capacities."^
The value assumptions of this vision encompass not only ideas de-
signed to insure egalitarianism and personal liberty but also others
which call for: nonauthoritarianism, interpersonal sensitivity, person-
al growth, intimacy, and social commitments. Humanistic expectations
assume that every individual (read institutions as well) can become more
open, just, caring, active and selfless.
In general, however, the tactics selected for achieving this earth-
ly paradise have been founded on three interrelated maxims: 1) redis-
tribution of power; 2) establishing a sense of community; and finally
3) a faith in the cooperation which would be nurtured by such actions.
But it is Gemeinschaft or community which has always been the ultimate
goal of the vision.
This ideal, a central utopian vision of Western society, has been
described in the following terms:
. .
.the desire for a conmunity in which the needs of each are
consonant with the needs of all, in which reason, freedom, and
happiness converge in the real life and imagination of all peo-
ple, is deeply woven into the design of Western art, philoso-
phy, and religion. It is, in its multiple forms, a majestic,
powerful vision of man released from the bonds of self and the
limitations of history, a view of social harmony that tran-
scends tensions between the one and the many, the self and
others, characteristic of various modes of society.
%chael P. Lerner, The New Socialist Revolution (New York: Delta
Publishing Company, 1973), p. xiii.
Speter Clccak, Radical Paradoxes (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1974), p. 274.
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At its core, then, the movement for a new and transformed educa-
tional system held out a definition of human nature which exalted the
abilities of mankind, and also organizations, to rnythic proportions.
/
People were expected to instantly adopt behaviors well beyond their ex-
periences and previous consciousness. More importantly, these neo-
utopianists were to confront obstacles which too few imagined. In their
quest for a new educational world, paradoxes emerged which few were able
to handle, at least for very long. This led many to a sense of genera-
tional failure, frustration, anger, guilt, and eventually withdrawing
Cynicism. But we are getting well ahead of ourselves. Let us turn now
to a longer discussion on the various options suggested for changing
America's educational enterprises.
Choosing the Options
To begin with, institutions and advocates could pick and choose
among notions which dealt with governance, admissions, curricula, in-
struction, evaluation, space/time issues, and those which impact on in-
stitutional operations.^ Table 2 represents a fairly comprehensive com-
pilation of the variety of options and trends operant in this period.
From among all these possible choices institutions selected their
own unique responses. For example, a few institutions sought to
com-
Yellow Pages 0
^For two other change typologies, see Ti2e_
graduate Educati on (Ithaca, New York:^ The ucrnell
ment in Undergraduate Education, 1974) and Harold , :
A Manua l for the Evaluation of Inm^itiye Pro^^ a
H1?i5rEdu'ZirtTOT ITerkeley; Tne University of^Caiilorma
usn.o-i •
Research and Development in Higher Education, 19/4).
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Table 2
The Old Change Agenda: A Typology of Academic Reform Trends and Options
Governance
,
Proposals Sought
more democratization
increased student representation at all levels of decision-making
establishment of campus wide "community" governance units
elimination of rigid social requirements
deletion of required courses
class attendance requirements dropped
concentration and distribution requirements altered
Admissions
Proposals Sought
greater access
greater minority enrollment in predominantly white institutions
breaking down of 18-22 year old attendance lockstep
enrollment of new student populations
removal of elitist admission policies
more active minority recruitment
development of special programs for the disadvantaged
increase in financial assistance opportunities
open admissions
Curriculum
Proposals Sought
more student-centered courses
more open and flexible curricula
development of more curricular options
individualized study options
independent study
student-initiated courses
contract learning
expansion of social problems courses \/
introduction of personal growth courses
integration of the various fields of knowledge
interdisciplinary programs
^ ^ ^ i
program-centered courses and programs approached from several
disciplines
recognition of experience as a valid learning device
off-campus opportunities
work-study or cooperative programs
apprenticeships and internships
_
cross-cultural and foreign study opportunities
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introduction of special study areas
Black Studies
Women Studies
Environmental Studies
Urban Problems
Peace Studies
Asian Studies
Futuristic Studies
and a wide range of specially designed programs for First Year
students
Instruction
Proposals Sought
less faculty authoritarianism
less formality
more seminar-like courses
clearer course objectives
more student input into course content
some inroads into the concept of "teacher as learning partner"
introduction of programs to improve instruction
student evaluation of teaching
instructional support services
teaching improvement programs and faculty development centers
teaching grants
more emphasis on rewarding good teaching
teacher awards
more attention to teaching in tenure decisions
rethinking of faculty advising and counseling functions
students permitted to do some teaching
Evaluation
Proposals Sought
de-emphasis on grades
initiation of a wide variety of grading options
pass-fai 1
pass -no record
elimination of point averages
written faculty evaluations
development of examination options
student contracts
student projects and student portfolio
case studies
performance and competency criteria
self-paced instructional programs
increase in the use of personal journals
take-home examinations, and open book tests
redefinition of the meaning of credit
recognition of life experiences as worthy of credit
initiation of variable credit concepts
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credit through examination
credit for work experience
Space/Time Variations
Proposals Sougnt
calendar changes
more emphasis on utilization of January term for learning ac-
tivities
4-1-4 calendar adopted at many institutions
expansion of non-resident degree programs
external degree programs
university without walls
correspondence study
full time-part time options provided
students encouraged to drop in or out
curriculum modularized into smaller units
Institutional
Proposals Sought
more cooperation between institutions through consortia activities
initiation of intentional experimenting colleges such as
Hampshire College
Evergreen State
Empire State College
Governors State
Eckerd College
Wisconsin at Green Bay
and many others
creation of experimental subunits in established institutions
model colleges
cluster colleges
residential colleges
li ving-leav'ning units
"free universities"
pletely reformulate their goals and purposes. Grant and Riesman recent-
ly divided these more intentional institutions into four categories; 1)
neo-classical movement
—
institutions which attempted to restore the 19th
century classical ideals end curriculum into the college's program (ex-
amples migiit include St. John's College, fussman's earsy experiments at
Berkeley, and Coswe'l College at Santa Cruz in 1965^*, 2 ) aes >.heti
c-
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e)^ressive mo^yement- institutions which introduced the performing and
creative arts as a central part of the curriculum (examples might in-
clude California Institute of the Arts, Grand Valley State College, and
Carleton College); 3) communal
-expressive movement-
-insti tutinn*^ which
stressed the importance of a sense of community, and also emphasized
programs from humanistic psychology such as encounter groups, workshops
on group dynamics, and other exercises that foster an awareness of self
or personal growth (examples might include the early Johnston College at
Redlands, Kresge College at Santa Cruz in the late 60's, and the now de-
funct Prescott College); and 4) activist-radical movement-
-! nstitutions
which deliberately encouraged and facilitated student activism through
involvement with social issues (examples might include Antioch College
at Yellow Springs and SUNY at Old Westbury during Harris Wofford's ten-
ure as president).^ In many ways, however, these institutions and others
like Hampshire, Evergreen State, and Empire State were the exceptions to
the general rule.
Beyond complete institutional revitalization, academic change us-
ually assumed two basic forms. First, enumerous institutions simply
initiated experimenting subunits. These model subcolleges or "new" col-
leges often operated as separate entities within some larger institu-
tional setting where a wide range of teaching-learning approaches were
explored while the main campus continued to pursue its more established
practices. The second and most popular maneuver involved developing
^Gerald Grant and David Riesman, "An Ecology of Academic Refo'^m"
Daedalus Volume 104, Ho. 1 (Winter 1975), pp. 169-176.
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isolated and somewhat more random reform proposals. In this case, an
institution left innovation to the individual initiative of departmental
and college entrepreneurs. In these cases, there was frequently little
if any communication, linkage, or coordination from one new idea to the
next.
An excellent illustration of this last approach would be Southern
Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. During the years 1968 to 1973,
although under the auspices of no single institutional umbrella or agen-
cy, this institution sponsored the following activities: 1) the Con-
tinuing Education division began to grant interdisciplinary masters de-
grees in the liberal arts; 2) the office of residential living (those
people charged with dormitory responsibilities) began to coordinate sev-
eral living-learning projects; 3) the Business School offered a series
of personal growth and life planning courses; 4) the freshmen and sopho-
more oriented University College conducted a wide range of problem cen-
tered courses; 5) individual faculty members in selective departments--
Sociology, Psychology, and History--tried out new examination and test-
ing options; and 6) the institution as a whole adopted a pass -fail grad-
ing system as well as a "shared governance" model for decision-making.
SMU symbolizes the eclectic approach to change. There was no ef-
fort to integrate all these activities into any single institutional
plan. Furthennore, none of these projects were intended to alter the
basic goals, objectives or power relationships of that university. Most
colleges and universities followed a similar pattern. They acted on the
rather extensive change agenda by picking and choosing those programs
which seemed to meet their local needs and situations.
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To the novice it may appear at first glance that a considerable
amount of educational re-thinking occurred during these years. However,
once the proliferation of options are transcended and the inquirer as-
certains the actual programs implemented and sustained, the record looks
less impressive. In general, institutions only sought to actively adopt
those ideas which were absolutely necessary.
Looking for a^ Qui ck Fix
The standard reaction to pressure for radical change is to
buy It off. Across America, a strategy of campus containment
IS emerging, which reads: grant with relative grace the
minor changes and options that don't endanger the System it-
self.®
Of course, one would be hard pressed to say nothing happened at
all. Students were given more personal autonomy and freedom to "shop,
to pick and choose, and to move at their own pace."^ And, since many
of the demands for reform were directed at the liberal arts area, much
of the formality and rigidness prevalent in those disciplines was re-
laxed. In addition, institutions did adopt nev; governance arrangements,
admit new student populations, offer more student-centered courses, and
dabble with bits and pieces of all the rest. Still, there are two key
things to remember: 1) what was often done in the name of change was
generally the result of a very, very reluctant reform process; and 2)
^Michael Rossman, The Wedding within the l-Jar (Garden City, New
York: Anchor Books, 1971 ) , p. 300.
^Grant and Riesman, "An Ecology of Academic Reform," p. 166.
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the overall goals and objectives of higher education changed very little
during this eraJ^
Generally speaking, the changes which do seem to have occurred are
largely rhetorical. For it is the language of administrators and other
institutional members that seems to associate every new idea with such
nebulous terms as "experimental" and "non-tradi tional" or "alternative."
As Leon Botstein, the ex-president of Franconia College (an institution
frequently classified along all the above-mentioned labels) stated not
long ago: "Although one can dismiss the misuse or soft use, of these
words as superficial shortcomings, the contextual banality is a symptom
of the questionable quality and the confusion in the current thinking
about higher education.
Perhaps, it is a natural tendency to identify change, no matter how
diminutive, in terms of the language of the times. Nevertheless, Bot-
^^There are many researchers who have described the resistance to
new ideas phenomena as experienced in American higher education. See
especially J. B. von Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform (San Fran-
cisco: Jossey Bass Inc., 1969); Joseph Fashing and Steven E. Deutsch,
Academics in Retreat (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1971); and Jack Lindquist, "Political Linkage: The Academic-Innovation
Process," Journal of Higher Education
,
XLV, No. 5 (May, 1974), pp. 323-
343. Also, in regard to institutional goals and objectives, Gross and
Grambsch (major researchers in this area) recently stated: "When we
compared the findings of 1971 to 1964, we were struck with the fact that
there was practically no change in the rank ordering of goals or goal
preferences. If the major events of the 1960 's had had an effect on
universities, the effect did not show up in the goals --that is, the di-
rection in which universities were moving--or in the values associated
with those directions." Edward Gross and Paul V. Grambsen, Changes in
University Organization, 1964-1971 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1974), p. 197.
^^Leon Botstein, "What Is Innovation, Really?" Change , IV, No. 3
(April, 1972), p. 14.
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stein's point is well taken; much of what is being called "innovative"
in our colleges and universities is tinkering at best. Institutions
which did away with requirements (the trend now is to reinstitute the
old ones), altered grading systems, introduced freshmen seminars, in-
serted independent study options, or announced calendar revisions, were
all too often doing one of two things: 1) trying to pacify student de-
mands; or 2) jumping on the perennial bandwagon. Many so-called reform
ideas were simply applied an institution's undergraduate program with
little or no thought of the college's total aims or educational mission.
Too often academic change symbolized the initiation of a few new gim-
micks, a sort of band-aid approach to learning.
Yet, one must recall the historical context of the decade. Before
the pressure for innovation was dissipated, the formula for change was
7
a fairly effective one: Look around. See what seems to be wrong with
the institution (the conditions which prevent human beings from relating
to one another as free and equal individuals). Identify the univer-
sity's complicity in perpetuating these conditions. Raise a few tough
questions about this state of affairs. Do a little nonviolent sitting-
in to draw attention to the issues. Then watch what happens. Repeat
the recipe whenever necessary.
For a short time, the old faculty-administrative oligarchy was cor-
nered ever so slightly into listening and reacting. Without fully
realizing it, the pedagogical leftists had hit a central nerve. For in
an organization whose principal membership is enamored with rationality
( and all that the term implies ) , the point of critical vulnerability con-
verges around the application of knowledge and reasoned intelligence to
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£grP ,1exin9 £rob1ems_. When the undergraduates and their advocates pre-
sented a potpourri of charges at the academy's doors, it switched the
formal and informal problem-solving mechanisms on. Since so much of
higher education's justification involves defining, analyzing and solv-
ing problems, the natural response was to think that these concerns
ought to be resolved somehow.
But these were not just any ordinary questions. Though the queries
were targeted at the university, one could easily transfer their indict-
ments to the society as well. For the university was seen as: dehuman-
izing, alienating, isolating, meritocratic, elitist, and racist. In
spite of this, rejoinders to these charges became inevitably entangled
with negotiating acceptable actions for relieving the perceived tensions
while simultaneously alleviating only the most blatant conditions. But
change was not to be pursued in purely objective terms; it was to be
guided along definitional lines which limited the debate and short-
circuited the potential actions which might be taken.
When the charges merged into chants for reform and innovation, the
victory seemed to be won. Hindsight now tells even the most casual ob-
server that each of these terms sets effective parameters around what
could and should be done with higher education. In other words, the
limits of change emerged from the problem-solving logic and the language
which became associated with this process. First, institutions re-
sponded to the demands by giving in only where absolutely forced to.^^
12wiii iam L. O'Neill, whose Coming Apart remains the only signifi-
cant history on this period to be published to date, stated: "The
threat of student action was always there to goad the faculty along.
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Secondly, what became known as "academic reform" was referred to by op-
ponents and advocates alike as "the modification and improvement of the
program of an educational institution. "13 so innovation came to be
thought of as any. new idea, practice, or object which was interpreted as
new in a particular educational setting.!'' The common language for such
tinkering continues to embrace words like "redefinition".
. ."renewal"
. . ."reconstruction" and other fix-up phrases.
Addi ti ve Strategies
Those who tried to rehabilitate America's institutions of higher
learning employed several basic strategies First, reformers present-
ed a number of seemingly interrelated goals and objectives: 1) to work
for a general restructuring of colleges and universities; 2) to seek to
redistribute power within these organizations; 3) to establish more demo-
cratic decision-making patterns; 4) to insure more personal freedoms;
5) to develop curricula and instructional options; 6) to increase ac-
cess for minority and disadvantaged students; 7) to reduce, if not
Most changes were made to appease students rather than to implement
powerfully felt educational principles." William L. O'Neill, Coming
Apart (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 302.
1 3
''^Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform
,
p. xix.
^^Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Inno-
vations (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
^^Tropman and Ehrlich's definition says a strategy is "an orches-
trated attempt to influence a person or system in relation to some goal
which an actor desires." In Fred M. Cox, et al. Strategies of Commu-
nity Organization (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1974), p.
162.
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eliminate, competitiveness, meritocratic distinctions, confining social
and academic restrictions, and also the sense of ivory-tower aloofness
prevalent in most educational enterprises.^^ Furthermore, reformers
were able to adopt a critical approach to the existing situation by re-
peatedly pointing out oppressive, dehumanizing, and alienating condi-
tions. Reformers then could further discredit the existing order by
putting forward a complex set of humanistic values and needs and thus
demonstrate that the dominant educational model was antithetical to
these visions. However, it is at the point of implementing a new ap-
proach that reformers began to compromise their dreams and stumble into
antiquated change assumptions.
As we have mentioned earlier, the most widely used tactic for
achieving a new educational system involved instituting alternative pro-
grams right along side of traditional arrangements and practices. J. B.
Hefferlin once described the renewal plans in the following manner:
Throughout the entire evolution of academic institutions, the
technique of organizing separate and parallel units of exist-
ing institutions. . .and has been the easiest means of academic
reform. Indeed, historically the most common means of adapt-
ing educational institutions to new conditions has been the
device of parallelism; the creation of programs and courses
which offer an alternative to existing programs.'
This sort of strategy assumes that when a perplexing issue
or
16ln general, the call for change was much more
haphazard than
pictured here. Few advocates possessed this entire agenda.
Most were
like the small child in a shooting gallery pointing
the pellet rifle at
anything that moves.
"•^Hefferlin, "End Runs and Line Bucking," p. 4.
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problem surfaces in a given educational system the best solution is
simply to graft on something new to the organization. If the existing
curriculum fails to deal with relevant social topics, then add a few
courses that do. If the present decision-making system seems a little
biased in favor of particular groups, then blend in the disenfranchised
constituencies by creating more governance units. If the faculty are
over dependent on traditional teaching styles, then establish a faculty
development center to retrain them. If the dormitories are dingy stud-
ent ghettos, then change the name over the door and transform them into
"living-learning centers." Whatever the obstacle, no matter the com-
plexity of the substantive issues involved, any "problem" can be swept
away ( solved , if you like) by merely creating some new gimmick.
In essence then, the hope of an additive strategist becomes very
much tied to the possible repercussions his/her new program might gen-
erate. But one must ask directly whether such "islands of innovation"
really alter the principal aims and purposes of the modern university,
or even if such add-on strategies alleviate the things they set out to
conquer. Hefferlin comments again:
. . .the techniques of creating a parallel program does not
solve the problem of the existing program; it irorely offers an
alternative to it. It is not a device for reforming the ex-
isting curriculum, except by undercutting it. ... It is an
end-run technique, a means of making progress by skirting the
opposition and outflanking it.
And here is the crucial point:
It is a beautiful ploy, but it is a ploy of diversion, of
solving a problem by avoiding the problem. A ploy of "benign
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neglecr'gthat does nothing directly about existing problems
America has a tradition of looking at change as one-shot responses
to symptoms. One can trace its modern roots through Johnson's Great
Society proposals, back to the Camel ot of Kennedy's New Frontier, and
on to the opportunistic liberalism of FDR's New Deal. But one must re-
member: "used by themselves, interventive actions tend to become merely
forays against ad ^ 'targets of opportunity' without any sense of how
they fit into some larger plan."^^ More importantly, the greatest myth
is that things can be made better by such temporary solutions while the
whole remains largely the same.
Keeping the Liberal Faith
The gospel of change in America is liberalism.^® According to this
faith, what is wrong with society, or any given institution within it
for that matter, can be solved by merely following certain assumptions.
The most common of them simply holds that when something is interpreted
as wrong, bad, or oppressive, this can be easily corrected by replacing
^®Ibid, p. 5.
^®Cox, et al.. Strategies of Community Organization
,
p. 161.
^®This discussion borrows rather freely from the writings of Louis
Hartz, Kenneth and Patricia Dolbeare, and Michael Lerner. Since this is
unquestionably the salient issue in understanding how people think about
change in this country, those interested in comprehending all the nu-
ances of liberalism should begin with Hartz's work and then move on to
the others. Also, we use the term here without making any distinctions
about the variety of liberal types which might fall under such a classi-
fication.
57
It with some new rule, social arrangement or invention. This argument
contends that when this does not seem to work then the next best re-
sponse is growth, either through "natural" expansion of activities or in
the form of acquiring new territories, new personnel, or even new eu-
phemisms. The tradition of liberalism, implied in that last comment,
believes that almost any problem can be fixed up, whether the cosmetics
be catchy phrases or revised programs.
The cornerstones of this faith are pragmatism, accommodation, com-
promise and experimentation. Pragmatism furnishes the good judgments
required for the moderation of corners two and three, while experimenta-
tion serves as the rhetoric which caters to elitist demands for differ-
ences and new things without bordering on the extreme risks required for
implementing more utopian visions. Thus change, to these pragmatic
counselors, becomes the art of the possible and their typical comments
to moral or idealistic change agendas is: "that's too unrealistic,
let's do something a bit more practical." Liberalism becomes the search
for mutually acceptable techniques for solving symptoms, for inventing
temporary solutions, for implementing only those proposals which are ac-
ceptable within the context of traditional values and established pro-
cedures .
A more extensive listing of liberal assumptions would include
statements
:
Problems are isolated from one another and can be dealt with
independently.
Things will be better if people try harder or if we get the
right people in positions of power.
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university also) is pluralistic and
all legitimate interests are heard under conditions of fair-
nelds and"piwer!"2l"^®’
assessment of others'
Only rational
valid.
'
empirical, objective approaches to problems are
Working within the system (through legalized processes, esta-blished decision-making units, and under conventional rules
and regulations) is always best.
Confrontation, conflict, and especially violence should be
avoided by choosing the more peaceful and compromised middle
grounds
.
Accommodation (giving in to the other side) is better for
everyone involved rather than having to endlessly debate the
merits of each and every issue.
It takes very little analysis to realize that these assumptions
limit change to those things which are not going to significantly alter
the dominant power and authority relationships. Furthermore, whatever
mutations do occur must fit within particular ideological, structural,
and political frameworks. This renders certain that the source of the
symptoms, the social and economic systems which produce indisputable
advantages and disadvantages, remains the same.
The Legends of Failure
Put away childish things; grow up; accept reality as it is, and
the rewards will be great and genuine. 2^
2^ Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 74.
22George Kateb (ed.), Utopia (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), p.
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The not so subtle message of liberalism is to give up the dream.
To pursue idealistic visions in a hostile world is truly foolishness.
The only recourse for those who desire a different reality, whether it
be a global' community or university run on humanistic principles, is to
accept the fallibilities of humanity. Human nature cannot be changed;
people will always be people. The whole system can never be radically
altered. Yet, how much of this is derivative of the change pattern it-
self?
The French social critic Andre Gorz has distinguished between two
primary change patterns:
A reformist-reform is one which subordinates its objectives to
the criteria of rationality and the practicability of a given
system and policy. Reformism rejects those objectives and de-
mands
--however deep the need for them--which are incompatible
with the preservation of the system.
On. the other hand, a not necessarily reformist reform is one
which is conceived not in terms of what is possible within the
framework of a given system and administration, but in view of
what should be possible in terms of human needs and demands. 23
Obviously, those who sought to change education were caught between
the dilemmas presented by these two patterns. Though the dream might
lead one to select a nonreformist reform pattern, we are captives of a
culture and reality which dictated the course of the pattern. In choos-
ing to change higher education, the choice had been made. The criterion
for change was to be set by the established frameworks (ideological, or-
ganizational, and political) so that only the illusions of reform would
^^Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p.
7 .
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result.
The illusions or deceptions of this pattern are much more difficult
to detect in the midst of unrest and seemingly plentiful resources. In
an era of growth, new programs and procedures offer immediate hope and
demonstrate that the system has the capacity for self-correction. How-
ever. when things get tight, both financially and politically, the true
nature of the system shines through. It was under conditions of econo-
mic scarcity that campus after campus eliminated the new luxuries, and
demands increased for a nostalgic return to old power alignments. By
this time reformers had accepted the message of the adage: "the more
things seem to change the more they remain the same." A generation was
stuck with the lessons that liberal reformist criterion siphons off ra-
dical pressure, coopts it, and then brings stability back to the system.
The system is just too resilient. Give up the dream.
No one sets out to deliberately fail. But is that not what the
mejority of these misguided idealists did? To begin with, they overex-
aggerated what was possible, as well as the speed at which change was
likely to occur. Schooled in Horatio Alger rriyths, too many felt radical
reform was as simple as mixing instant breakfast cereal. More than
this, they overestimated the impact of their pet panaceas. Not only was
their interpretation of change much too romantic but most possessed a
grossly distorted sense of history; they had a tabula rosa approach to
the past which often said "let's just wipe it out and start anew." In
general, these reformers were a generation indoctrinated with liberal
tnyths
,
glorifying America's potential for redirection, and very much un-
aware of their own ideological biases.
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Louis Hartz has said, in commenting on the liberal tradition in
America, that the tragedy of most popular reform movements has been
their imperfect knowledge of the enemy they face.^^ While Michael Ler-
ner asserts that "the most obvious problem with the liberal position is
that it provides a mistaken analysis of the problems and hence cannot
provide a solution. These are the real keys to understanding the
failures. In pursuing educational and societal humanism, reformers
chose to enter a political contest where the rules of the game were
rigged from the very beginning; where academic and societal values and
beliefs, no matter how flexible and neutral they may first appear, sup-
port and sustain particular options over others; where the nature of
educational organizations encourages territorial (we-they) thinking and
structural isolation; and where the processes of decision-making are
biased in favor of what i_s_ rather than what might be.
These are some of the conditions which limit the possibility for
real change. In the next few chapters, we will examine these interre-
lated issues in some detail.
^^Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Har-
court. Brace, and World, Inc., 1955), p. 13.
^^Lerner, The New Socialist Revolution
,
p. 117.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONSTANT LENSES
WGSt6rn culture is a kind of Magi not line of the mind.
Philip Slater
In discussing reform and change in American higher education, ad-
vocates almost never acknowledge the full ideological significance of
their pet panaceas. Proposals for new governance arrangements, revised
admission standards, or individualized curricula more often than not
take place in ideological vacuums. It is not so much a case of ideology
being non-existent (which, of course, is never true) but that reformers
either deny or ignore the barriers which arise from it. This, in a very
real sense, is a fatal error that too often only shows itself in the
form of a blocked proposal, a dismembered reform, or a poorly imple-
mented idea.
The intention of this chapter is to examine the major elements of
mainstream American beliefs. These basic ideas serve to limit and
guide reform suggestions according to their own rationales. Until this
is more fully recognized and appreciated, advocates will continue to
create strategies designed to fail.
On Ends and Means
Let us begin with the rather simple notion that within each of our
heads there exists some image(s),of what constitutes a university or
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college. These images are influenced by a number of factors: 1) our
previous contact and experiences with education in general, as well as
with higher education; 2) our present relationships to such settings
(parent, taxpayer, student, teacher, sports fan, and so on); 3) the in-
formation and opinions we have collected on such places over the years
from family, friends, the media, governmental agencies, and a host of
other sources. From this melange, we each construct an image of what
higher education is and is not
,
as well as what we believe it should
strive to be.
These perceptions about higher education are both collective and
personal in nature. Some are shared images held by a wide range of in-
dividuals within the society. Others are uniquely subjective interpre-
tations. All these perceptions are nothing more than the mental images
which are part of a complex system of beliefs and opinions we each hold
about reality. This system refers to the "total universe of a person's
beliefs about the physical world, the social world and the self."^ A
belief system is v/hat gives meaning and understanding to our experi-
ence. It is through these beliefs that we both comprehend and interpret
reality.
Beliefs aid an individual in defining both the everyday situations
one encounters, as well as "how the present social, economic and poli-
tical order operates." Thus, beliefs about education comprise only a
^Milton Rokeach, Beliefs , Attitudes and Values : A Theory of Or-
ganization and Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972) , p. 123.
^Kenneth M. Oolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, Amer-.can Ideologies
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 3.
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small portion of a person's complete belief system. A person's total
belief system consists of all the varied perceptual lenses with which
he/she interprets the world.
Scholars frequently refer to this total belief system as a person's
—- °gy - typical explanation states: "Ideologies are integrated
systems of belief in which definitions of reality bear a relation to a
goal and methods of achieving it."^ Still others have defined it as
follows:
Ideology serves as a bridge by which community translates
timeless, universal values such as survival, justice, and
self-fulfillment into real-world application. It is the
framework of ideas that integrates and synthesizes all as-
pects of a community's being--political
,
social, cultural,
ecological, and others. Ideology legitimizes a community's
institutions--business, government, universities, or what-
ever—and thus it underlies the authority and rights of
those who manage the institutions.^
But, what is the source of our ideology? Our total culture defines
the goals of this belief system. In other words, American society,
through its heritage and social institutions, establishes certain end-
states of existence as desirable "frames of aspirational reference." We
all know that. From very early on we are taught that particular end-
states are much more important than others. Through games, family and
friends, teachers, television and endless significant others, we learn
the desirables.
^Ibid, p. 7.
^Will iam F. Martin and George Cabot Lodge, "Our Society in 1985--
Business May Not Like It," Harvard Business Review
,
LIII, No. 6 (Novem-
ber-December, 1975), pp. 149-150.
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What we often fail to realize is that how we accept these end-
states greatly influences what we see, experience, and do, and, more im-
portantly, what we come to expect. Conversely, these culturally deter-
mined end-states serve, in a very real sense, as boundaries to each per-
son's understanding of reality. Ideologies are the lenses that trap (or
free) mankind into particular ways of behaving and relating to one an-
other. They are the constant lenses which are so difficult to shed.
If the end-states are largely determined by our culture, what about
the means for achieving them? Robert Merton, among others, states that
our methods for reaching the desired goals are also largely determined
by what we believe. In other words, what we know as social structure is
derived from the same source of rationale as the end-states. In Mer-
ton's own words, social structure "defines, regulates, and controls the
acceptable modes of achieving these goals."® Thus, social structure de-
terniines the means or how of our lives. It dictates, clarifies, and
regulates the acceptable processes and activities to be utilized in pur-
suing the end-states.
Bel iefs and Val ues
We acquire our beliefs through a very complex and little understood
process. A person's personality structure, social setting, class and
economic background, and life experiences all come into play in this
process. Naturally, one of the central agencies associated with the
^Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomic ' .American Sociolog-
ical Review
,
Volume 3 (October 1938), p. 672.
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"learning" of our ideological frameworks is the nation's educational in-
stitutions. Through these organized academies, we inherit the "American
way of interpreting reality. We learn about the merits, inevitability,
and utility 6f our various institutions, their practices, and particular
social-economic-political goals. Though few could deny the importance
of other agencies and social units in this process (family, television,
music, peers, organized religion, etc.), it is the educational establish-
ment which performs an important and integral role in this indoctrina-
tion.^
Of course, we do not get inoculated with one holistic and inte-
grated ideology. A person may comprehend and integrate only a portion
of an ideology. Also, preferences develop between and among competing
beliefs. For example, we each make evaluative judgments about the
world: 1) whether it is good or bad; 2) what should be done about it,
if anything; and 3) why things are like this. In the process of answer-
ing these questions, we each come to value some end-states more than
others. Value suggests a choice among certain ends and means. It as-
sumes a personal preference or selection among competing and often con-
flicting activities and purposes. Also, values exist at all levels of
society. We have cultural values, organizational values, and personal
values. A dominant ideology, however, does exist, and, it actively
seeks to maintain the conditions, institutions, and customs which insure
the realization of its particular goals and values.
^Webster's dictionary defines indoctrination as meaning: "to in-
struct in any doctrine, or to imbue certain principles."
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As the Dolbeares have noted, an ideology may be so pervasive and
extensive that it is not perceived as such by a majority of its citizens
and analysts. Because what exists has been legitimized by history and
the prevailing power structure, its rationalizations and justifications
go largely unchallenged. Under such circumstances an ideology becomes
a device for infl uencing how people view reality and what are the appro-
priate courses of action open to them in a given situation.
America's educational institutions are a most active and willing
partner in the perpetuation of the dominant ideology. These educational
agencies derive their formal legitimacy, and often as not their finan-
cial support, from the society and its mainstream beliefs. Consequent-
ly, higher education tends to serve the society by translating, inter-
preting, and validating the acceptable beliefs and social-economic-
political customs. Education celebrates the dominant beliefs through:
1) its own academic value system; 2) the manner in which it defines and
disseminates knowledge; 3) the ways in which knowledge is organized; 4)
the mechanisms through which this is all perpetuated--namely , how these
organizations are structured and the processes by which they continue to
reach decisions about their activities and practices.
Baseball
,
Apple Pie
,
and Chevrolet
The concern here is with what has been commonly labeled as Ameri-.
ca's "mainstream ideologies." These consist of "ideologies that are es-
tablished, enduring, and orthodox and have dominated the thinking of
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American political and other leaders throughout the twentieth century.
Mainstream ideologies are those that give justification and meaning to
what already exists in this nation. These beliefs presume that the ex-
isting social order and class structure are permanent and fixed. They
support "what is" and do not challenge the underlying concepts and prac-
tices inherent in their view of reality. In this sense, these ideol-
ogies share a status quo explanation of how the society does and should
operate, both economically and politically.
What, then, are these dominant beliefs? Conventionally, they are
thought of as two separate but very much interdependent and overlapping
belief systems, capital ism-liberal ism . First, capitalism involves an
explanation of how best to organize the economic sector of society.^
But, because an economic rationale can never be singled out and isolated
from a total understanding of a given society, capitalism also holds
particular assumptions about how best to conduct the affairs of state.
On the other hand, liberalism explains "how and in the service of which
values the polity should be organized and operated."^ In actuality,
each belief system mixes its assumptions and values with the others so
that it is extremely difficult to determine where one begins and the
^Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies
,
p. 16.
®In a moment, we will offer a definition from another source. Re-
alizing that the present system no longer fits the classical definition,
one could easily label contemporary capitalism as a mixed economy (which
it obviously is); however, here we are dealing more with the basic be-
liefs purported by the system, not a description of an economic model of
how it actually functions.
^Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies , p. 18.
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other ends.
Capitalism, however, is normally associated with a description of
the American economic system. It has been defined as "the private own-
ership of the means of production and allocation of the resources,
goods, and services of the society through the mechanism of prices set
by competitive markets. "^0 Today, it represents a term which means much
more than a mere description of a so-called free market system. Capi-
talism is a total belief system which interprets certain "facts" about
human nature and the most appropriate routes to the good life.
Capitalism, for example, assumes that mankind has particular needs
(food, shelter, survival, etc.) which are basically individualistic in
nature. In order to satisfy these needs, an individual must struggle
alone against other individuals to serve those needs as she/he sees fit.
The primary value underlying this assumption is that mankind is largely
self-seeking in nature. Since our interactions and personal pursuits
are motivated by self-interests, we seek to maximize our rewards and
gains at the expense of others. Under these conditions, self-fulfill-
ment is best achieved through competition and the satisfaction derived
from those types of experiences. The measurement of successful achieve-
ment becomes associated with the possession of material goods. Status
and recognition are connected with material acquisitions--money, proper-
ty, goods, and so on. As symbols of cultural success, these separate
the winners from the losers.
The economic system and the subsequent social order generated or
lOlbid, p. 25.
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created by it are largely accepted by liberalism. As a consequence,
liberalism adopts the basic values of capitalism--individualism, compe-
tition, materialism, and especially the private ownership of property.
But liberalism is chiefly concerned with the most appropriate political
system for perpetuating and insuring these values. It envisions this to
be a free political market for the exchange of ideas, demands, and sup-
port among competing interest groups. In this sense, liberalism views
politics as a "pluralistic process. This means that decisions and
policies are seen as being made through a complex process of coalition
building, generation of popular support, persuasion, bargaining, negoti-
ation, and, of course, compromise.
To insure the openness and fairness of such a political system,
liberalism relies on particular rights and procedures as guaranteed by
law. Law or "legalism" assumes an important function in this ideologic-
al perspective. It is through the adoption of particular legal rights
by the body politic- -the right to own property, the right to participate
in political elections, the right to due process under the law, and the
rights of personal 1 iberty--that equal treatment is believed to be as-
sured for all citizens. The liberal perspective believes that the legal
system accomplishes a number of important things. It makes sure: 1)
that particular procedures and rules are used in the decision-making
process of the society and its agencies; and 2) that the government is
^Vor a classic discussion of the pluralistic perspective, see Ar-
nold Rose's The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967), especially pp'. 255-297. We will discuss this issue much more
fully in a forthcoming chapter.
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limited. The existence of a comprehensive legal system further insures
that conflicts are controlled, divergent and competing goals are chan-
neled, and compromise promoted through techniques which encourage accom-
modation and conflict avoidance. As has been stated elsewhere, "Liber-
alism places its confidence in the method by which decisions are made
rather than in the people who make them or in the inherent quality of
the decisions themsel ves . "^2 Consequently, stability and "working
through the system" become the bulwarks of such a belief system.
Most analysts are content to terminate their discussions on Ameri-
ca's mainstream ideologies at this point. However, increasing attention
is being given to new elements which sustain the traditional belief sys-
tems. In the recently published The New American Ideology
,
Harvard
business professor George Cabot Lodge proposes that education, in parti-
cular the fragmentation of what we have come to call formal knowledge
and science, must be added to the basic tenets. Let us discuss these
points for a moment.
Reality and the Scientific Legacy
We know that within certain social institutions, which our society
refers to as universities or colleges, formal education after the sec-
ondary schools is conducted. These bodies have been referred to as the
"trustees of cognitive culture. Their role and function are unique
^^Dolbeare and Dolbeare, American Ideologies , p. 68.
’’^Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, The American University
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
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in this regard. As institutions, they define what is worth knowing.
They pass on the cultural heritage to each new generation. Furthermore,
universities develop the acceptable processes through which one learns
these things'. They also construct the standards against which the know-
ledge acquired by the student is validated. And finally, it is the uni-
versity or college which must certify that the student actually knows
these things.
To truly understand higher education's power, one must first come
to grips with how it determines what is worth knowing. Today, the prin-
cipal approach to understanding and knowing reality is scientific in na-
ture. Science is a technique for comprehending many minute and global
facets of mankind's existence. It is one way of experiencing reality
that has been elevated to a position of eminence above all others. In
this sense, science represents mankind's continual quest to control the
universe through rational and cognitive means. Science is a searching
and discovery process based on the need to know in order to control, to
survive, to manipulate, and to dominate reality.
Science assumes we know what is real by following prescribed rules
—the major precept being the practice of objectivity, which involves
viewing the world without distortions or personal involvement. True
knowledge is supposedly acquired from observations of reality that exist
independently from any personal considerations and, objectivity is the
central assumption behind the scientific method.
^^For the novice in such matters, the scientific method encompasses
the following steps: 1) statement of the problem to be investigated; 2)
hypotheses as to the cause of the problem; 3) experiments designed to
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In Zen and the ^ ^ Motorcycle Maintenance, a most articulate
dialogue on science and reality, Robert Pirsig states that the real pur-
pose of the scientific method is "to make sure Mature hasn't misled you
into thinking you know something you don't actually know. "'5 On this
same course, Pirsig continues:
The whole purpose of scientific method is to make valid dis-
tinctions between the false and the true in nature, to elim-inate the subjective, unreal, imaginary elements from one's
own work so as to obtain an objective true picture of realityj^
The scientific perspective holds that reality, and by that we mean
the world with all its complexity, is best understood when it is reduced
to observable phenomena which can be experienced by the senses. This
bel ief--cal 1 ed empi ri ci sm- -consi ders all knowledge to be derived from
the senses. Under the guise of empiricism, social reality is inter-
preted as those objects that can be measured, counted, touched, and
otherwise observed. These objects also are believed to have connec-
tions to one another that can be discovered and explained by particular
cause and effect relationships. The more positivistic vein of this per-
spective assumes that there are laws governing human conduct and inter-
action similar to those in the physical and biological science areas.
Hence, science through the application of the tools of logic involves
test each hypothesis; 4) predicted results of the experiments; 5) ob-
served results of the experiments; and 6) conclusions from the results
of the experiments
.
^
^Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New
York: Bantam Books, 1975), pp. 100-101.
l^ibid, p. 278.
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the determination and interpretation of these relationships and laws.
Academic Machismo
The successful practitioners of scientific life pride themselves on
their cognitive skills, their ability to approach reality from behind
complex methodologies and conceptual formulas. To them, cognitive ra-
tionality is the ideology of academia, for cognitive rationality con-
trols intellectual pursuits in both theory and practice. It urges
faculty members to participate "in the development, the manipulation,
and transference of knowledge judged in terms of empirical validity.
As a value pattern, cognitive rationality says there are primarily
two ways in which to interact with and interpret reality. One is hard,
tough, rigorous and masculine in its approach. This is called object-
ivity. The other is soft, irrational, erratic and feminine, and it is
labeled as emotion and/or subjectivity. The first believes it can va-
lidate reality on the basis of empirical evidence. The latter is seen
as being too inner-oriented and thus potentially reactionary in its re-
sponse to the external world.
The practitioners of cognitive rationality view reality as objects
and problems to be dissected, analyzed, and solved. In the process of
reducing reality into smaller and more minute and manageable parts, this
faith is practiced in an ever increasing number of disciplines and spe-
cialties. And rationalism, as presently mastered, is best explained as
an inability to perceive wholes.
^^Parsons and Platt, The American University, p. 5.
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In the empirically dominated settings we call colleges and univer-
sities. one must be independent, self-assertive and emotionally under
control to survive. Faculty learn that they must be able to take it.
to be tough and resourceful. The traumas of graduate education and then
professional advancement require that they demonstrate strong, consist-
ent. and aggressive behaviors. Since the research and publication grind
can be very demanding, it means that the most competitive precise and
forceful persons are likely to be held up as role models. People are
frequently made to feel guilty if they do not select this rugged defini-
tion. Those who do not fit snugly into the mold are snickeringly re-
ferred to as intellectual light weights, soft researchers, flabby scho-
lars. or just too intuitive.
Once one looks deeply at these idealized descriptors of what con-
stitutes a good faculty member, the list appears more masculine-oriented
with each statement. It should be obvious then that success in the aca-
demic world is measured in machismo terms. Here, in these descriptions,
are the male images that have seduced generations of academicians, and
that the ability to successfully cope in these mental environments is
heavily weighed in favor of predictable male reactions.
Machismo is normally associated with such movie figures as John
Wayne, Clint Eastwood, and the late Gary Cooper. The big, strong, fear-
less cowpoke with the fast guns and a rough and tumble style is what
^^There is very little literature that makes this subtle point.
However, a stimulating piece is Judith M. Bardwick and Elizabeth Dou-
van's article, "Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women," in Vivian
Gornik and Barbara K. Moran (eds.). Woman in Sexist Society : Studies in
Power and Powerlessness (New York: Signet Books, 1972), pp. 225-241.
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first pops into the mind. This is the fellow that battles the bad guys
and then rides off into the sunset. We all recognize the stereotypes.
We have lived with them through the televised escapades of Matt Dillon
and the death defying leaps of Evel Knievel across the Snake River can-
yon.'® The machismo image is part of our national consciousness, it
generates popular heroes and influences even our foreign policy.
Academics are not inoculated against this imagery. Faculty members
frequently size each other up in machismo terms. In describing academic
work, they use the same type of language: "working at the frontiers of
knowledge," the academic man seeks to destroy the primitive truths and
legends of the pre-scientific world. The enemies they battle are com-
monly referred to as ignorance and prejudice. Instead of six shooters,
their weapons are objectivity and reason. Often driven by needs for
achievement, if not outright recognition, many race each other to see
who will win the prizes and prestige that accompany myth destruction.
From the DNA to desegregation to the space shots, they have competed for
the right to give advice, to present their right answers, to solve hu-
manity's unsol vable problems. They are modern society's ultimate
"answer men."
^^It should really not come as any surprise that the society values
these masculine images, for success itself is primarily defined in macho
language. For a longer and much more entertaining discussion on all
this, see Pete Hamill, "A Farewell to Machismo," in The Village Voice
(Vol. XX, No. 50), December 15, 1975, pp. 8-11. Also, see Warren Far-
rell's "The Masculine Value System: Men Defining Reality" In The Lib-
erated Man (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 14-28.
^^Robert Nisbet traces some of this in a rather apologetic account
entitled "Knowledge Dethroned" in The New York Times Magazine , September
28, 1975, pp. 34-43, and 46.
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J i me
, Almost
There can be little doubt that the application of scientific meth-
ods and cognitive rationality have lifted mankind from 'primitive" con-
ditions to "modernization." Moreover, the scientific approach to prob-
lem solving has aided in the curing of diseases, in the lowering of in-
fant mortalities, the expansion of crop production, and a host of other
technological or societal develop^nts. It has, however, also produced
most sophisticated tools for war and destruction. But in terms of
ideology, the scientific point of view has suggested that all other per-
spectives on reality are invalid. In other words, it has successfully
labeled all rivals as being generally inferior. The scientific approach
to reality has become dogma binding mankind to a certain set of views
about the nature of the world and our existence in it.
As the late Abraham Maslow, a noted philosopher-psychologist, dis-
cussed in The Psychology of Science, science is merely "one philosophy
of knowledge among other phi losophies . "22 u is largely a product of
Western culture and values, and, in this regard, shot full of assump-
tions about mankind and nature. It is also a product of a particular
time and place in civilization. This especially needs to be more fully
recognized. What is most unfortunate is that science per se has become
21 Those interested in a more supportive elaboration on the contri-
bution of science are directed to any of the works of Jacob Bronowski.
See especially The Common Sense of Science (London: Pelican Books,
1960) and Science and Human Values (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965).
22Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science (New York: Haroer and
Row, 1966), p. 1.
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synonomous with all knowledge. Science now serves as the yardstick upon
which to judge what is knowledge and what is worth knowing.
The Myths of Science
There are many lessons and suggestions implicit in the scientific
approach to reality. Perhaps, the most perplexing entails the doubt it
creates within many of us. For to accept the scientific interpretation
is to doubt and deny the validity of one's human experience. Why? The
normal person's perceptions are likely to be less than real. They are
suspect at the very least. They are not always arrived at through an
application of scientific methods. Undoubtedly, one's personal reality
is distorted and influenced by humanity's true nemisis, the emotions.
The first lesson is quite clear. In order to see reality as it truly
is, all subjective considerations must be eliminated.
In perceiving the world and reality in these terms, supporters of
science argue that objectivity allows mankind to demysticize nature.
Through scientific methodology and its subsequent abstractions, the
"true facts" about reality are finally discovered. These facts end the
rnysteries of life. Nevertheless, in the search for concrete facts, the
data gathered always remain a portion of the whole. Science is commit-
ted to dividing the world into smaller and more finite parts and then
building some structural understanding from these. The parts are con-
tinually lifted or sliced away from the whole, often out of the only
context where they have meaning. As science reduces the whole, the in-
terrelationship and interdependency among the parts is lost. The parts
become more than the whole. The end result is that the parts often be-
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gin to elicit an image of reality that is both incomplete and also
mechanistic.
There is an old scientific slogan^^ which goes something like this:
"Facts, justly arranged, interpret themselves." The key, of course, is
the phrase "justly arranged." The ordering of anything requires sub-
jective choices and considerations. Facts, in and of themselves, re-
quire interpretation. Selection of which facts to emphasize and how to
present them all involves some human criteria. It is often influenced
by a person's feelings about her/himself, the nature and worth of
others, and her/his view of the world and how it works, or, to make it
more relevant to this discussion: "A person's subjective state and
ideology comes into play in such choices."
Science has tried to lead us to believe that facts stand on their
own, and, it (science) has nothing to say or do with human values. Sci-
ence has stated, through some of its practitioners, that it is merely an
instrument for comprehending the how of life. It has no preferences
about the goals, purposes and rewards of life. It is detached and neu-
tral, or, in the language of the times, it is object! ve.^^
But science is rooted in its own value system. Values are involved
in the choice of what problems are to be studied, as well as the expla-
^^Much of this is drawn from the writings of Theodore Roszak. In
particular, this section comes from his edited work entitled Sources (New
York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), "The Mists of Objectivity," pp. 70-
81.
^^For a thought-provoking discussion on American intellectuals' ob-
jective pursuit of truth as it related to foreign policy and the Vietnam
war, see Noam Chomsky's American Power and the New Mandarins (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1967).
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nation of the results. Some problems are always seen as more important
than others. Or certain questions offer more challenge. The ability to
pose the right questions then is based on a sense of what is valued.
Choosing, rejecting, and selecting are all words describing the scien-
tific enterprise. Each denotes value.
The pursuit of truth, which is what science refers to as its pri-
mary purpose, is a derivative of values. Truth is in itself a value.
It involves judgments about the more desirable, more valuable, and more
perfect conditions. It implies a preference. It involves a choice
among other options.
Academic Ideology Revisited^ ^
The structure and processes of American higher education are best
understood as being consistent with the dominant ideologies. Higher
education is individualistic, competitive, materialistic, legalistic
oriented (politically speaking), dominated by objectivity, and influ-
enced by expertise thinking. The educational system--ranging from its
curriculum, requirements, grading practices, the "right answer" syn-
drome, to faculty status and tenure--! s geared in both process and con-
tent to support the dominant beliefs. More importantly, it is designed
to train people to view the world in ways which are largely congruent
with that belief system.
The student products of such a system are as fragmented as the in-
25ona could simply end these comments on ideology here but we have
taken the liberty of commenting on the ramifications of such a system,
from our perspective. . . .
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stitutions which nurture them. Trained to look at the world as a series
of objects, they begin to see each other as objects as well. Indoctrin-
ated in self-interests and the competitive ethic, it becomes easier for
them to treat one another in those terms. Since they can no longer
trust their subjective impulses, students frequently believe it is best
to manipulate each other as one would any other object. In the end, the
important thing is always to stay on top, to give the appearance of be-
ing a winner.
Our universities and colleges, in conjunction with the various aca-
demic disciplines and professional associations, also make choices about
what are the suitable areas of knowledge to be studied. Tradition and
the scientific value system generate a hierarchy of intellectual merit.
Microbiology and sociology are seen as more appropriate tests of the
mind than plumbing and woodworking. Even the most traditional disci-
plines believe that to be truly respectable one must be scientific. In
this manner, a discipline gains additional status by becoming political
"science." In other areas that sit lower on the intellectual totem
pole, the introduction of scientific tools has the potential to create
a new image. Under the mystique of science, a field like physical edu-
cation transforms itself into "exercise science."
Within the academic conmunity, the more scientific disciplines
sneer at those who do not pursue truth in their terms. Truth has come
to represent the level of abstractions dealt with and the utilization of
mathematical formulas. Truth is now facts supported by numbers. But
counting things implies that only the tangible or visible dimensions are
addressed. Anything that cannot be quantified is unreal and suspect.
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Truth insists that things are only what they can be shown to be.
What has been the result of such activities? The search for more
and more concrete facts has produced a multiplicity of often contradic-
tory answers. Pirsig described the phenomena in these terms:
The predicted results of scientific enquiry and the actual
results of scientific enquiry are diametrically opposed.
. .
The purpose of the scientific method is to select a single
truth from among many hypothetical truths. That, more than
anything else, is what science is all about. But historically
science has done exactly the opposite. Through the multipli-
cation upon multiplication of facts, information, theories and
hypotheses, it is science itself that is leading mankind from
single absolute truths to multiple, indeterminate, relative
ones. The major producer of social chaos, the indeterminacy
of thought and values that rational knowledge is supposed to
eliminate, is none other than science itself. . .
Yet, relativity of truth is denied. Truth is too often articulated
in fixed terms , ’meaning that the fragmentation of knowledge into many
specialized disciplines creates varying perspectives about what consti-
tutes truth. Each discipline and specialty area sees it differently.
Within a particular field certain "facts" may be interpreted as given
or absolute, however, divisions and disputes em.erge between and among
disciplines according to emphasis, understanding, and perceived import-
ance. Consequently, truth assumes authoritative dimensions only in re-
lation to its source. Since there are multi -hypotheses, truth is rela-
tive to who disperses it.
The issue, of course, is that human beings are more than objects.
26pi rs i g , Zen and the Art cf Motorcyc;
c
:'ia;ntenanco, 109 .
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Their problems are "living, inner, moral and intellectual" ones. 27 An
educational system and an ideology that denies this limits personal
knowledge. It generates a false sense of learning that is merely fo-
cused on the manipulation of facts and symbols, not on insight and self
discovery. It assumes that most learning comes only through external
sources.
. .from textbooks, libraries, classrooms, and professional ex-
perts. It promotes the illusion that someone else has all the answers,
and, if only we memorize the right ones, we can survive!
By only equipping the masses to deal with a particular type of
knowledge, one rooted in the cultural and scientific traditions, these
people are prepared not to live in the world, in some cases, not even
to cope with it. Students are simply being socialized as victims, fluc-
tuating from one personal and societal crisis to another. They are be-
ing trained to be both helpless and distrustful. Far too many are being
encouraged to escape reality through any means, believing that the only
solutions to the present traps and paradoxes are to be found in those
things that insure privacy. Hoping, in the end, that some drug or sha-
man will show them a route out.
The Limits of Ideology
There have been, of course, efforts to change all this. Others
have reported and chronicled the academic reform efforts of the past
decade. Generally speaking, they were seen as the work of "pedagogical
27Roszak, Sources
,
p. 75.
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leftists. "28 Their proposals were the product of a particular time and
place in American educational development. But it is safe to say that
the thrust of their ideas centered on reducing the isolation, aliena-
tion, competitiveness, sense of powerlessness, and lack of relevance in-
herent in most collegiate learning systems.
It is easier to see now that much of what they proposed was simply
a response to the symptoms of what they believed was wrong with higher
education. 25 What few of the change advocates were prepared for was the
overall resilency of the dominant ideology and its supporters. Few re-
alized that the dominant beliefs would determine what would be seen as
acceptable tactics and strategies for change, that would limit debates
and define what were the appropriate courses of action available.
The dominant belief system forced the new visions and their advo-
cates to play the game according to its rules. Even when there was suf-
ficient evidence and pressure to muster, the basic approach to change
was frequently one of reluctant accommodation. Higher education permit-
ted only certain issues to be addressed. All the while, the mainstream
belief system and its practices remained intact. Even when some pro-
jects were adopted, the dominant ideology stood ready to subvert these.
Nothing was implemented without feeling the continual presence of the
2^Gerald Grant and David Riesman, "An Ecology of Academic Reform"
Daedalus Volume 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), pp. 169-176.
25For a recent discussion on reforming the symptoms, see George
Bonham's editorial "Academic Reform: Still a Pseudoscience" in Change
(Vol. 7, No. 9, November, 1975), pp. 11-12, and 64. Also, in Chapter
III, entitled "Strategies for Deliberate Failure," we discussed at
greater length the limited success of these recent change efforts.
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forces of capitalism-liberalism and science.
Nevertheless, the mainstream ideologies we have discussed are pro-
ducts of the past. Each is grounded in the history, traditions and cus-
toms of our Western civilization. They are what has been. This com-
bined ideology represents what has dominated our thoughts and actions to
this point. In this regard, each is integrated and dependent upon the
others. Each gives meaning and support to the others. Their collective
forces serve to influence how we think about the world and ourselves, as
well as to dictate how we design and conduct our institutions. They al-
so serve to control what can be altered and how and act as our constant
societal lenses. So it will require more than new prescriptions to
change them.
chapter V
THE UNIVERSITY: IN SEARCH OF A METAPHOR
. . .existing (organizational) theories offer little hone-
Charles Perrow
No longer are the tasks and functions of most higher education in-
stitutions as clearcut as simply teaching and learning. The activities
conducted under the auspices of such organizations have become remark-
ably diverse. Most are presently engaged in things that range from
restaurant management to multi-million dollar fundraising efforts. In
the process of ever-expanding tasks and functions the learning organiza-
tion has become extremely complex and complicated. Today's educational
institution easily elicits descriptions which vary from "knowledge fac-
tory" to "giant marshmallow." In some ways, these metaphors point to a
major conceptual problem now facing higher education: there are no con-
sensus viewpoints about what these organizations are supposed to be all
»
about.
The goal in this chapter is to examine the familiar stereotypes
people commonly utilize as conceptual frameworks when discussing, ex-
plaining, and/or comprehending some facet of these organizations. It is
our contention that several metaphors influence the debates about the
nature of universities and have helped to create a bastard organization,
one that adheres to no single image entirely but instead practices the
86
87
compromise maxim: "Let's have something for everybody." Thus, in order
to survive the pressures of conflicting metaphors, the university has
been forced to accommodate the competing demand-.: of several distinct or-
ganizational' viewpoints
, each of which holds dvferent expectations and
presses for different organizational responses. Under these conditions,
such organizations become a diluted mixture of goals, functions, and
processes
.
For those interested in educational change, this poses an interest-
ing predicament. On one hand, proposals for change demand strategies
which recognize the conflicting metaphors that exist within higher edu-
cation. More importantly, those concerned with internal change must be-
gin to understand how the prevailing interpretations of the university
as an organization limit and guide their pet reforms, especially in
terms of the rejection and acceptance process. Beyond this they need
to realize that the pressures of these metaphors serve to subvert re-
forms once they are accepted. As you read what is to follow, keep these
issues in mind.
Organizational Consciousness
For over half a century now one of the fastest growing bodies of
literature has related to the study of organizations, all shapes and
sizes. In general, scholars have approached these social arrangements
like every other phenomena, from a language of vMell -formulated supposi-
tions which seeks to explain human behavior, action and events in those
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settings.' However, what one often forgets in sifting through the piles
of recent publications is that these perceptions belong to the experts,
not the common everyday organizational members. Regulars, if we may la-
bel these common folks with that term, rarely spend the time or have the
inclination for such analytic inquiries. Instead, the hypotheses they
do seem to operate with are a loose mishmash of previous organizational
experiences, personal encounters, half-understood theories, and a few
catchy phrases. From such insights people interpret their organization-
al worlds and create expectations for what ought to go on.
Whether by design or through indifference, the only model people
employ when comprehending their complex and dynamic organizations as
often as not emanates from a single expression or a combination of fuzzy
terms. Hence the conceptual frameworks most organizational members use
emerge not from some wel 1 -concei ved theory but from a single metaphor or
two. These metaphors are "borrowed from a variety of other institu-
tions, ordinarily without much of a conscious selection from the rather
large set of alternative models available."^ This usually happens be-
cause most organizational members are looking for some quick handle for
^ Si nee there is a potpourri of literature related to this topic,
those interested in a healthy dose of the various perspectives from
which the university has been approached theoretically are directed to
the following: 1) Herbert H. Stroup, Bureaucracy in Higher Education
(New York: Free Press, 1966); 2) James A. Perkins~(ed. ) , The University
as an Organization (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1973); 3) Tal-
cott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, The American University (Cambridge,
Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1973); and 4) John Andes, A
Systems Approach to University Organization (Washington, O.C.: United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1970).
^Michael Cohen and James G. March, Leadership and Ambiguity (Mew
York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), p. 30.
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classifying the organization. Few are interested in exploring the nu-
ances of organizational life beyond these mental reference points, thus
these terms become their descriptions for organizational reality, either
as they envision it or as they wish it would be.
As a consequence, within the university persons adopt various meta-
phors principally as a phrase for explaining the institution, for justi-
fying particular conventional practices, and for planning demands (or
expectations) on what ought to be happening in such settings. Although
one might draw from a wide array of metaphors, there are three which
have dominated higher education discussions in this country.^ These
are: 1) the university as a complex bureaucracy; 2) the community of
scholars; and 3) the democratic ideal. In the subsections to follow,
each shall be explored in some detail.
Hierarchy and Its Counterparts
A formal organization. . .has a well developed formal social
structure consisting of titled positions, giving those in a
higher ranked status the right to give orders to those of a
lesser rank and to expect the orders to be carried out.^
The explanation of organizational life that has reigned over much
%ome may say this is a somewhat arbitrary selection, especially
since Cohen and March have discussed at least eight. Still, these are
the most often used ones. Even those people who now advocate some col-
lective bargaining arrangements continue to be trapped in these percep-
tions. For a more thorough discussion on other higher education meta-
phors (the dispensing machine, the zoo, the mammoth cave, etc.) see
Charles Monson, Education for What? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970),
pp. 122-131.
^Everett M. Rogers and F. Floud Shoemaker, Conmuni cation of Innova-
tions (Hew York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 28-29.
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of this century is a bureaucratic one. Since the early writings of Max
Weber, this concept has come to mean "organized social systems wherein
tasks are assigned to individuals and to groups so as to attain, effi-
ciently and economically, through the functional coordination of all ac-
tivities, the objectives previously agreed on."^ Within the university
this metaphor has largely become associated with the administrative or
management aspects of organizational life.
But a bureaucracy is usually understood to encompass the following
basic features as well:
1) a hierarchized series of offices, each containing an area
of imputed competence, responsibility, and status, ra-
tionally organized and functionally related for the pur-
pose of achieving maximum efficiency in attaining prede-
termined goals;
2) an impersonal, routinized structure defined by systematic
rules wherein legitimized authority rests in the roles or
offices thereof and not in the person of the role/office
incumbent;
3) prescribed relations between various offices involving
considerable degree of formality and clearly defined so-
cial distance between occupants of these offices;
4) systematic rules aimed at minimizing friction and official
contact between office incumbents to patterns which pro-
duce a stable set of mutual expectations .6
Persons who make use of the bureaucratic metaphor interpret the
universities' activities as being responsive to several traditional ob-
^Charles A. Tesconi , Jr. and Van Cleve Morris, The Anti -Man Culture
(Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois PressTn972), p. 4.
^Ibid, p. 4.
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jectives—teaching, scholarly research, graduate training, and public
service. The adopters of this metaphor see the university as being or-
ganized into a hierarchy of tasks and authority relations in order to
most efficiently achieve these long-standing objectives. Thus the words
and phrases which they frequently attach to this description include:
division of labor, structure, hierarchy, authority, efficiency, control,
coordination, consistency, specialization, impersonal, rules and regula-
tions, status, pecking order, stability, and predetermined expectations.
However, if one were forced to select the three key terms which repre-
sent the essence of bureaucracy, they would probably have to be hier-
archy
, efficiency , and control .
First of all, the central assumption underlying this model is that
hierarchical arrangements are the single best means for accomplishing
work. The implicit message is that organizations ought to be designed
to deal with stable and routine tasks. VJhen this is impossible, then
the goal is to work towards the routinization of tasks. Hence, hierar-
chy supports the rational and systematic ordering of tasks into pyra-
midal arrangements. These formal arrangements denote the division of
organizational labor and signify the distribution of authority, as well
as which offices and positions are supposed to do what.
Beyond these rather basic notions of hierarchy is the belief that
fuels many of the organization's operations and activities, efficiency.
This is a crucial part of Vies tern culture's productivity consciousness.
Efficiency is a cornerstone belief of industrialized society which holds
an incessant infatuation with speed, precision, accuracy, and uniform-
ity. Besides being understood as the ratio of useful work obtained to
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energy expended, efficiency symbolizes a constant idol for organiza-
tional workers. Everything is weighed in efficiency terms.
For example, efficiency channels and directs organizational energy
by influencing what is done, when, where, and at what intervals. Effi-
ciency also greatly defines the parameters about how competency is to be
judged, as well as what the suitable work standards are likely to be.
But in judging worker performance it emphasizes a criterion that all too
often simply reinforces productivity thinking. By doing this the idea
of efficiency becomes ingrained in the minds of most organizational men
and women. Under such circumstances, it soon dictates how many of them
interpret and conduct their assignments.
At the same time, in order to secure efficiency, a bureaucratic or-
ganization (like the university) utilizes specific devices to ensure
that task routinization occurs. By choosing particular control devices,
usually in the form of rules and regulations, the bureaucratic model de-
sires to standardize tasks so that greater efficiency may occur. Yet,
these measures help to legitimize what can and does go on in an organi-
zation. But routinization brings both privileges and obligations along
with it. For example, in most settings rules and regulations encompass
everything from vacation applications to standard operating procedures
for office equipment. The real purpose of such devices is often to as-
sure organizational predictability. Within the bureaucratic university,
rules are frequently relied upon to direct and control certain courses
of action. Often as not, they take on a symbolic meaning as well and
thus assume a significance beyond their original intent. When this oc-
curs, rules and regulations become a tool for stability rather than a
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means to achieve particular goals.
There is one final point which relates to this metaphor. Since
hierarchical arrangements are a product of dividing organizational tasks
and functions in such a way as to achieve the most efficient utilization
of energy and resources, individuals are required under such a system to
develop skills which correspond to specific roles and/or occupations.
Bureaucracy demands a great deal of role and skill specificity. But the
definition of what constitutes those skills almost always stems from ef-
ficiency thinking, meaning that persons who perform a particular task
with great speed or precision are often thought to be experts. Exper-
tise may be more generally defined as having specific technical know-
ledge and/or concrete facts and information about a given area or sub-
ject matter.
Sometimes an organization can begin to distribute assignments in
such a way that it can be said to be developing a complex form of or-
ganizational careerism known as professionalism. Many commentators sim-
ply correlate professionalism with high task achievement.^ However, it
is much more than that. Professionalism encompasses a strict code of
behavior and a set of task or role-related standards. In many cases,
these measures are not necessarily written down anywhere but exist as
unspoken norms and expectations which are not to be violated. Standards
such as these are deep-rooted and often result from the processes
through which an individual receives his/her training. Consequently,
^Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, The American University (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
94
such codes are built directly into the person rather than originating
exclusively from any organization per se.
Professionals tend to only accept co-workers who have come through
the same initiation rites that they have. A high employment priority is
placed on hiring people with previous training or rather set qualifica-
tions. If a person has not experienced nearly identical preparatory
training, he/she is often seen as ill-prepared and/or less capable. The
whole notion of professionalism suggests a language, tools, methodology,
and task tnystique which are held as unique to all but its practitioners.
To be an expert is to know things that no one else does.
In summary, it comes as no great surprise to learn that the uni-
versity is seen by many observers and organizational members as a bur-
eaucracy. For most organizations in this society possess all the neces-
sary elements to be labeled as such. In this regard, the bureaucratic
metaphor deals rather nicely with a significant portion of social real-
ism known as university life. It captures, in its language and tone,
the formal structural characteristics which vividly express the essence
of such places--the division upon division of tasks and functions which
hide behind strange names on organizational charts. The term also seems
to convey the isolation engendered in organizations which appear dedi-
cated to sustaining endless streams of long lines for breakfast, for
registration, for identification cards, for advice, and even for ill-
nesses. And what phrase could better suggest the nameless faces in
such places who relish the power of rules than the graphic defamation--
bureaucrat!
There can be very little doubt that the university exhibits enough
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features of this description to warrant the title. Hov/ever, this
phrase, in many ways, is simply an explanation of part of academia's
organizational reality. One must blend in the unique aspects of its
professional subculture to further distort the picture.
The Mental Professions
From the end of the Civil War into the early years of this century,
the groundwork was laid for the emergence of academic disciplines. Dur-
ing this period, colleges went through a very slow and gradual trans-
formation as faculty members began to declare their specialization in
one or two disciplinary fields. Before this era most faculty were en-
gaged in instructional activities which encompassed a wide range of in-
tellectual pursuits. Soon national guilds and societies were formed and
scholarly journals were initiated to further share information and new
ideas. In short order, campus after campus adopted a fairly uniform or-
ganizational model, one that was greatly influenced by departmental ar-
rangements and professorial distinctions. All this soon produced dif-
ferent obligations and expectations for faculty. Most found themselves
responding to the pressures of departmental loyalty and other demands
for research and scholarly publications.
However, the authority of any professional system only works if it
is supported by some ideology. Within academia, this does not mean that
what constitutes knowledge must be fully agreed upon by everyone. In-
stead, it indicates that the climate and processes associated with the
creation of knowledge must be respected and protected. For the faculty
professional, the concept that serves to bind them together is commonly
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referred to as "cognitive rationality." The term cognitive represents
a general concern for the state of knowledge that can best be reached
through rationality
,
which had been defined as the "codification of
knowledge in terms of empirically valid observations. "8 This dominant
belief, shared by most faculty professionals, assumes that the true na-
ture of complex phenomena can be detected through the strenuous applies-
tion of rules of logic and reason.
Under the guise of cognitive rationality, actual and potential mem-
bers of the professions come to accept the basic guidelines and informal
code of this intellectual world. Faculty acquire an understanding about
the following matters: 1) what are the suitable research areas in their
disciplines; 2 ) how a scholarly journal article should be prepared; 3)
what conduct is considered appropriate and inappropriate in the class-
room; 4) how respectful one should be if one desires to advance up the
career ladder. So, in joining a discipline, one must agree, however
tacitly or temporarily, to the restrictions and distinctions of this
unique fellowship and to all the other requirements usually associated
with being a member in good standing.
Part of this happens rather naturally. Academic professionals
identify a large portion of their "self" with their way of work. One's
work serves to legitimatize a person's existence; it gives one some
sense of meaning and purpose. Also, to advance and prosper within a
^Gerald M. Platt and Talcott Parsons, "Decision-Making in the Aca-
demic System," in Kruytbosch and Messinger (eds.) The State of the Uni-
versity (Beve'^ly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 196877 p. 138.
97
mental profession, one must expend large amounts of physical and psychic
energy. Since the pursuit and maintenance of a career demands this sort
of investment, one must adhere fairly consistently to the official and
unofficial code of conduct. As a result, the code, and the concepts
which legitimize it, are often held in reverence and their perpetuation
becomes an almost sacred obligation. Therefore, the prestige of the
profession and the standards associated with it must be protected as one
would one's own self.
Yet there are benefits for playing the game according to its tra-
ditional rules. These may range from general promotions (going from
assistant to associate professor) to the ultimate contract for life,
tenure. Since most people are motivated to work for anticipated rewards
and not immediate ones, these incentives are academia's behavioral
chips. Each reward serves as another enticement into the profession.
In their disbursement, they represent an intricate sanction system that
supports certain normative reactions.
As an illustration, promotions are most commonly made on the basis
of "professional promise." This translates into such productivity
terms as: number of publications (journal articles, abstracts, pam-
^For a thorough discussion on the entire faculty evaluation pro-
cess, see Robert R. Hind, "Analysis of a Faculty: Professionalism,
Evaluation and the Authority Structure," in 0. Victor Baldridge, Aca-
demic Governance (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Pub! ishing, 1971 )
,
pp. 253-292. IT should also be noted that the overwhelming majority of
people who manage institutions of higher learning, those who hold upper
echelon administrative positions, are largely products of this same re-
ward system. They generally share not only similar career experiences
but comnon perspectives on what constitutes a good university, a good
department, and a good faculty member. The career ladder dictates
this.
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phlets, reviews, books, and so on), types of journal articles (in terns
of content difficulty), prestige of the journals published in, number
of federally or privately funded research projects and grants, and the
level of involvement in outside consulting work. Thus, achievements are
validated which primarily bring status and prestige to the department,
the individual, and somewhat vicariously to the university. Despite the
hue and cry of recent years for equal attention to teaching in the pro-
motion process, career advancements and tenure decisions continue to be
heavily dependent upon the old "publish or perish" criterion. And, in
a time of economic uncertainty, the reward pendulum swings even farther
out towards the research and publication end of the continuum.
Other factors contribute to the academic professional reward system
as well. There is no denying that the job of a faculty member can be
very gratifying. It is loosely structured and allows for a great deal
of personal creativity. Furthermore, the organizational climate of most
universities is filled with "flexible schedules, few deadlines, unin-
hibited bull sessions, conference going, freedom to publish, and so
on."^® Not to mention the prestige and status normally associated with
being a faculty member—doing consulting work, making little impromptu
presentations, being called doctor and all that can be pretty heady
stuff.
Nevertheless, the hidden payoff for most faculty members comes from
their need to be associated with bright people. This is the primary
^^Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations (Glenville, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972), p. 56.
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benefit of professional membership. As products of an educational sys-
tem that seems to idolize humanity's cognitive cultivation, these people
cherish the sanctuaries provided by most campuses. Here, in these set-
tings, they 'can engage the "best and the brightest" of their profession-
al colleagues, not to mention the intelligent young people who come un-
der their influence. Here, at least under the boom conditions of the
1960's, they could pursue some microscopic research interest without too
many distractions. Many are deeply afraid that such things cannot take
place with much consistency anywhere else in society, that such activ-
ities are only protected and nurtured on college campuses, and most im-
portantly, that the climate which has allowed this all to take place is
now very much in jeopardy.
A social structure such as this one can only exist if its member-
ship is protected somehow. Faculty members have survived and prospered
largely due to academic freedom. In the simplest language the concept
is primarily a license for professional autononiy. For several decades
now it has come to mean freedom of instruction and freedom of inquiry.
Within the boundaries of disciplinary standards, academic freedom
allows the individual faculty member some discretion to pursue his/her
own thing. The prevalent view today is that this concept guarantees
that each and every faculty member will be free from all external inter-
^^This is, of course, a much idealized version. From the days of
Scott Nearing to the more modern cases of Bruce Franklin and Angela
Davis, academic freedom has been si tuational ly practiced. This is es-
pecially true when political ideologies are presented in the classroom
or through direct political action which run contrary to the dominant
American beliefs.
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ferences in their affairs. Accordingly, it has come to mean that
faculty members are eminently more qualified to judge the competencies
of their particular departments as well. As one might gather from all
this, academic freedom has become the key rationale for arguing for
faculty members to have the right to control the nature of their work
situations, as well as who will do what, when, where and how. It is a
rationale that says faculty are the university and thus they should be
running it.
Communi ty of Scholars
To this stage we have sought to elaborate the nature of life in the
academic professions. If one were to further catalog the phrases which
comprise the ambiguous vocabulary utilized by this segment of the uni-
versity population, it would be filled with the following terms: scho-
larship, academic standards, rigor, excellence, intelligence, intellect-
ual development, reason and logic, academic freedom, autonorriy, disci-
pline, and, of course, tradition. It matters very little that most of
these are exchanged without ever being mutually defined. For these are
the verbal cues which comprise the academic professionals' perceptions
of the university and they see the organization not so much as it ac-
tually is but rather as they would like it to be.
The metaphor most often used to express this idea of the university
is "a community of scholars." In its customary usage, the term denotes
an elite fellowship, one composed mainly of credential ed faculty members.
The metaphor assumes the present day scholars remain dedicated to the
tirreless ideals of the medieval universitas: the preservation of cul-
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tural heritage, the pursuit of truth through the application of cognit-
ive rationality, and the constant creation of new knowledge. This
unique fraternity traces its roots back to the academies at Oxford, Cam-
bridge, Paris, and Bologna and to the legacies of Abelard, Bacon, and
Galileo. Hence, the current professionals see themselves as possessing
some ancient mantle which serves as perpetual pact with the scholarly
generations that have proceeded them.
Of course, today this metaphor is most frequently used as a nostal-
gic call for a return to those older days. Many modern scholars tend
to fantasize that "those were the days" when faculty members were at the
apex of power. In this respect, the metaphor represents a commonly held
n\yth in academia, that the classical acaden^y and even the nineteenth
century American college was a freer and more intimate place to practice
the arts of the mind than what now exists. Others believe that some-
where in the past campuses were marked by a common culture and more
clearly shared purposes. Thus the phrase--communi ty of scholars--has
become a sort of rallying cry for those who decry the management mental-
ity of many present day universities. People use the term as an easy
reference point for urging the re-establishment of those bygone days
when faculty power and authority were supposed to determine what tran-
spired in such places. Until now the metaphor has become not so much a
description of what the modern university is as an idealized alternative
to the bureaucratic impulses of control, coordination, and cost-effici-
ency. Then, in its present usage, the community of scholars is simply
a justification for recreating faculty sovereignty.
One need only inspect the thorough histories of a Hastings Rashdall
102
or Nathan Schachner to discover the false sense of the past inherent in
these organizational interpretations. From time immemorial, the moments
of shared purpose have been extremely infrequent. More often than not
the university has existed in a political context where external forces
(be they popes, kings, governments or economic depressions) have con-
stantly tugged at the internal operations. Even more importantly, the
academic enterprise has rarely been an idyllic setting, at least not the
community ideal professors often imagine. An honest history of most any
academic discipline, or the campuses where such things are practiced,
would likely be a chronicle marked by internal strifes, competition,
persecution of minority viewpoints, and enumerous displays of petty
jealousies. Without carrying these generalizations too far, conflict
more than cooperation has dominated the essence of this community.
However, the definition of what one means by "community" is the
crucial issue associated with this metaphor. If one simply applies the
word to a given university without fully exploring its meaning, then ex-
pectations are created which are both ambiguous and divisive. Too often
faculty have limited their vision of community to a particular geograph-
ical plot (say a campus) or the territory they call their department,
without realizing other dimensions suggested by the word. One cannot
have the shared purpose these people so desire without the intentional-
ity required to go beyond the isolation of professional and disciplinary
autonomy. This means a clear delineation of what those shared ideals
are that everyone (faculty, students, administrators) ought to hold in
conmon, as well as the behavioral and organizational expectations and
rewards required to reach these conditions. Also, one cannot speak of
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community and define membership in limiting ways, that is unless one is
committed to an exclusive fellowship. And, of course, the salient ques-
tion remains: Can individuals create the community faculty desire with-
in a bureaucratic structure like the modern university, or, more import-
antly, should they even try?
No matter the significance of these questions, the metaphor per-
sists. It has been translated into the major utopian vision operant in
academia today. As we will see in the next section, community is no
longer just a fantasy for faculty members. Even radical students, theo-
reticians, and social critics have ascribed to this dream but in very
different ways.
The Jeffersonian Legacy
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. ^2
From the writings of Kant, Locke, or Marx, one can find many refer-
ences to an ideal social order. However, within American political lit-
erature, the pen of Thomas Jefferson has produced some of the most il-
luminating tracts on humanity's potential. In particular, the scholar
from Monti cello gave this nation two concepts which have lingered in the
imaginations of all those who aspire to some higher collective good.
These concepts are equal i ty and the power of the people . The one word
"•^The Constitution of United States (New York: Barnes and
Noble Pubfi shers , 1 9687, p. 22.
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that most symbolizes the intention of these concepts is democracy.l3
recent times, these propositions furnished a generation with the rhe-
toric of protest, if not a simple solution for achieving the liberty and
happiness that Jefferson so desired.
Beginning with the Port Huron Statement, students and other critics
articulated a significant portion of the past decade's change agenda.
We would replace power rooted in possession, privilege, or
circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflect-iveness, reason, and creativity. As a social system we seek
the establishment of a democracy of individual participation,
governed by two central aims: that the individual share in
those social decisions determining the quality and direction
of his life; that the society be organized to encourage inde-
pendence in men and provide the media for their common parti-
cipation.
Students for a Democratic Society,
196214
This thesis applied the thrust of Jefferson's declaration to the
university, as well as to the society in general. In doing this the
concepts of equality and power assumed broader interpretations. Equal-
ity, for example, became more than just a matter of equal opportunity
under the law; it meant that people had "a right of membership" which
assured them equal representation and a voice in determining societal
and institutional affairs. This argument usually was an extended para-
l^Carl Cohen, the distinguished political philosopher, has defined
democracy as "that system of community government in which, by and
large, the members of a community participate, or may participate, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect them all."
Carl Cohen, Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 7.
l^Charles Monson (ed.). Education for What? (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1970), pp. 217-225.
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phrase of Jefferson's manifesto: "In free societies all those affected
by a social policy have an inalienable right to a voice in its formula-
tion. Then power, the primary instrument for achieving equality, be-
came almost solely equated with some form of democratic decision-making
and all types of organizations (governments, universities, corporations)
were urged to adopt more distributive forms of management.
The password for this view of the university became known as parti-
cipatory democracy. This concept was initially championed by and for
the student population (who continue to be the constituency most en-
amored with the democratic metaphor). But in rather short order enfran-
chisement was urged on all organizational members. Theoretically at
least, this was supposed to bring about a new sense of shared responsi-
bility, one that would reverse "the trend toward concentration of poli-
tical authority in the hands of elected representatives and appointed
experts.
Arnold Kaufman, a major spokesperson for this position, defined
participation as essentially involving "actual preliminary deliberation
(conversations, debate, discussions) and in the final decision each par-
ticipant has a roughly equal formal say."^^ It was to have two unique
features: 1) the dispersion of authoritative decision-makinq- -this as-
^^Earl J. McGrath, Should Students Share the Power? (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1976), p. 51.
^^Terence E. Cook and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.) Participatory Demo-
cracy (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971), pp. 3-4.
"•^Arnold Kaufman, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," in
William Connolly (ed.). The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton
Press, 1969), pp. 191-192.
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sumes that an organization can become more open and responsive by trans-
ferring decisions downward from some centralized or hierarchical loca-
tion into the hands of its general membership; 2) the direct involvement
of a^teurs—participatory democracy further assumes that it is wise to
legitimatize the active participation of novices throughout the delib-
erative processes jhus the aim of this model is not to create an in-
stitution run necessarily by majority rule but one where everyone has
equal influence through decentralized decision-making mechanisms which
permit "codetermination" and "responsible collaborations."
Although the democratic metaphor may simply be applied to the uni-
versity as a more realistic appraisal of the multiplicity of values and
interests operating within and upon the institution, those who identify
with this description tend to utilize it in a very optimistic manner.
Implicit in the democratic approach is a fundamental belief in human po-
tential. This faith holds that divergent groups of people can come to-
gether in a spirit of harmony and cooperation. Part of this is a con-
tinuation of a familiar message. The primary presupposition of demo-
cracy is "the existence of a community within which it may be operat-
ive."^^ In its present usage, democracy is seen as a rational technique
for establishing community, for creating self-government, and thus em-
powering people with the creative and constructive power needed to
achieve greater happiness. Within the university, it becomes a word
1
8
Cook and Morgan, Participatory Democracy
, p. 4.
^^Cohen, Democracy
,
p. 41.
20Kaufman, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," p. 184.
107
that represents both the benefits of shared power as well as a valid
learning experience that prepares one for a more fulfilling existence.
Again, realizing that this is another ideal for the university, let
us review for a moment the central assumptions underlying this view.
The democratic metaphor suggests: 1) that power resides somewhere in
the decision-making process; 2) that by giving everyone (usually stud-
ents, faculty, and administrators) an equal say, power will be shared;
3) that through legislative devices based largely on our federal system
of government (constitutions, new governance units, committee member-
ship) participation can best be insured; 4) that amateurs can have equal
influence in these arenas; 5) that other organi zational members share the
democratic faith and thus will make every effort to see that the "parti-
cipatory" system works.
If this descriptor can be understood in such an optimistic fashion,
then it can also be interpreted as an extremely naive view as well.
The democratic perspective almost totally neglects the fact that its
aims are most incompatible with the nature of the university as we have
discussed it in this chapter. For example, the conditions necessary for
democracy to exist--whether organizational, intellectual, or psycholog-
ical—are not present to any significant extent in most higher education
institutions
.
To begin with, in an organization where formal authority and the
spirit of professional expertise stand as rather constant opposing
forces to one another, no democratic wand, with all its good intentions,
can easily transform the real power and status differences perpetuated
by such divisions. Furthermore, the structural conditions (the func-
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tional lines and specializations) combine with America's dominant ide-
ology (individualism, self-aggrandisement, etc.) to form a competitive
situation where it is very, very difficult, if not impossible, for or-
ganizational members to transcend their own parochial self-interests.
Also, due to organizational size, complexity, and variations in issues,
it is rarely possible for every member affected by a given decision to
fully participate. Moreover, many organizational members do not parti-
cipate due to exclusionary provisions, indifference or deliberate
choice. Of course, there are other structural limitations that take the
form of rules, laws, and rituals which further prevent or inhibit par-
ticipation. And finally, the mutual trust and cooperation needed to
form democratic bonds are antithetical to the expectations engendered by
the other metaphors that we have discussed.
Yet as congressman-political scientist T. V. Smith said over a
quarter of a century ago: "democracy is more than a form of government.
It is also a way of life. . . Those who continue to support the
democratic metaphor ignore the barriers; they strive to put theory into
practice at an institutional level. However, in advancing expectations
for fraternity, community, equality, and liberty, they set themselves up
for frustration, cynicism, and the always reluctant acceptance of unmet
ideals. Still, their vision of an open and democratic university calls
for a new level of human interaction, one where people will respond to
one another with a sense of tolerance and fairness that is well beyond
21t. V. Smith and Eduard C. Lindeman, The Democratic Way of Life
(New York: Mentor Books, 1963), p. 7.
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what seems presently possible. So the organization they seek to re-
create remains, in the immortal words of J. P. Jordon, "about as demo-
cratic as Saudi Arabia."
The Metaphor Mi
x
Existence is beyond the power of words
To define;
Terms may be used
By are none of them absolute.
It would be rather ludicrous to propose that these terms explain
all that the university seems to be. These are the images which parti-
cipants and onlookers alike most frequently apply to academia. And, in
that respect, these are the descriptions which most often dominate their
state of mind about such places. Yet what people perceive as the true
image varies significantly. What the university has evolved into for
many is a loose collection of these metaphors and others as well. Now
most either approach the university from one of these images, from some
unique blend, or with no perspective at all.
This furnishes a most unusual dilemma for those who wish to change
such places. Not only must they confront three opposing interpretations
of organizational reality, but they also must develop proposals and
ideas which are able to negotiate the precarious balance which exists
between these perceptions. So few "change agents" realize that the
merit of their suggestions depends quite heavily on whose perceptions
22Lao Tzu, The Way of Life , trans. and ed. by Witter Bynner (New
York: Capricorn Books, 1944), p. 20.
no
are being challenged or supported. More often than not these reformers
are not even cognizant of their own organizational biases nor the con-
tradictions inherent in these three views.
But, If one were able to spread each metaphor and its accompanying
assumptions out on a table, like some giant jigsaw puzzle, it would soon
become rather apparent that the pieces just do not fit, at least to-
gether. Why? The images contradict one another. Each is a different
perception of the nature of organizational power, control, loyalty, and
how the university ought to be managed.
Today's university represents a tenuous balance of these competing
descriptions which has resulted from a chemistry process based largely
on accommodation and historical accident. University after university
has adjusted its sense of organizational reality in such a manner as to
reconcile the conflicting demands of these three images. Until now al-
most anyone could point to some aspect of these visions--be it the
hierarchical arrangements of control and coordination guarding the cen-
tral administration, or the spirit of autonomy hiding behind depart-
mental collegiality, and even the pseudodemocracy of campus governance.
Still, when an organization begins to harbor a significant number
of members with either very divergent conceptions of institutional re-
ality or with no clear image at all, then a false sense of harmony ex-
ists. Beneath the surface of placid cordiality, participants no longer
share common ideas about how the university ought to be managed, what
objectives are primary, and the nature of legitimate authority. At the
roots of their contrasting dreams, these things (and other issues as
well) are all open to disputes and different interpretations. Thus, un-
in
der circumstances where supporters of one view bejin to exert their in-
terpretations on how the university performs (as during the present era
of system management and centralization), then the balance becomes dis-
rupted and tension, if not outright conflict, results.
The arena for these disputes often becomes the university's govern-
ance system. In fact, if one separates the metaphor mix, the essence of
their differences repeatedly centers on how decisions ought to be made.
In the next chapter, we will explore this issue from both a theoretical
and descriptive standpoint.
CHAPTER VI
POLITICS AMID THE mi£
For the politics of education, while related to larger poli-
tical crosscurrents, has exhibited unique tendencies over the
past century, tendencies too often blurred by the conmonly
held fiction that education is non-political.
Lawrence Cremin
In the last two chapters, we have attempted to analyze two major
issues which limit the possibilities for change in American higher edu-
cation, namely, mainstream American ideology and the nature of the uni-
versity as an organization. Now we want to merge these into a discus-
sion about institutional decision-making. For it is through the deci-
sion-making system that ideas about reform and change get played out.
In this chapter, we will argue that not only does the dominant ide-
ology discriminate against certain kinds of ideas, and this is espe-
cially true of proposals designed to address inconsistencies in the or-
ganization and its common practices, but it favors a decision-making
system which plays a conservative function rather than an open one.
How? By legitimizing a complex decision-making system which channels
interests through various governance and bureaucratic mechanisms, and
also the procedures and rituals connected with those structures, the de-
cision-making system has the potential to direct and to influence com-
peting claims on the university. These mechanisms and the principles
underlying them can be and often are utilized to manipulate the "scope
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of conflict" and effectively bias the possible outcomes. Thus the sys-
tem becomes less of an open forum for the free expression of competing
interests than it does an instrument for controlling certain issues and
concerns
.
With regards to this, the decision-making system performs several
disturbing functions: 1) it projects an image that higher education en-
courages open discussions and debates on various issues and problems,
when in actuality the system merely represents a series of theatrical
stages for cooling off conflict and airing general frustrations; 2) by
allowing weaker groups to become involved in a biased system a partici-
pation put-on is perpetrated without any real risk to decision outcomes;
3) a work within the system" ethos provides a potent stimulus for those
with different views from the mainstream bel i efs--requi ring them to
either ignore the decision-making system entirely, play the game accord-
ing to established rules and rituals, or face negative sanctions; 4) the
system acts to slow down reform and change by forcing proposers of al-
ternative views to make adjustments and compromises if they want ap-
proval for their ideas; 5) by virtue of this, the decision-making system
is able to transform reforms into less threatening proposals. The end
result of such a system is that it provides a stabilizing tool for the
more status quo-oriented forces in the university, and, in many ways,
serves to solidify their position.
The plan in this chapter is to explore institutional decision-mak-
ing in terms of the pressures, tension and rivalries which result from
the university structural and territorial relationships. Particular at-
tention will also be given to the pluralist interpretation of university
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decision-making, which serves to rationalize the present conditions of
decision-making and explain prevailing arrangements. An effort will be
made to demonstrate the limitations of this interpretation and how it
impacts negatively on proposals for change.
Caution
, Decision Ahead
A complex decision is like a great river, drawing from its
many tributaries the innumerable component premises of which
it is constituted.'
Since Simon's classical work on decision-making in the late 1940's,
there have been literally hundreds of books and articles written about
this subject. The act of choice, the processes leading up to that
choice, as well as those associated with decision implementation, have
all been rather extensively analyzed so much so that the concept or word
"decision" is very much maligned. Much like other social science terms,
it is now a contested concept with as many interpretations as there are
organizational theories and explanations for understanding human behav-
ior. For that reason, it makes some sense to offer a few words of cau-
tion and introduction on this subject before we delve any deeper into
the mixed bag known as university decision-making.
Any definition or explanation of decision(s) and the processes as-
sociated with it are linked implicitly to some basic assumptions about
human nature and human conduct. No explanation better illustrates this
^Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press,
1957), p. xii.
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point than the so-called "rational model" of decision-making. Popular-
ized by the economic school of decision analysis, this view corresponds
quite nicely with the dominant American ideology's justification of hu-
man behavior. Ideally, it sees the act of choice as being very delib-
erate and calculative. Furthermore, it envisions human beings as maxi-
mizing creatures who define their goals and/or problems, find alternat-
ive ways to achieve or solve these, evaluate each alternative, and then
select the most appropriate one to act on.
Of course, social psychologists and other researchers have demon-
strated the shortcomings inherent in purely rational explanations of de-
cision-making. Time, personalities, values, and personal biases often
come into play when decisions are reached. Also, more often than not
people act first and rationalize their responses later. Yet the ra-
tional model represents the principal normative standard against which
all decision-making is judged. In this sense, the rational model is
both an ideal and a value, encouraged and pursued by organizational so-
ciety. It urges that all actions be measured on the basis of reason
and intelligence. Lest we forget, neither of these are value free.
Nonetheless, when you have an organization pursuing many different
tasks and objectives, some coordination of effort is required between
individuals and larger clusters of people. Consequently, arrangements
are established to deal with organizational priorities, to distribute
various jobs, to evaluate performances, to allocate resources and space,
and an endless number of other matters. The method by which an
organi-
^Ibid, pp. 66-78.
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zation makes choices about such matters is referred to as its decision-
making or problem-solving system. This almost always involves some pat-
tern of communications and relations between organizational members and
groups. The manner in which these things are conducted is called the
organization's decision-making processes. The term "process" refers to
"how" decisions are actually made.^
Katz and Kahn, among others, stress that there are also types of
decisions which include the following: 1) the formulation of substant-
ive organizational goals and objectives; 2) the formulation of proce-
dures and mechanisms for achieving goals and judging performances; 3)
setting routines for the application of existing choices to ongoing op-
erations; and 4) ad hoc decisions that impact on both goals and the al-
location of organizational resources--space, money, personnel, etc.^
Thus, all sorts of decisions are being made constantly at various levels
throughout the organization. Some decisions deal with relatively rou-
tine matters and others with more substantive issues or problems.
But there is always a thin line between such distinctions. A rou-
tine decision usually deals with general procedures, rules, or interpre-
tations of how a particular job should be performed. While a decision
that affects the entire institution (budget cuts, tuition increases, en-
rollment rollbacks) almost always seems more significant than those
^There are commonly thought to be four general processes: 1)
problem-solving, 2) persuasion, 3) bargaining, and 4) politics. James
G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp.
129-131.
^Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology, ^ Organ iz_a_-
tions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 196^, p. 260.
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which impact on a single student or a particular subunit.
Few decisions are never cut and dried matters. There are always a
number of stated and then some hidden considerations attached to any is-
sue or problem. For example, a decision to offer a course in a given
discipline includes these sorts of considerations: 1) the perceived
need for such a course; 2) the benefits to the department for offering
it; 3) the availability of a competent instructor; 4) his/her general
reputation, qualifications and work load; 5) whether a time and class
location can be arranged; 6) who the potential student audience might
be; 7) the difficulty associated with getting the course approved, if
it is a new offering; 8) the availability of resources and rewards.
Also, every organization has established some balance betv/een who
has control over which issues and/or decisions. This is usually refer-
red to as the centralization-decentralization continuum. To illustrate,
there are certain decisions which are made by members of the central
administration unilaterally and others which subunits have more directly
under their influence. Weber classified the continuum according to five
zones: 1) admi nistrati ve domi nance- -decisions made strictly by the cen-
tral administration with little or no input from any other groups; 2)
administrati ve primacy
—
decisions made by the administration but with
some consultation; 3) shared author! ty- -decisions by the administration
and faculty in full collaboration; 4) faculty primacy—decisions made by
the faculty with some consultation; 5) faculty dominance
—
decisions made
5
unilaterally by faculty.
^Arnold Weber, et al . Faculty Participation in Academic Governance
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Despite the limitations inherent in this schema, the important
point to recognize is that different types of decisions are being made
at various levels throughout the institution. For example, faculty mem-
bers may select the books they wish to utilize in a particular course
but someone in the central administration designates how the books are
to be ordered and where they are to be purchased on campus. Or students
may select their semester courses but the faculty normally determines
which courses will be offered and often the sequence in which a given
course may be taken. In other words, even though different levels have
the authority to make certain kinds of decisions, some decision are ob-
viously more important than others and the choices which may be avail-
able are frequently predetermined or at the very least limited in some
way.
There are also many points of confusion in the literature over the
distinctions between the terms decision and policy. As we have mention-
ed earlier, decisions are most often viewed as an actual choice which
results from some specific deliberations. Granted, there are also a
whole range of decision types which include everything from non-deci-
sions to muddled ones. In its normal usage, however, policy implies a
more important decision involving salient courses of action effecting a
significant number of people. Although more researchers do acknowledge
the incremental nature of single decisions being merged together over
time to form policy statements, the term policy is almost always seen as
the more critical label. Due to the fact that the two terms are often
(Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1967).
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interchanged for one another, there will be no effort to define or dis-
tinguish between the two beyond this point, except when required by the
interpretations of a particular source.
The Governance Maze
The organization represents the walls of the maze and, by and
large, organizational decisions have to do with solving maze
problems, not reconstructing the maze walls.^
Every institution of higher learning has some formal and informal
system of governance. This entails a diverse number of processes and
agencies through which choices are considered and made about institu-
tional priorities and the allocation of effort and resources. As one
might imagine, the most appropriate description for such a decision-
making system is that it resembles a very disjointed and complex maze,
for the essence of such arrangements is extremely bureaucratic.^ Formal
authority is delegated from state accrediting agencies which grant in-
stitutional charters to the university's board of trustees and then on
to the president.
The winding paths of decision-making within most universities ac-
tually begin with the president or chancellor, as the case may be, for
it is through this individual that authority is delegated inside the
campus. Below the president reside the various vice-presidents, deans.
^Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations .
^Jack Lindquist, Strategies for Change (San Francisco: Pacific
Soundings Press, forthcoming)
.
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-and directors for such things as business affairs, food services, aca-
demic matters, student services, alumni development, and so on. Each of
these positions is joined by specialized units with their own staff and
office personnel. Within this loosely overlapping framework a number of
groupings exist. Table 3 provides a clearer illustration.
Table 3
The Structure of Governance^
A
Governmental
Agencies
Sprcm Jack Lindquist, St£atenje^ f^r ^airge
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There are various kinds of decision-making bodies at different
levels of the organization. At the top are various administrative coun-
cils for the executive level officers to present and discuss matters of
mutual interest. In the middle are regular deans meetings for largely
the same purposes. Then each division has its own configurations, both
formal and informal, designed to coordinate the personnel in that parti-
cular area, as well as more permanent policy making groups on specific
topics of interest. In addition to these arrangements, there are a host
of faculty-oriented bodies. These usually include a representative sen-
ate of some sort with related councils and committees. Also, smaller
units encompass such topics as personnel matters, curriculum, space and
calendar, student life, budgetary matters, long range planning, and a
wide range of ad hoc concerns.
The walls of the maze also include student decision-making groups.
In residential campus situations, these include everything from dormi-
tory councils to campus -wide student government associations. There are
also commuter student assemblies, fraternity councils, married student
associations, gay student alliances, political groups, and all the
others which comprise the current generation's consciousness.
Grafted on to all this are the collective bargaining units. With
a growing percentage of institutions operating under unionized condi-
tions, these units represent an increasing number of campus employees
and constituencies. And these agencies add an entirely new element to
the maze, one based on legalized processes for bargaining and contract
negotiati on
.
Perhaps there was a time, say in the early years of this century.
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when Airerica's institutions of higher learning seemed to have a single
unified structure. Now the modern university resembles a maze where a
number of groups and subunits vie for every available nook and cranny,
claiming them as their own private space. From these points of limited
vision, each views the university in its own terms and not as a whole.
Each perceives its mission and objectives as predominant. Each over-
emphasizes the importance of its activities, as well as what it may be
capable of achieving. Some groups seek to cultivate institutional
power, to give advice and influence decisions, while strictly maintain-
ing their own autonorriy and independence. Others believe their perspect-
ives and leadership should dictate what the institution seeks to under-
take. Still others just want to be left alone, to exist as islands in-
sulated from larger concerns and institutional problems.
Terri tories and Ri ghts
The present university may be conceived of in territorial terms.
This refers to a particular field of things--a space in which boundaries
are set, patrolled and defended by some occupant or group of occupants.^
Normally, a territory is envisioned as a physical space like a library
or an admissions office. But organizational territories are more than
that; they encompass specific roles, tasks and functions that become as-
9The major source for most of this discussion is Erving Goffman.
Although much of his writing focuses on face-to-face interactions, it
has significant implications for those interested in understanding other
facets of organizational behavior. See Relations in Public (New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1971), especially Chapter 2, "Territories of
Self," pp. 28-61. Also, see Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative
(New York: Atheneneum, 1966).
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sociated with the divisions of labor. It implies a definition of or-
ganizational identity, a mapping of duties, responsibilities, power and
status. Thus a territory suggests not only the places of organizational
work, leisure, and residence, but also the activities that extend from
these.
In this sense, each territory believes it has special privileges
and interests. These may be thought of as jurisdictions, organizational
rights that are derived from traditions and formal authority relations.
Or they may simply be claims that have been granted because of expertise
and/or organizational needs. Over time, however, a territory (and its
occupants) acquires a unique and frequently distorted understanding of
this delegated as well as interpreted set of rights.
Although a territory is created through the granting of authority,
the field and activities associated with it soon become considered def-
inite entitlements. Territorial occupants exercise control over these
privileges as if they were actual material possessions. Their organiza-
tional belongings are personalized and then guarded with a zealot-like
fervor. As an example, when policies and actions are suggested for the
organization as a whole, occupants tend to favor those which seem des-
tined to enhance the importance of their possessions. With this in
mind, they oppose expenditures and other actions which do not fit into
their conception of the organization.
Occupants want their sphere of influence to be as autonomous as
possible. Although they may not envision all their missions and activ-
ities as fixed, they resist anyone outside of their preserve interfering
with what they actually do. Having occupied their spots for some time.
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in many cases, they assume a permanency that appears deep-rooted. Their
attachment is derived from the sense of ownership and psychological ad-
vantages which accompanies having one's own private space. However,
people who are part of a territory, no matter how loosely affiliated
with it they may be, can and do form bonds which transcend personal and
professional differences when faced with possible intrusions into their
affairs
.
Because it is often difficult to comprehend where some territories
begin and end, it often seems like there are no clear boundary markers
between preserves. Only when some encroachment occurs do we learn what
a territory believes is under its purview. But boundaries are constant-
ly being probed, tested, renegotiated and contested within the univer-
sity. One of the most often played organizational games involves trying
to anticipate which territories and occupants may react to a given ac-
tion, or what response a territory may make to a specific proposal.
For over a decade, the most publicized struggles in higher educa-
tion have been about territoriality and trespassing. First, it was the
students in the sixties who tried to carve out larger preserves and
rights for themselves. Then it was an administration, faced with eco-
nomic turmoil, which fought to balance the distribution of funds
throughout the territories. Now the focus is temporarily turned outside
the university to federal and state agencies that are intruding on ter-
ritorial operations. There seems to be no end to the potential en-
croachments.
Territories form the university. They divide the university into
an ever growing number of special groupings that include students,
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faculty, administrators and an expanding array of other people. Terri-
tories are a very real by product of hov/ we organize universities, es-
pecially the bureaucratic arrangements which emphasize hierarchy, divi-
sion of labor, and isolation.
But each territory requires somebody to defend it so that its power
and status can continue. Territories are designed to keep people from
one another, to exaggerate differences and spawn conflict. When an or-
ganization becomes dominated by territorial "we-they" perspectives,
parts begin to believe that they are incompatible with one another.
Each preserve develops what it thinks is its own unique sense of purpose
and direction. Competing goals result that further generate value dis-
agreements, tension, and a lack of trust among participants, until the
university as a whole appears torn betv^een a multiplicity of missions,
uncertain and ambiguous to everyone. Decision-making, under such cir-
cumstances, becomes increasingly ah expression of political advantages.
A Political Explanation
Although many persons have written about the university from a po-
litical perspective, J. Victor Baldridge popularized this explanation
with the introduction of his doctoral dissertation in a book form en-
titled Power and Conflict in the University .^^ As a sociology graduate
student at Yale, Baldridge spent several years studying how decisions
were made at New York University. Utilizing techniques of participation
^®We have also chosen Baldridge because his work is the most rep-
resentative of the pluralistic position on university decision-making.
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observation, surveys, and personal interviews, he generated the data
which lead him to a political interpretation of decision-making.
The major focus of Baldridge's research is on policy formation. Me
explains his selection in these terms:
. . .major policies commit the organization to definite goals,
set strategies for reaching those goals, and in general deter-
mine the long range destiny of the organization. Policy deci-
sions are not just any decisions, but instead are those that
have major impact; those that mold the organization's future.
In short, policies are the 'critical' decisions, not merely
the 'routine' ones.
. .
.*1
Baldridge believes policy decisions are so important that people
throughout the organization try to influence the final outcome so that
it coincides with their values and interests. He labels the processes
associated wi th those influence struggles political.
Baldridge views the university as a complex pluralistic system
which is fractured by conflict "along lines of disciplines, faculty sub-
groups, student subcultures, splits between administrators and facul-
ties, and rifts between professional schools. Thus, the decisions
which are reached within the university are often the product of con-
flict resolution among quite diverse competing interest groups. The
central thesis of Baldridge's study deals with interpreting decision-
making as the result of bargaining and negotiations between various
groups all pushing and supporting particular goals. Furthermore, the
Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971 ) , p. 21.
12 Ibid, p. 105.
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goals of these interest groups represent divergent values that foster
continual and on-going degrees of conflict within the organization.
Though there may be many goals shared commonly by several interest
groups, the institution appears so complex and fragmented that the
"shared values" are often overshadowed by the divergent interests.
In addition, the world for most universities includes both internal
and external environments, each with its own set of special interest
groups. In order to more fully understand the "political system" of a
particular institution, the observer must know the structural arrange-
ments, participants and values of both those inside the institution as
well as potential external influences. Under these conditions, the po-
litical process not only takes place within the context of the univer-
sity, but along certain structural boundaries, both formal and informal,
which channel the conflict into the decision-making process. In a ra-
ther fluid manner, the decision-making process tends to move in and out
of various structural arrangements (academic departments, governance
bodies, and administrative units) which overlap and affect numerous in-
terest groups. Thus politics is an activity that is not only multi
-
interest oriented but also multi -leveled as well.
Baldridge goes on to report:
. .
.there is an insulating and segregating phenomenon , for
the different parts of the system are often protected from
direct conflict because they are not concerned with the same
issues. . . . The departments have one set of interactions,
the college or school another, the entire university another.
It confuses the issue to talk as if all these levels were com-
peting for the same types of influence or for control of the
same issues. Ordinarily this is simply not so, for each level
128
is charged with different responsibilities and different
spheres of influence.
.
.13
As one might imagine, conflict often emerges when particular subunits
are in direct or perceived competition with one another. But the poli-
tical battles appear initially as competing claims for authority and
jurisdiction. The debates evolve from questions about who has respon-
sibility, into who either wants responsibility, or how to influence
those who do.
Though we have briefly discussed the decision process, it is the
nature and forms of interest groups which give substance to this plural-
istic model. As an illustration, Baldridge believes the faculty com-
prises one of the major subcultures within an institution. Its ranks
are filled with members who represent varying statuses, values and goals.
A partial list of faculty concerns might include: research and the ad-
vancement of knowledge, the preservation of a given discipline, main-
taining job security, control over tenure and promotion decisions, im-
provement of teaching practices, concern for the growth and development
of the student, the application of knowledge to contemporary social
problems, and so on.
Accordingly, faculty will agree and disagree about the merits of
these items within disciplines, across school or college lines, and in
general, throughout the university. In a sense, the pluralist model be-
lieves there is a certain amount of flexibility within the system which
may make for strange bedfellows on any particular issue. And faculty
’3ibid, p. 108.
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interest groups may range from specific faculty members within a given
discipline desire to see the department move in certain curricular di-
rections, to a campus-wide subgroup of the local American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) chapter that advocates faculty unioniza-
tion.
To summarize the pluralistic approach, decision-making is the re-
sult of a complex political bargaining process. Because the university
is a diverse organization, fragmented by interest groups and structural
arrangements, decision-making rarely rests with any one official.
Powerful forces exist--interest groups, bureaucratic officials, influ-
ential individuals, organized subunits--that cause issues to surface
within the university's political community. Decisions then are the
products of informal decision networks, governance bodies, and commit-
tees, as well as professional and bureaucratic influence. The success
or failure of any given group under this system depends on its trust of
central governance figures, what organizational resources it possesses,
and its persistence in bargaining.
More often than not the first political struggle involves where an
issue or problem lands for deciding, in other words, the actual decision
location. By the time this occurs, in Baldridge's own words, "decisions
are usually pre-formed to a great extent. . .not all options are open
and the choices have been severely limited by previous conflicts
Compromises, bargaining and negotiations then describe the political
process itself. But even when an issue appears resolved, the contro-
14 Ibid, p. 190.
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versies and struggles are likely to continue on to the next concern and
thus the conflicts in values and interests never seem to end.
The Biased Forum^^
To this point we have accepted the pluralist interpretation unques-
tioningly. One must realize, however, that this is merely a single ex-
planatory position among competing theoretical perspectives. In essence
it holds that decision-making is the result of mutual adjustment between
competing forces. Of course, such an analysis can be both incomplete
and misleading.
To begin with, the pluralist perspective says: the university po-
litical system offers to all who are organized, persistent, or have the
time to spend, an opportunity to influence the institution's goals, di-
rection and management. Is this really so? What about those members
who are not part of any organized group? One could respond by saying
this interpretation is especially distorted in favor of the stronger,
more organized group and subunits.
Next, one needs to ask: if bargaining and negotiating have a great
deal to do with determining decision results, surely there are people
who do not possess these skills and are always at a disadvantage. More-
over, this approach places significant importance on two power related
variables: trust for authority figures and persistence. It says
very
^^Much of this discussion was influenced by the writings of
William
E. Connolly. For a more elucidating critique of the
CPP Cnnnnllv's edited work The Bias of Pluj^alism (New York: Atherton
PrLri969K especially hiFTwiT^apter entitled "The Challenge to
Pluralist Theory."
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little about what happens when the authority figures do not trust those
who are being persistent, or how those with perceived power can and do
deflect what they do no^want to deal with.
An important ingredient in the pluralist analysis is the belief
that interest groups and individuals have the potential need to influ-
ence the system. For in the pluralist's eyes, the system simply refer-
ees the decision-making process in a neutral manner. Yet one must ask
quite candidly whether this forum is as tolerant and accommodating as
this perspective would lead us to imagine. Does everyone have the right
and ability to express their opinions and interests effectively? And,
if they do indeed, does the expression of an interest or opinion corre-
late with power or influence? In other words, how much of this exchange
process is simply symbolic?
What we are alluding to is the fact that most university decision-
making systems are designed to allow people to think they might have
some influence. In actuality, the system is more theatrical than any-
thing else; what is decided is largely predetermined and as often as not
inconsequential
.
There can be very little disagreement over the fact that the deci-
sion-making discussions appear real. The people who participate in
these meetings do feel involved in the management of the university, no
matter how boring and meaningless the discussions might seem at times.
And, of course, there is some expression of choice. Participants do af-
firm policies, veto provisions, recommend problems for further study,
and defeat the adoption of controversial ideas. But these acts take
place within a particular context, one that is heavily weighted in favor
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of certain opinions, traditions, and customs.
Whatever the conditions, little is presented that has not been ex-
plored informally with the principal groups concerned. This is less
true for students; they frequently view consultation as cooptation. In
other cases they are excluded from the more significant deliberations by
design and/or ignorance. With regards to faculty and campus administra-
tors, most matters are at least pretested with key officials and opinion
leaders. Those issues which have not undergone any prior parley are
often considered along lines that anticipate the responses and reactions
of influential persons or interest groups likely to be concerned with
the issue, idea or problem.
Few concerns ever really pop up unannounced. When something unus-
ual or controversial does sneak through, there are numerous tactics for
derailing it. The issue can be directed to a particular governance com-
mittee for study; or if it comes out of one of these structures, it can
be sent back for reconsideration, more information, and/or further cla-
rification. All these are rather classic techniques for simply saying:
"This is unacceptable."
Therefore, the decision-making system of most American institutions
of higher learning must be viewed as being designed primarily to furnish
a theatre, a stage, a setting for artificial interactions. This thea-
trical metaphor does not mean that participants are actors with fixed
roles and lines, though surely some case could be made for a variation
of that analysis. Rather, these settings are places where symbolic
^^See, for example, Harold L. Hodgkinson, Educati on , Interaction
,
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gestures are made, where political charades are conducted, and where
participants act out their power and influence needs. Governance meet-
ings in particular supply a portable stage where members can let off
steam, talk about the state of the organization, discuss problems, and
make suggestions about what ought to be done, with the assurance that
some captive, if not attentive, audience will be there to listen.
The purpose of a system which is more theatrical than it is delib-
erative is to provide for performance arenas to limit and control what
is possible within the university, and to create an illusion of shared
power among major participants. Such a system serves primarily as a re-
lease device for the conflicts which exist between community members and
a mechanism for orchestrating desired outcomes. It imparts a false
sense of power for members who need to believe that they are important
and that the choices they make in those settings really matter.
The Power of Context
When people talk about changing higher education, whether it be an
entire institution or some aspect of its operation, they must inevitably
face questions of strategy and tactics. A significant portion of this
reflection involves determining responses to how one ought to confront
the decision-making system. Regretfully, too many would-be change agents
move their pet ideas forward without fully realizing the context in
which decisions are weighed.
and Social Change fEnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
,
^Inc.
,
T9F7)V and' especially, Ferdinand Mount, The Theatre of Po1itic_s_ (New
York: Schocken Books, 1973).
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In most cases, proposals are suggested which fail to take into con-
sideration two very critical factors: (1) that the context of decision-
making is almost always biased by academic h'istory and mainstream Ameri-
can ideology; (2) that the nature of power to accept or reject a given
reform idea is greatly influenced by bureaucratic arrangements.
As we have stated elsewhere, decisions and decision-making pro-
cesses for that matter are not amoral or value-free. A course of action
which is chosen in some deliberative process denotes a temorary commit-
ment in favor of certain actions, procedures and/or desired conditions
over other possible alternatives. Thus no decision can honestly be
viewed as neutral. Although any choice may be selected through seeming-
ly rational processes, it emerges out of specific ideological con-
straints which help to define what constitutes a possible and/or reason-
able act or alternative in a given society or social unit. Then deci-
sion-making always takes place against a backdrop of values and beliefs
which serve to legitimatize some actions and discourage others.
Furthermore, our unique blend of capitalist-liberal philosophy com-
bined with scientific rationality creates a biased interpretation of re-
ality which serves to explain, justify and mobilize support for parti-
cular practices and institutions. In conjunction with this, over time
the university has developed its own belief system which justifies and
explains many of its practices, as well as its relationship to the
larger society. These also support particular customs and practices
within higher education. Still it is this mixed ideology (both academic
and cultural) itself which constitutes an effective set of pressures and
expectations which help give meaning to our daily lives as well as
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greatly influence, in conscious and unconscious ways, the decision op-
tions we consider appropriate and viable.
Inherent in this ideology are specific rational, pragmatic and ef-
ficiency-oriented assumptions which often influence what is viewed as
possible actions. These assumptions support a brand of skepticism which
measures issues and concerns on an imbalanced scale, one that often se-
lects options on the basis of "realistic criteria." In many cases, the
pragmatic features of this ideology effectively prohibits alternative
visions of reality from being assessed, either through deliberate sub-
version or simply by labeling the ideas as irrational. This establishes
ideological limits around what can be tested and tried within a society
and its educational institutions. And even when new ideas are intro-
duced, the dominant beliefs serve to discredit them.
There are probably no better examples of this phenomenon at work,
in both cultural and academic terms, than the issues of grading prac-
tices and experiential learning.
Initially, grades came under attack during the 1960's because they
were seen as a part of the competitive ethic of society. Education was
viewed as having a major role in sustaining and perpetuating that value.
After several years of struggle, some variations on the pattern of com-
petitive grading were adopted. But, in many cases, institutions have
backed away from trying to tamper with these practices.
Though the reasons for this vary from place to place, most critics
of grade reform efforts simply admit that competition is seen as a na-
tural phenomenon, something which is basic to all human existence and
thus unalterable. Consequently, proposals designed to play down com-
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petit! veness run directly into not only ideological factors which oppose
such notions as id_ealistic but a complex set of interrelated cultural
practices that validate competition. From sports events to the Graduate
Record Exam and on to the ladders of upward mobility, competition is
reinforced to such an extent that few countersuggestions are likely to
generate enough energy to overcome these forces. Thus non-competitive
efforts end up being discussed in a contextual environment where the
forces for change are far out-numbered, in conscious and unconscious
ways, by the forces of the status quo.
In terms of experiential learning, we have a very different set of
reactions. For example, advocates for internships and field study op-
tions have been much more successful than one might first imagine, for
one thing supervised field experiences can be presented in pragmatic
terms. Giving students a chance to test out career opportunities is
viewed as a reasonable idea, especially in a market situation where cit-
izens and government agencies are stressing the importance of education
which is tied to employability.
On the other hand, reformers find more resistance when they discuss
the more volatile issue of assessment of prior learning. To suggest
that someone's life has value which can be translated into credit terms
is truly revolutionary in academia. The more tradition bound disci-
plines, in the humanities and social studies areas, view education as
being largely classroom and book-confined. To somehow be able to review
a person's life and fix credit equivalency to parts of it is viewed as
both a foreign process and an erosion of academic quality.
In this sort of situation, legitimate interests are often denied.
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distorted, suppressed, and/or ignored if they do not correspond to the
prevailing views. Whenever possible, this ideology tries to limit which
concerns are able to gain access into the decision-making system of the
university, as well as the reception those issues are likely to find
once they have been presented. It also establishes a special legitimacy
and rationale for conventional practices and procedures. Thus people
with alternative ideas and new concerns inevitably encounter dual bar-
riers, ones consisting of ideological rigidness and resistance.
Intermingled with these ideological constraints is another context-
ual nemesis, the nature of bureaucratic arrangements and the tools it
furnishes for status quo elements in the university. Most of the re-
search on power in collegiate settings seeks to ascertain whether the
organization is controlled by competing power groups or some power elite
alignment. These studies miss a very subtle point; it matters little
whether the university is an oligarchy or not. The power of bureaucracy
is found not only in who occupies which sets of influence, but it rests
also with how such arrangements monitor and guide decision-making (both
formally and informally) along certain channels. Moreover, power re-
sides with the ability and potential of bureaucratic structures to force
almost any proposal to go slow, be compromised, or face endless delays.
There is, of course, a curious paradox associated with all this.
It is that reformers rarely realize it but their first choice before em-
barking with any idea is really: "should we engage the bureaucracy or
not?" For once a group commits itself to an approval process, to having
some authority pass judgment on whether the idea is valuable or not,
then it must accept the fact that the idea is doomed to certain predict-
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able happenings.
To seek approval is to negotiate the maze: Why? Because the pro-
cess of approval means that the maze is going to be empowered with par-
ticular rights. It also means that those with a given suggestion for
improvement will attempt to secure permission from an ever ascending
number of department heads, deans, bureaucrats, conmittees, and coun-
cils. In essence, the quest for official sanctions entangles the idea
with the structural dynamics of the organization, and the maze is de-
signed to place immeasurable checks and balances on any suggestion for
change.
To begin with, specific types of decisions --budget, tenure, hiring,
program devel opment--happen along what may be labeled "action-chan-
nels. "^7 These channels structure the decision process, pre-select the
major participants, determine when each participant enters the process,
and distributes specific advantages and disadvantages to each person in-
volved. These are the bureaucratic and governance related structures
that channel issues for discussion. Since both these are hierarchical
in nature, it matters whether an issue percolates up the maze, surfaces
somewhere in the middle, or is sent down from above.
A central expectation of the system is that issues and participants
are to follow the proper channels. As an illustration, student leaders
who desire to change dormitory regulations but decide to take their case
directly to the university president are likely to be asked immediately
^^Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971), pp. 169-171.
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whether or not they have discussed their concerns with the "proper au-
thorities." The first question will almost always be: Did you check
with the dormitory councils, the director of residential life, or the
vice-president for student affairs? Those at the top of the organiza-
tion often hesitate to act on issues which fall in someone else's per-
ceived territory. Also, people who are bypassed in the presentation of
an issue resent not being consulted and may express their discontent by
subverting the final outcome.
So the first rule of decision-making urges the participants to move
their issues according to prescribed courses. Of course, not everyone
pays attention to it. Nevertheless, inherent in the custom is a belief
that certain members have a right to review particular issues. Besides
the tediousness and built-in inertia generated by such arrangements, it
also tends to produce a system that is cumbersome and timid. For one
things, organizational members often hesitate to make suggestions for
change because it takes so long to get anything substantial approved.
If they do venture forth with a new idea, there are so many check points
that it is easy to stall or stop almost any idea.
Also, rules differ according to the issues at stake. Issues take
different routes and involve different people depending on whether they
originate in academic departments, relate to budget matters, concern
physical plant problems, or deal with external relationships. In gen-
eral, though, there seem to be four major considerations that influence
what happens along the routes or channels. These are:
1) Who Must Sign Off? Many issues require several groups to agree
before any action can take place. In other cases, when people
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are known to be opposed to a given course of action, the matter
may be bent to their wishes, terminated entirely, or moved for-
ward very silently without the knowledge or involvement of op-
posing elements. The existence of sign off claims creates a
system that is always concerned with the receptivity and will-
ingness of overlapping groups to go along before decision ac-
tion occurs.
2) Through Which Channels Is an Issue Required to Pass? Specific
types of issues are supposedly required by governance agree-
ments and bureaucratic customs to take rather set routes. This
is especially true of curriculum matters which have long been
under the purview of faculty. A proposal for a new course us-
ually moves from a departmental committee to the school or col-
lege level and then on to a dean, an all campus council, a
vice-president for academic affairs, and finally to the board
of trustees. People with a new proposal realize that the more
check points which have to be engaged the greater the risk for
alteration and/or outright failure.
3) How Hi gh Up Does an Issue Have to Go? Many concerns can be and
are settled at their point of origin. But issues that impact
on the institution as a whole or on a significant segment of it
are expected to make their way to the upper chambers.
4) What Form Does an Issue Have to Take? Some things surface in
the decision-making system without any shape to them, but few
ever stay that way very long. They are analyzed, dissected,
outlined, and written up. Even when this is not the case, no
141
issue makes it through the system on its merits alone. The
perceived influence of the issue-presentor, plus the style and
language of the presentation, play an integral part in whether
an idea is accepted or not. Also the form is likely to change
drastically based on current needs and interests of those list-
ening to the presentation. If it does not meet their present
needs, the whole matter may very well end up in someone's file
thi rteen.
Several things may be deduced from this little list. For example,
the most important silent rule deals with anticipation. People delib-
erate a wide range of issues with their ears to the ground. They are
concerned, perhaps overly so, with how specific interest groups and key
participants are going to respond to a given action. Thus the system
often hesitates or fails to react because decision-makers are apprehens-
ive about arousing v/hat they see as "sleeping giants." Above all else,
decision-makers seem bent on avoiding conflict and most will seek to
avoid it whenever possible.
Also, this system functions on a fear of failure principle. This
might be better called the "what-i f-something-goes -wrong" syndrome. On
both the bureaucratic and formal governance sides of the university,
hesitancy and timidity are encouraged. People learn that caution is the
surest course, that risks denote waves and these might upset the balance
of institutional stability. Faculty and administrators also come to un-
derstand that being liked by one's supervisor is important to organiza-
tional survival. Sticking to principles may be admired in some quarters
but there is no assurance that it will be rewarded. The best course is
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a moderate or conservative one; it does not endanger one's position nor
take the university into unchartered waters.
In summary, it is the context under which decision-making is acted
out which represents the greatest barrier to change in American higher
education. These learning institutions exist within a culture where
certain values and behaviors are interpreted as more worthwhile than
others. This ideology places an invisible boundary around what can be
tried and in what ways. In addition, the structural characteristics of
most universities remain bureaucratic, which adds still another set of
barriers to the process. Invariably, such arrangements work to slow
down and block significant proposals for change.
CHAPTER VII
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
If God had wanted us to walk, he would not have invented roll-
er skates.
Wee Willie Wonka, from the movie
version of The Chocolate Factory
In this the concluding chapter, we attempt to integrate the dis-
sertation's major thesis. Particular attention is spent on reiterating
the failures of the liberal analysis which dominated academic reform ef-
forts in the past decade. In addition, a distinction is made between
institutional and social change. Change advocates are urged to acknow-
ledge that conventional reform tactics are often illusionary, the es-
sence of the cultural system remains the same. A more transitionary
strategy is then articulated. To demonstrate how this approach might be
operationalized, an effort is made to show how work in America can be
intimately tied to a new social and educational change agenda.
The Liberal Dilemma
We were operating on the theory that here was a problem, you
expose it to the world, the world says "How horrible!" and
moves to correct it.'
Bond's statement clearly demonstrates typical 1960's assumptions
^Julian Bond, "The Movement Then and Now," Southern Exposure , Vol-
ume III, No. 4.
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about change. Time and events showed this to be a most simplistic and
naive view. One does not achieve change by means of fair play, justice,
and rational problom solving alono.
This might be called the structural change approach. Followers of
institutional change believe various interventions can be introduced to
rectify certain perceived negative conditions in an organization or so-
ciety. In most cases, these actions are designed to either add on new
functions or remodel aspects of an old structure--without altering, to
any significant degree, the essence of the total system.
Those who advanced structural change proposals in higher education
often found: (1) that standard channels of power withdraw from anything
but the most modest of proposals; (2) that at best such ideas are likely
to be viewed as merely temporary responses, usually accepted during
times of crisis; (3) that the standard resistance factors--bureaucratic
imperatives, cost-efficiency, academic disciplines, professional self-
interests, and the conventional wisdom about teaching and learning--are
not easily negotiated.
This constitutes the perimeter of what we will call 'the liberal
dilemma.' You see the central thrust of structural change strategies is
liberal in its origins. This liberal analysis says one can manipulate
parts to alter the whole. Piecemeal internal efforts (be they referred
to as reform, innovation or renewal) are then interpreted as mechanisms
for adapting institutions to new sets of values, behaviors and relation-
ships. But one soon learns that mainstream ideology, organizational
patterns, and the continuing (but too often denied) biases of decision-
making always seem to dominate America's institutions of higher learning.
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The dilemma is that many reformers now find themselves trapped be-
tween equally unfavorable alternatives. They are convinced that v/hat
they tried failed and what exists is not qood enouqh. In other words,
the conditions which originally necessitated the liberal responses have
not been sufficiently eliminated, and the panaceas which were suggested
were often subverted, ill -conceived, or impossible given their lofty ex-
pectations. The end result seems to have produced an era of lowered ex-
pectations, tempered visions, and a growing sense of powerlessness.
Part of the current dilemma evolves from the liberal analysis it-
self. This perspective invariably focuses on institutional issues as
separate problems to be solved. Frequently, it leads reformers to envi-
sion organizational symptoms in terms of single causal factors. Demands
are then expressed which call for quick answers--what Hannah Arendt once
called "the lust for plausible answers." Too often, however, the issues
are not adequately linked to the social and cultural conditions which
produced them.
Over and over again, the liberal analysis suggested programs that
were designed to fail.^ Governance, admissions, curriculum, instruc-
tion, grading practices, and various rules and regulations all fell prey
to liberal interpretations. In other words, all were seen as separate
levers to be manipulated, problems to be solved.
This perspective did, of course, accomplish some critical things.
For a while, changes were made. Responses to problems were introduced
^For greater details, see an earlier chapter in this dissertation
entitled "Strategies for Deliberate Failure."
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and some people said: "See, the system does work." Yet, many persons
were dealing with things (processes, structures, and functions) as the
source for change. In this sense, change all too often became trans-
lated to mean simply new techniques. More importantly, the changes
which developed did not alter, to any great extent, the basic values and
beliefs of the larger cultural system. The basic motivational system of
American culture remained the same. That system continued to support
profit-oriented, individualistic, competitive, and exploitive interpre-
tations of human reality.
In summary, the liberal analysis coopted reformers and neutralized
those who wanted more. People either became paralyzed by the failures
of pet schemes or drew false conclusions. Still, the logic of liberal-
ism created a major contradiction. To paraphrase Michael Harrington,
liberalism worships two opposing idols: reform and the status quo. On
one hand was the demand for change. On the other hand was a general ac-
ceptance of human nature, basic political arrangements, and the economic
system which supports and creates those things.
Social Change
To this point, the argument is basically that what were suggested
as potential changes for higher education did not alter the essence of
the dominant culture. Why? For the most part, university change has
tended to be seen as simply playing with the means of internal educa-
tional processes. 3 Proposals for academic reform almost never grappled.
^For two important exceptions, see Michael Rossman, On Learning and
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in very concrete ways, with the ends of higher education, namely, that
higher education is in the service of the larger culture.
Philip Slater once wrote: "Change can take place only when insti-
tutions have been analyzed, discredited, and disassembled, and the moti-
vational forces that gave rise to them rejected into alternative spheres
of gratification."^ Slater is calling for a radically different way of
thinking about change. His view requires one to begin with the contra-
dictions inherent in the dominant culture and also for examining the mo-
tivations and institutions which create such things.
America's contradictions would include social inequality, racism,
poverty, hunger, sexism, the polluted environment, the demise of small
towns, and alienating work conditions. Those who lost their innocence
in the struggles to deal with some of these issues in the last decade
know that such things are interconnected. This is where the difference
between institutional and social change begins--! n the ability to accept
the inter-rel atedness in our lives. In other words, to move beyond lib-
eral reform, one must seek to understand the complexity of the politic-
al, economic, and social forces which help define America's brand of
late twentieth -century reality.
Those concerned with both social and educational change must begin
with a simple realization. First, if credentialing is to continue, and
there is no indication that we can expect otherwise, then those commit-
Social Change (New York: Vintage Books, 1972); and Ivan Illyich, De^
schooling Society (New York: Harrow Books, 1972).
^Philip Slater, In Pursuit of Loneliness (Boston: Beacon Press,
1970), p. 125.
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ted to social change must move forward along two intersecting lines:
(1) engaging issues which address the means of higher education (inter-
nal processes and structures) and, this is the critical point, (2) de-
veloping strategies and programs which confront the ends of higher edu-
cation (the nature of life after credential i ng) . Naturally, there could
be at least two basic responses to this: (a) the radical response--
which tends to say that whatever happens must begin with the imnediate
'deschooling of society' by establishing school s-without-di pi omas; (b)
the transitionary response--which counters by saying that intermediate
goals can and must be established which will lead to some radical ob-
jectives .
The position we wish to explore here is the second one.^ The next
impetus for social change will have to come partially from a strategy
which links educational means to cultural ends. In order for that kind
of change to occur, educational change advocates will have to do these
things
:
....establish organic links between ideas which seek to fix up
higher education and those designed to confront contradic-
tions in the larger cultural milieu;
....develop carefully thought-out strategies to influence both
the timing and methods for implementing these ideas; and
strive to always initiate an idea which builds on an ear-
lier one.
^Andre Gorz, the French social critic, says the major challenge is
to create the conditions which will lead to a cultural transformation.
In his opinion, this can best be accomplished through a long transition
of both small and large scale actions. See Andre Gorz, Strategy,^
Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and Socialism ^ Revolutigii (Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973).
149
A logical reaction might now be: "Is this really very different
from the liberal position? Is this merely another euphemism?"
To begin with, transitionary strategies realize that change occurs
in dynamic phases. Change is part of a progressive struggle. There are
no quick overnight, easy, one-shot sol utions--even under revolutionary
conditions. Rather, social change must be judged in terms of its power
to reduce cultural contradictions. Such efforts are endless and relat-
ive. With that in mind, reform is no longer an unacceptable course of
action, as long as the goals are understood to be intermediate ones.
But interventions must emerge which not only improve the situation in
the short run but nurture the forces for a more dynamic cultural trans-
formation over time. Such strategies must be both patient and purpose-
ful .
The Past as Future
Any new strategies for change must evolve from a deep respect for
situational context, timing, and a sense of history. The last item is
especially noteworthy. Advocates for change need to be mindful of the
ideas and actions which have preceded them. Though the final aims may
be to subvert the monopoly power of higher education, or to transform
the economic structure of contemporary capitalism, tactics ought to ex-
tend from the lessons of the past. This means understanding that there
was and is an old educational reform agenda which can and does serve as
a rallying point for liberals and radicals. Moreover, this is an agenda
which both groups know is unfinished.
Within higher education, the 1960'5 agenda centered primarily on
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C]U6Stions of dccGSS, powGr, dnd vqIugs. It dskod: Who gGts crGdGnt-
ialed (which social classes receive access to which educational re-
sources)? Who makes decisions and allocates valued resources (which
persons and groups have power over the institution's activities)? What
ideology is held in high esteem (which ideas, values and actions are
justified by the dominant culture and its credentialing system)?
There is nothing drastically wrong with this old agenda. For ex-
ample, in a society where degrees and diplomas are perceived by a sig-
nificant proportion of the population as being crucial to one's poten-
tial employment opportunities, then who achieves access is a paramount
concern. When an educational system credentials mostly those who can
afford it, or only those who meet certain cognitive standards, or just
those who are able to spend extensive periods of time at particular lo-
cations, then that system can be said to serve particular classes of
learners. Under such circumstances, many of America's poor, minority,
and socially disadvantaged can lose out on a de facto requirement for
economic parity. Yes, access must remain a constant issue.
The question of power is less clear, particularly if one focuses
almost entirely on the governance process. To fight solely for either
new power arrangements or seats on specific decisional councils (boards
of trustees or executive committees) may be an energy-draining venture.
Instead, a crucial power contest, in the decades ahead, must revolve
around the influence and interpretation of cognitive rationality itself.
Robert Pirsig recently stated it most succinctly:
.
.the true system, the real system, is our present construc-
tion of systematic thought itself, rationality itself, and if
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rationality which produced i1
another fa^tory^^
>^ationality will simply produce
This view requires change advocates to concern themselves less with
the symbols of power and more with its ideological sources. If the
monopoly power of credential ing is going to be wrestled away from edu-
cational institutions,^ then new confrontations will have to be made
with the keepers of the gate-the professionals, the disciplines, and
the knowledge they create, define and defend. In particular, internal
institutional struggles ought not be directed entirely at the theatre of
governance. Rather, the power of cultural and academic ideology needs
to be examined, discussed, and debunked whenever and wherever possible.
All too often, however, the typical end-run strategy is to continue
initiating programs which have the potential to subvert the established
academic order--external degree options, university without walls, indi-
vidualized education and credit for prior learning. These programs deal
with ideology and power indirectly. The end-run approaches do erode the
power of academic mythology--conventional beliefs which support faculty/
disciplinary omnipotence and stress the obvious supremacy of classroom-
confined learning. But these are still limited options. As programs
they avoid the real challenge, they do not alter the value system in any
measurable sense.
^Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New
York: Bantam Books, 1975)
,
p. 94.
^By monopoly power, we mean faculty control over the transmission
of knowledge and skills.
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In order for that to happen, more political interventions must oc-
cur. Within the university there can and should revolve around a funda-
mental discussion on pedagogical concerns: how learning takes place and
what one should know as a result of some collegiate learning experience.
For it is through pedagogy that the dominant beliefs about knowledge and
human nature are mixed into academic practices.
To a large extent, this is (or should be) part of a cyclical de-
O
bate. For over half a century, academicians have been engaged in a
haphazard exchange around pedagogic principles. Today, traditionalists
are calling for some rebirth in general education--some determination of
a unity of knowledge or discovery of a basic, core curriculum which
every student should experience somehow. On the other hand, reformers
and educational radicals remain derailed. They do not seem to have any
clear, concise principles to counter with. In other words, they are un-
clear about their own ideology.
Nearly ten years ago, Warren Bryan Martin labeled this the essent-
ial ist-existentialist confrontation. In Martin's words, essential ists
"are concerned for that which goes beyond time and place--for that which
is permanent, uniform, rational and sure."^ The existentialists inter-
pret education in much more personal terms. They say, in a sense, that
whatever external truths are to be discovered must occur on an individ-
ual basis through self discovery.
®We discussed the earlier phase of this debate in Chapter One,
"Seeds for the Sixties: The Progressive Legacy."
^Warren Bryan Martin, Alternative to Irrelevance (Nashville, Ten-
nessee: Abington Press, 1968), p. 49.
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This is one key political battleground for the, decade ahead.
Whether the forces of academic retrenchment thoroughly reassert their
conventional definitions of knowledge and education will be largely de-
termined by how well present day change advocates understand, accept,
and defend existentialist pedagogic principles.
In summary, the old agenda (access, power, and ideology) continues
to be important. To this list, however, one must add a critical issue
which can link higher education more directly to the dominant culture.
From Pedagogy to Payrolls
If you recall, we stated earlier that transitionary strategists
must present issues which confront contradictions in the larger cultural
milieu. Why? Henry Levin, among others, argues that educational reform
can best occur as a byproduct of social change in the larger society.
He goes on to say that there are three ways in which the "structure, or-
ganization, and values" of the total system may be altered. These
are: (1) natural disasters (earthquakes); (2) external factors (oil
crises, wars, immigration, etc.); (3) internal contradictions (civil
rights, the Vietnam War, etc.).
Ted R. Gurr, in his massive work Why Men Rebel , made a similar
point. A central thesis in his cross cultural analysis suggested
that
people come to expect certain things from their society. Therefore,
when a major discrepancy exists between what i^ and what ou^^ to be.
^^Henry M. Levin, "Educational Reform and Social Change,"
Jou rn al
of Applied Behavioral Science , X, Ho. 3 (1974), p.
313.
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tension will surface in the form of dissatisfaction, alienation, and
even violenceJ^ The American system, for example, either knowingly or
unknowingly nurtures expectations about the quality of life which one
ought to experience within it. Generations have come to associate cert-
ain things with this good life: upward mobility, materialistic acquisi-
tions, and a sense of personal achievement. Slater, you remember, men-
tioned the importance of understanding these motivational roots inherent
in the larger system.
Another way of providing a fulcrum for viewing that issue is to
simply ask: Education for what? In a recent survey, based on 218,890
first year undergraduates, seventy-one percent said they thought college
attendance would help them get a better job.^^ These undergraduates ob-
viously see the university as a certification station--a stopping off
point before employment and upward mobility. For them the end of higher
education is simply: Work.
In this sense, educational reformers have ignored a central factor.
While they established living-learning centers and pass-fail options,
students were preparing to barter their lives away. The majority of the
student population either recognize, or blindly accept, the fact that
education is something one exploits to gain preferential treatment in
the employment market. At this early stage, whether work is meaningful
or not is far from an issue. Simply stated, the n\yth is that one just
^^Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1971 ) , pp. 22-58.
^^See The Ameri can Freshman : National Norms for Fall 1 976 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1977)7”
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needs a degree to get a job and that part of the rnyth is increasingly
true.
There is nothing new to this discussion. It has long been recog-
nized that America's educational institutions have become diploma mills
for "cognitive vocational ism. "13 Despite the rhetoric of liberal arts
champions, career and vocational education rule today's colleges and
universities. One need only follow the migration of students to the
disciplines and majors with projected employment payoffs or job oppor-
tunities to know this.
In practice, if not in theory, higher education functions on social
efficiency assumptions. 1^ Its role now is principally to adapt students
to the priorities and values of the corporate structure.
According to the current interpreter of this position, Willard
Wirtz (former United States Secretary of Labor), education's main goal
is to match preparation with employment opportunities. Wirtz and his
colleagues at the National Manpower Institute see education in the serv-
ice of the corporate establishment. For them, education is the cultural
mechanism for fitting student aspirations and abilities to the need for
economic progress. Of course, all this is veiled in the ideological
language of rational planning, material prosperity, and greater economic
I^Edgar Litt, The Public Vocational University (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1969)
.
I^See Arthur G. Wirth's "The Philosophical Split" in Dyckman W.
Vermilve (Editor), Relating Work and Education (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1977). Wirth documents that since the turn of the
century American educators have been moving more and more towards social
efficiency justifications for education.
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efficiency.
In the meantime, students seek to acquire the skills and personal
style necessary to appear competitive (employment wise). Why? Because
one must be ablo to see one's self as 'labor' in order to secure the
necessary resources required to fulfill other needs— food, shelter,
transportation, leisure, marriage, and so on. The contradiction begins
once the degree is granted. First one must go through the often de-
grading experience of peddling--finding, getting and keeping a job (in
some cases, any job). Then the reality of work sets in. Most entry
level positions are at or near the bottom of the organization. People
learn quickly that the new employment system nurtures specialization,
status differences, hierarchy, passivity, repetitive activities, and
alienation. Nowhere in all this do you find educational change agents
questioning to any significant degree the meaning or quality of work
that the student is likely to find upon graduation. For all the popular
strategies for change are divorced from the realities of economic life.
As we have stated elsewhere, the major objective has been to alter the
internal processes and structure of higher education, not confront the
contradictions of work under advanced capitalist conditions. What the
student has to go through in his/her search for a livelihood and a sense
of personal identity is really immaterial in this situation.
But, work becomes important to any discussion about social change
because it is one of the basic institutions in life. As a recent HEW
Report acknowledges, work "plays a pervasive and powerful role in psy-
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chological, social, and economic aspects of our lives. It becomes
crucial to the transitionary strategist for other reasons as well: (a)
work demonstrates the inter-relatedness in our lives; (b) work is an is-
sue that touches everyone; (c) work provides a logical focus for examin-
ing and exposing the full scale failures of the economic system.
Choice Points
Recent reports^ ^ on the nature and quality of work in America have
shown: (1) that more people are being credential ed than there are ade-
quate and available employment opportunities; (2) that increasing num-
bers of people are now educated beyond the challenges of their work; (3)
that the hierarchical and specialized nature of work limits people's
ability to feel fulfilled by their work; (4) that a majority of workers
are dissatisfied with their work; (5) that a majority of workers desire
more control over their employment- environment.
The question(s) of how and in what ways our society chooses to re-
spond to these facts provides a major social change agenda for the
decades ahead. The choice points which will have to be faced impact not
only on the nature of our economic system but also on how we form organ-
^^James O'Toole, et al . Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1973), p. 2.
^^Study after study has recently documented the general popula-
tion's dissatisfaction with work. See, for example, the comprehensive
report published by a special task force to the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare entitled Work in America . Or read the critical
research of Michael Maccoby and Katherine Terz, "Character and Work in
America," in Brenner, et al.. Exploring Contradictions (New York: David
McKay and Company, 1974).
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izations and make decisions about products and services. For to deal
with work is to struggle in very fundamental ways with the very vision
of what constitutes a good society, and also which values are to domin-
ate its just and fair operation.
If we are to establish a society dedicated to humanistic princi-
ples, the vision must deal with economics, social organization, deci-
sion-making, and ideology. Marcus Raskin, as an illustration, captured
the parameters of the vision when he said:
People must find those social forms and develop social insti-
tutions which link freedom, liberty and self-sufficiency to
the practice of sharing, empathy and cooperation.
Implicit in such a vision is a different definition of human nature, a
new ideology, and the establishment of more participatory power rela-
tions. At its core must be the goal of redefining and controlling the
institutions which influence the lives of an entire citizenry. In par-
ticular, any new vision must confront the nature and quality of work in
America and the economic and political system that sustains those ar-
rangements .
There are several paths one might embark upon with regards to all
this. Most transitionary strategists, however, believe that to truly
eradicate the powerlessness which permeates our lives a long range goal
must be set that calls for the establishment of economic democracy in
this society. Economic democracy has been defined as "the right of
every person to have cooperative and democractic control over the condi-
^^Raskin, in Brenner, et al.. Exploring Contradictions, p. 19.
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tions of his or her work, the product of work, and the income and pro-
fits from work."^® The term, of course, is utilized here (and by its
supporters) as a more palatable phrase for socialism or workers' capi-
talism. Still, in its present usage, economic democracy does not neces-
sarily mean increased public ownership of the means of production on a
centralized state planning model, as in Russia or China. What is being
advocated now in the United States is a more organic and evolutionary
expansion of worker control at the local community or plant/work setting
level. According to Maccoby and Herrick, this means reconstructing
the work place along four dimensions: (1) securi ty--developing programs
which deal with health and safety, guaranteed work and income, pensions
and job attrition; (2) equity--establishing fair pay differentials, pro-
fit sharing, fair promotions and job assignments; (3) individualization
--dealing with work related boredom, promoting craftsmanship, ongoing
educational opportunities to develop skills and abilities, and respect-
ing the needs and interests of individuals; (4) adopting varieties of
participatory management, autonomous work groups, self management which
foster democracy in the work place and insure the rights of free speech
and assembly. 20 This is the substance of an economic democracy
^®David Olsen, "The New School for Democratic Management," in The
New Harbinger, Volume IV, No. 2 (May, 1977), p. 33.
^^There are exceptions to this. For two conflicting examples, see
Peter Clecak's "The Future of Socialism" in Radical Paradoxes
--Dilemmas
of the American Left: 1945-1970
pp. 273-299
in The New Socialist
300.
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974)
,"
and MTchael P. Lerner's "Socialism: The Only Alternative"
Revolution (New York: Delta Books, 1973), pp. 287-
20Michael Maccoby and Neal Q. Herrick, "Socio-Psychological
Princi
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strategy. 21
We know that the major social experiments which have been accom-
plished along these lines have occurred largely in pre-industrialized
settings. To some extent, that is v/hy the Americanization of this vi-
sion is likely to be unique. Not only must this experiment be conducted
under conditions of advanced capitalism, but the cultural and political
heritage of this country will direct the outcomes.
Granted, the task itself is extremely complex. One could brush
that aside by simply saying economic democracy is a long range goal and
thus cannot be achieved overnight. That response, of course, takes us
nowhere. Naturally, such ideas (economic democracy, socialism, etc.) go
directly against the power of mainstream beliefs, economic justifica-
tions, and corporate self-interests. These factors notwithstanding,
economic democracy also suggests major implications for the present cor-
porate legal structures, trade unionism and collective bargaining, the
concepts of private ownership and property rights, and the nature of
profit allocation. . .just to name a few.
Under these circumstances, the questions then become: Is economic
democracy merely another adventure in tilting at windmills? Or, on the
practical side, who will activate such visions? And, more importantly.
ciples for Reconstructing the Work Place," in Drenner, et al . , Exploring
Contradi ctions
, p. 163.
21 It should also be reported that most supporters of this approach
are not calling for one party dictatorship, the establishment of a rul-
ing eTTte, or excessive central planning on the part of the federal
government. Nor are the more realistic transitionary strategists pre-
dicting the demise of capitalism in the near future.
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what role does higher education play in all this?
To Each His/Her Own
The creation of an alternative economic system assumes: (1) that
there are certain basic ideas which will serve as a foundation for such
actions; (2) that a political movement can be established which supports
these ideas; (3) that a system of institutions will emerge which puts
the theory into practice at a local level.
The basic ideas underlying the proposed economic vision are demo-
cratic and humanistic in nature. Arthur G. Wirth has stated: "Funda-
mentally, what is at issue is the relation of democratic values to our
economic system. The issue, simply stated, is whether people will be
treated (by their economic system) as ends rather than means.
The goal now is to create a system or set of institutions which
will value the uniqueness of each human being and continue to seek ways
to promote their holistic welfare, in terms of combining both personal
development with the integration of quality work. This means that work
must involve more than the creation of jobs which lead to materialistic
fulfillment. It presupposes that each of us desires to work in ways
which are personally fulfilling and also which we have some role in de-
fining. Again, in Uirth's words, the goal is to relate work "to the
human quest for potency in which the person may explore his potential,
test his limits, be in touch with his powers, and discover his human
22wirth, "The Philosophical Split," p. 12.
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dignity and worth.
Who will activate this vision? Eventually, coalitions must be de-
veloped which are comprised of a cross-section of individuals—students,
minorities, feminists, faculty members, workers and community members
who see a need for such a movement. But before they surface, persons
with ties to these sectors must begin to act as catalysts, to raise is-
sues about the nature of work, the need for economic democracy, and edu-
cation's role with regards to all this.
The last item implies that there is some role for higher education.
First, let us assume that higher or post-secondary education, as it is
presently organized, will have little to do with what we are discussing
now. That is to say insti tutions--be they public, private, or community
colleges--wi 11 not jump into this fracas. If anything, these entities
(because they are part of the corporate structure and a subindustry
themselves) will continue to oppose such talk. There is some evidence
that higher education is more likely to construct programs which portray
the merits of capitalism. Witness the development of Institutes on
Constructive Capitalism at the University of Texas and elsewhere.
The role higher education can assume is one of providing a setting
for personal and collective action. The contribution these places will
make is largely as a shelter for discussion, reflection and organizing.
For there are persons within these settings (faculty members, students,
administrators, and others) who can and will contribute their energy to
this struggle. And one can further assume that the actual strategies
23ibid, p. 13.
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and tactics which they decide upon will evolve from their own experi-
ences and interests. That is to say that the nature of the actions are
not predictable.
Nonetheless, some strategies and actions need to be tied to efforts
which prepare people to deal with the issues implied by the vision of
economic democracy. The basic guidelines for this should be: (1) that
these efforts help people understand and analyze the critical issues;
(2) that the process by which this is accomplished facilitate the de-
velopment of democratic leadership skills; (3) that it also encourages
people to act on their ideas in ways which will add to their sense of
personal and collective power.
The level of actions may range from the introduction of work-re-
lated topics into the structure of an existing course to the development
of educational training programs for workers in participatory and co-
operative management. One could also argue that university-affiliated
advocates should use the current backdrop on vocationalism and "career
education" to engage in a wide range of consciousness-raising activities.
Two critical responses to this would be: (1) to establish labor educa-
tion projects (programs and curriculum) that raise consciousness about
the sources of job alienation; (2) the negotiation of pilot projects in
economic democracy with workers and various types of work settings.
The final issue confronts the present realities: is the cultural
climate right for such reasoning? Within the university and society,
there have been budget squeezes, dismissals, and general unemployment.
Such events normally are seen as weeding out the opportunity and demand
for reform. There are also increased signs of neo-conservatism in the
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general population.
Despite these developments, there are countersigns which give some
indication of the possibil ities .24 Federal and foundation funding for
work related issues are at an all time high.^^ More experiments with
worker control are underway than ever before. As just one example,
the Department of Labor has recently initiated a project with six com-
munity colleges to establish local education-work councils. Though
there is no assurance what these groups will actually deal with, it is
conceivable that at least one of these may attempt some experiment in
worker control
.
The question of whether the time is right or not can only be an-
swered in personal terms. Some people will see all this as senseless
rhetoric. Others will respond as best they can. Those who choose to
act will begin wherever they are because this struggle can be fought
anywhere. In this sense, it is individuals who must choose to act or
not.
The real priority is that we cease to continue personalizing the
failures of the sixties. We have had our time of retreat and reflec-
tion. Both Toynbee and Confucius have discussed the benefits of such
withdrawals and returns--meaning departure from action allows one to
24oison, "The New School for Democratic Management," pp. 32-39.
^^The Ford Foundation has recently given nearly a million dollars
in support of "Research, training, publications, and demonstration
pro
jects relating to the structure of jobs and to forms of worker parti ci
pation in decision-making," Curr^ Intere^ Foundatjioii,
1976 and 1977 (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1976), p. 7.
2^0
'Toole, Work in America, pp. 188-201.
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meditate and be renewed. Now the time is upon us to go back, to pick up
the lost dreams. For we should be wiser now: we recognize our own
frailties. More importantly, we now know at least some of what we are
up against.
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